Explaining Imagination

Cover
Explaining Imagination
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface
1 Explaining Imagination
	1.1 Introduction
	1.2 What It Is to Imagine
	1.3 Cats and Bats
	1.4 Imagistic Imagining and Attitude Imagining
	1.5 The Relation of I-imagining to A-imagining
	1.6 Explaining in What Sense?
	1.7 What We Do When We Imagine
	1.8 Simple and Complex Attitudes
	1.9 What Do I Mean by “More Basic”?
	1.10 The Delicious Mud Pie
		1.10.1 Imagination and Action
		1.10.2 Imagination and the Will
		1.10.3 Imagining What We Disbelieve
		1.10.4 Imagination and Emotion
	1.11 Introspection and Mental Imagery
	1.12 More Case Studies as Prelude
		1.12.1 Daydreaming: Imagining that I Am Rich and Famous
		1.12.2 Pretense—a Sketch of Chapters 7 and 8
		1.12.3 Conditional Reasoning—a Sketch of Chapters 5 and 6
		1.12.4 Consuming Fiction: The Barest Sketch
	1.13 Summary
2 Folk Psychology and Its Ontology
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 Folk Psychological Ontologies—a Brief History
	2.3 Heavy-Duty Ontology
	2.4 Light-Duty Ontology
	2.5 Heavy-Duty Incredulity about Light-Duty Dispositionalism, and Principled Agnosticism
	2.6 Explaining Imagination for Light-Duty Theorists
		2.6.1 Objections to this Form of Explanation, from a Light-Duty Perspective
	2.7 Explaining Imagination for Heavy-Duty Theorists
	2.8 Summary
3 Imagistic Imagining Part I: Imagery, Attitude Imagining, and Recreative Imagining
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 Imagistic Imaginings and the Nature of Mental Imagery
		3.2.1 Defining ‘Mental Imagery’
	3.3 Attitude Imaginings—Keeping the Definition Neutral
	3.4 The Relationship between A- and I-imagining
	3.5 A-imagining without I-imagining
	3.6 I-imagining without A-imagining
	3.7 Against Recreative Imagining
4 Imagistic Imagining Part II: Hybrid Structure, Multiple Attitudes, and Daydreams
	4.1 Introduction
	4.2 The Relation of Mental Images to I-imaginings
	4.3 The Multiple Use Thesis
	4.4 Judgment I-imaginings
	4.5 I-imaginings that are Desires, Decisions, and Intentions
	4.6 On the Relation of Desire to A-imagining More Generally
	4.7 Decision I-imaginings
	4.8 Imaginative I-imagining?
	4.9 Daydreams
	4.10 Hybrid Structures Are Not Problematic
	4.11 Recap
5 Conditional Reasoning Part I: Three Kinds of Conditionals and the Psychology of the Material Conditional
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 Modal Epistemology?
	5.3 Conditionals: Metaphysics and Psychology
	5.4 The Material Conditional and Its Relation to Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals
	5.5 The Material Conditional and Assumptions: Conditional Proof and Reductio ad Absurdum
	5.6 Psychology and Systems of Natural Deduction
	5.7 Conditional Proof and Reductio ad Absurdum Revisited
		5.7.1 Conditional Proof without Assumptions
		5.7.2 Reductio without Assumptions
	5.8 Mental Models?
	5.9 Summary
6 Conditional Reasoning Part II: Indicatives, Subjunctives, and the Ramsey Test
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 The Ramsey Test and Its Psychology
	6.3 From Belief Conditions to Truth Conditions
	6.4 A Difference for Subjunctives
	6.5 The Ramsey Test and the Psychology of Indicative Conditionals
	6.6 A General Argument Against the Need for Sui Generis Imaginative States in Conditional Reasoning
	6.7 It Is Simpler to Just Use Beliefs—Considering an Example from Williamson
	6.8 Mental Imagery and Conformations of the Brain?
	6.9 Two Objections Considered
		6.9.1 Would We Really Have to Copy So Much into Imagination?
		6.9.2 Thought Experiments—Hard Cases for Me?
	6.10 Recap
7 Pretense Part I: Metaphysics and Epistemology
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Psychology: Three Questions about the Relation of Pretense to Imagination
	7.3 The Metaphysical Question: What Is It to Pretend?
	7.4 What It Is to Pretend
	7.5 Answering the Epistemological Question
	7.6 Summary
8 Pretense Part II: Psychology
	8.1 Introduction
	8.2 The Question of Quarantining from a Light-Duty Perspective
	8.3 Quarantining: The Central Mistake
	8.4 Inner Speech as Imagining? A Digression
	8.5 Leslie’s Tea Party—a More Complex Pretense
	8.6 Conditional Reasoning during Pretense
	8.7 Inferential Disorderliness and the Outlandish Premise
	8.8 Cognitive Attention—Asking Ourselves Questions and Holding Propositions in Mind
	8.9 Freedom and Pterodactyls
	8.10 Autism and Pretense
	8.11 Conclusion
9 Consuming Fictions Part I: Recovering Fictional Truths
	9.1 Imagination and the Many Puzzles of Fiction: Plan for the Next Three Chapters
	9.2 Understanding a Fiction—the First Puzzle
	9.3 Imaginative Filling-in—the Second Puzzle
		9.3.1 Sidebar on Matravers
		9.3.2 Recovering Fictional Content through Counterfactual Reasoning
		9.3.3 Imagery and the Development of Indeterminate Fictional Truths
	9.4 Extracting Fictional Truths through Non-counterfactual Reasoning
	9.5 Constraints on Fiction-related Imaginings?
	9.6 Reconciliation with Intentionalism—the Third and Fourth Puzzles of Comprehension
	9.7 Summary
10 Consuming Fictions Part II: The Operator Claim
	10.1 Introduction
	10.2 The Operator Claim
	10.3 Mapping the Territory: Three Views
	10.4 To Which Fiction Do Your Desires Refer? Troubles for the Simple View
	10.5 Troubles with I-desires
	10.6 The Life-expectancy of Fiction-directed Desires
	10.7 Imagining that, in the Fiction, p, and the Problem of Thatcher’s Pearls
	10.8 The OC’s Implications
	10.9 Immersion in the Fiction as Such?
	10.10 Does Immersion Involve an Imaginative “Spectrum”?
	10.11 Being Upset at the Fiction Itself, or Its Events?
	10.12 Summary
11 Consuming Fictions Part III: Immersion, Emotion, and the Paradox of Fiction
	11.1 Introduction
	11.2 The Emotional Irrelevance of What We Merely Imagine
	11.3 The Paradox of Fiction
	11.4 Some Background on the Paradox
	11.5 Distinguishing the Metaphysical and Normative Puzzles
	11.6 Solving the Normative Puzzle: False Starts
	11.7 Believing It Is a Fiction and the Norms of Immersion
	11.8 But None of These Things Are Happening! Summary via Objection
	11.9 Back to the Triad
	11.10 Summary
12 Creativity
	12.1 Introduction
	12.2 Creativity and A-imagining
	12.3 The Easy versus the Hard Problems of Creativity
	12.4 The Build Challenge
	12.5 Losing the Scent—Recent Missteps in Linking (Sui Generis) Imaginings to Creativity
	12.6 Back to the Deep Waters
	12.7 Songwriters on Songwriting
	12.8 Creativity and the Subconscious
	12.9 Creativity and Associationism
	12.10 Generative Adversarial Networks
	12.11 The Importance of Being Earnest
	12.12 Character, Creativity, and Conscious Dreams
	12.13 Concluding Thoughts
References
Index