Efficiency, Equality and Public Policy: With a Case for Higher Public Spending

Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 8
Preface......Page 11
1.2 A partial resurrection of the old \'new welfare economics\'?......Page 12
1.3 Introductory summary......Page 13
1.4 A case for higher public spending......Page 15
1.5 The misguided consensus......Page 16
1.6 Three basic problems of social choice/public policy......Page 18
1.8 A methodological note......Page 20
1.9 What this book is not about......Page 21
Part I: The Foundation of Public Economic Policy......Page 24
2.1 An intuitive explanation using a parent\'s choice......Page 26
2.2 Economists\' misplaced hostility against cardinal utility......Page 28
2.3 The impossibility of social choice based on ordinal utilities......Page 32
3.1 The Sen–Ng debate on welfarism: an appraisal......Page 35
3.2 Another argument for welfarism......Page 41
3.3 Rational individualism implies welfarism......Page 43
4 Utility, Informed Preference, or Happiness......Page 47
4.1 Non-affective altruism: the pure concern for the welfare of others......Page 48
4.2 Irrational preferences......Page 56
4.3 Autonomous desires......Page 63
4.4 Why is happiness fundamental?......Page 65
5.1 Compelling arguments for utilitarianism......Page 68
5.2 Rational individualistic egalitarianism implies utilitarianism......Page 73
5.3 A defence of Harsanyi against some recent criticisms......Page 77
5.4 A defence of using just perceptible increments......Page 83
5.5 Utilitarianism and process fairness......Page 87
6.1 The paradox of interpersonal cardinal utility......Page 93
6.2 The proposed solution......Page 