Experience and the World's Own Language: A Critique of John McDowell's Empiricism

Contents......Page 10
I.1. Minimal empiricism: introductory......Page 14
I.2. Minimal empiricism: some initial difficulties......Page 16
I.3. McDowell’s empiricism: overview and prospective......Page 20
I.4. The simple model of empirical content......Page 23
I.5. The ‘order of justification’......Page 25
I.6. From the complex to the simple model of empirical content......Page 28
II.1. Causation and the complex model of empirical content......Page 32
II.2. The threat of Anomalous Monism......Page 36
II.3. Causation in the space of reasons......Page 41
II.4. Nature and supernature......Page 50
II.5. Rampant and naturalized platonisms......Page 57
II.6. Realm-of-law causation and the Myth of the Given......Page 66
III.1. McDowell’s transcendental argument......Page 78
III.2. Judgement and freedom......Page 82
III.3. Knowledge and the opportunity to know......Page 90
III.4. Knowledge and infallibility......Page 92
III.5. Ayer on perceptual error......Page 102
III.6. Experience and self-consciousness......Page 106
III.7. The ‘highest common factor’ conception of experience......Page 108
III.8. McDowell’s individualism......Page 122
III.9. Externalism and the individual......Page 134
III.10. Externalism and the ‘order of justification’......Page 140
IV.1. Two species of mentality......Page 144
IV.2. Mentality and the transcendental argument......Page 146
IV.3. Objections to McDowell’s account......Page 150
IV.4. Conceptual consciousness and the Private Language Argument......Page 153
IV.5. ‘Not a something, but not a nothing either\'......Page 159
IV.6. Feeling pain and feeling a pain......Page 162
IV.7. Mentality and conceptual sophistication......Page 165
IV.8. Two species of mentality revisited......Page 167
IV.9. Mentality and propositional content......Page 172
V.1. The ailment: Kantian transcendental idealism......Page 179
V.2. Sense, reference, and concepts......Page 182
V.3. Propositions and states of affairs......Page 194
V.4. Concepts and nominalism......Page 197
V.5. Wittgenstein and ultra-realism......Page 201
V.6. Ultra-realism and universals......Page 206
VI.1. Combining objects and concepts at the level of reference......Page 212
VI.2. Locating propositions at the level of reference......Page 216
VI.3. The problem of falsity......Page 228
VI.4. Truth and intrinsicism......Page 233
VI.5. Der Mensch spricht nicht allein......Page 237
VI.6. Epilogue: the unity of the proposition......Page 244
References......Page 248
D......Page 260
I......Page 261
Q......Page 262
W......Page 263