Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy)

Book Cover......Page 1
Half-Title......Page 2
Title......Page 5
Dedication......Page 6
Copyright......Page 7
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 12
Acknowledgments......Page 15
Introduction......Page 17
PART ONE Sources of justification, knowledge, and truth......Page 27
CHAPTER 1 Perception......Page 28
The elements and basic kinds of perception......Page 30
Perceptual belief......Page 31
Perception, conception, and belief......Page 32
Seeing and believing......Page 34
Perception as a source of potential beliefs......Page 35
The perceptual hierarchy......Page 37
Seeing and seeing as......Page 38
Seeing as and perceptual grounds of justification......Page 39
Seeing as a ground of perceptual knowledge......Page 41
Perception as a causal relation and its four main elements......Page 43
Illusion and hallucination......Page 44
The theory of appearing......Page 45
The argument from hallucination......Page 46
Sense-datum theory as an indirect, representative realism......Page 48
Appraisal of the sense-datum approach......Page 49
Adverbial theories of perception......Page 52
Adverbial and sense-datum theories of sensory experience......Page 54
A sense-datum version of phenomenalism......Page 56
Adverbial phenomenalism......Page 57
Appraisal of phenomenalism......Page 59
Indirect seeing and delayed perception......Page 60
Vision and the eyes......Page 62
Notes......Page 64
CHAPTER 2 Memory......Page 69
Memory and the past......Page 70
The causal basis of memory beliefs......Page 72
Theories of memory......Page 73
The direct realist view......Page 74
The representative theory of memory......Page 76
The phenomenalist conception of memory......Page 77
The adverbial conception of memory......Page 78
Remembering, recalling, and imaging......Page 80
The epistemological centrality of memory......Page 82
Remembering, knowing, and being justified......Page 83
Memory as a preservative and generative source......Page 84
Notes......Page 86
CHAPTER 3 Consciousness......Page 88
Two basic kinds of mental properties......Page 89
Introspection and inward vision......Page 91
Realism about the objects of introspection......Page 92
An adverbial view of introspected objects......Page 93
The analogy between introspection and ordinary perception......Page 94
Introspective beliefs, beliefs about introspectables, and fallibility......Page 95
Infallibility, omniscience, and privileged access......Page 96
Difficulties for the thesis of privileged access......Page 98
The possibility of scientific grounds for rejecting privileged access......Page 99
The range of introspective knowledge and justification......Page 101
Consciousness as a basic source......Page 103
Notes......Page 105
CHAPTER 4 Reason......Page 107
Self-evident truths of reason......Page 108
The classical view of the truths of reason......Page 110
Necessary propositions......Page 111
The analytic, the a priori, and the synthetic......Page 112
The empirical......Page 116
Analytic truth, concept acquisition, and necessity......Page 117
Rationalism and empiricism......Page 118
Empiricism and the genesis and confirmation of arithmetic beliefs......Page 119
Empiricism and logical and analytic truths......Page 122
The conventionalist view of the truths of reason......Page 123
Knowledge through definitions versus truth by definition......Page 124
Conventions as grounds for interpretation......Page 126
Meaning change and falsification......Page 127
The possibility of empirical necessary truth......Page 129
Reason, experience, and a priori justification......Page 131
Loose and strict senses of ‘a priori justification’ and ‘a priori knowledge’......Page 133
The power of reason and the possibility of indefeasible justification......Page 135
Notes......Page 138
CHAPTER 5 Testimony......Page 144
Formal and informal testimony......Page 145
The inferentialist view of testimony......Page 146
The direct source view of testimony......Page 148
Knowledge and justification as products of testimony......Page 150
The epistemic dependence of testimony......Page 153
Conceptual versus propositional learning......Page 155
Testimony as a primeval source of knowledge and justification......Page 157
Non-testimonial support for testimonially grounded beliefs......Page 158
Notes......Page 161
PART TWO The structure and growth of justification and knowledge......Page 164
CHAPTER 6 Inference and the extension of knowledge......Page 165
The process, content, and structure of inference......Page 166
Two senses of ‘inference’......Page 167
Reasoned belief and belief for a reason......Page 168
The basing relation: direct and indirect belief......Page 169
Confirmatory versus generative inferences......Page 171
Inference as a dependent source of justification and knowledge......Page 172
Inference as an extender of justification and knowledge......Page 173
Deductive and inductive inference......Page 174
The inferential transmission of justification and knowledge......Page 176
Inductive transmission......Page 177
Some inferential transmission principles......Page 180
Deductive transmission of justification and knowledge......Page 182
Memorial preservation of inferential justification and inferential knowledge......Page 185
Notes......Page 187
CHAPTER 7 The architecture of knowledge......Page 190
Infinite inferential chains......Page 192
Circular inferential chains......Page 193
The epistemic regress problem......Page 195
Infinite epistemic chains......Page 196
Circular epistemic chains......Page 197
Epistemic chains terminating in belief not constituting knowledge......Page 198
Epistemic chains terminating in knowledge......Page 199
The epistemic regress argument......Page 200
Foundationalism and coherentism......Page 201
Holistic coherentism......Page 202
A coherentist response to the regress argument......Page 203
Coherence and explanation......Page 205
Coherence as an internal relation among cognitions......Page 206
Coherence, reason, and experience......Page 208
Coherence and the a priori......Page 209
Coherence and the mutually explanatory......Page 210
Epistemological versus conceptual coherentism......Page 211
Coherence, incoherence, and defeasibility......Page 212
Positive and negative epistemic dependence......Page 213
The process versus the property of justification......Page 214
Beliefs, dispositions to believe, and grounds of belief......Page 215
Justification, knowledge, and artificially created coherence......Page 216
The role of coherence in moderate foundationalism......Page 217
Moderate foundationalism and the charge of dogmatism......Page 218
Notes......Page 221
PART THREE The nature and scope of justification and knowledge......Page 224
CHAPTER 8 The analysis of knowledge......Page 225
Knowledge and justified true belief......Page 226
Knowledge as the right kind of justified true belief......Page 228
Dependence on falsehood as a defeater of justification......Page 229
Knowledge and certainty......Page 230
Knowing and knowing for certain......Page 231
Knowing and making certain......Page 232
Knowledge as appropriately caused true belief......Page 233
Knowledge as reliably grounded true belief......Page 235
Problems for reliability theories......Page 236
The specification problem......Page 237
Reliability and defeat......Page 239
Reliability, relevant alternatives, and luck......Page 240
The apparent possibility of clairvoyant knowledge......Page 241
Natural knowledge......Page 242
Internalism and externalism......Page 243
Some varieties of internalism and externalism......Page 245
Internalist and externalist versions of virtue epistemology......Page 247
The internality of justification and the externality of knowledge......Page 249
Justification and truth......Page 250
The correspondence theory of truth......Page 251
The coherence theory of truth......Page 252
The pragmatic theory of truth......Page 254
Concluding proposals......Page 255
Notes......Page 256
CHAPTER 9 Scientific, moral, and religious knowledge......Page 261
The focus and grounding of scientific knowledge......Page 262
Scientific imagination and inference to the best explanation......Page 264
The role of deduction in scientific practice......Page 265
Fallibilism and approximation in science......Page 266
Scientific knowledge and social epistemology......Page 268
Social knowledge and the idea of a scientific community......Page 269
Relativism and noncognitivism......Page 271
Preliminary appraisal of relativist and noncognitivist views......Page 274
Ethical intuitionism......Page 276
Kantian rationalism in moral epistemology......Page 277
Utilitarian empiricism in moral epistemology......Page 278
Kantianism and utilitarianism compared......Page 279
Religious knowledge......Page 281
Evidentialism versus experientialism......Page 282
The perceptual analogy and the possibility of direct theistic knowledge......Page 283
Problems confronting the experientialist approach......Page 285
Justification and rationality, faith and reason......Page 287
Acceptance, presumption, and faith......Page 288
Notes......Page 289
CHAPTER 10 Skepticism......Page 292
Perfectly realistic hallucination......Page 293
Two competing epistemic ideals: believing truth and avoiding falsehood......Page 294
Some dimensions and varieties of skepticism......Page 296
Skepticism about direct knowledge and justification......Page 297
Inferential knowledge and justification: the problem of induction......Page 298
The problem of other minds......Page 299
The egocentric predicament......Page 302
Three kinds of epistemic infallibility......Page 303
Knowledge and fallibility......Page 304
Uncertainty......Page 306
Knowing, knowing for certain, and telling for certain......Page 307
Entailment as a requirement for inferential justification......Page 308
Knowing and showing......Page 310
Deducibility, evidential transmission, and induction......Page 311
Epistemic and logical possibility......Page 312
Entailment, certainty, and fallibility......Page 313
Epistemic authority and cogent grounds......Page 314
Grounds of knowledge as conferring epistemic authority......Page 316
Refutation and rebuttal......Page 317
A case for justified belief......Page 319
The regress of demonstration......Page 321
A case for knowledge......Page 322
A circularity problem......Page 323
Skepticism and common sense......Page 324
Notes......Page 325
Conclusion......Page 329
Short annotated bibliography of books in epistemology......Page 338
Index......Page 345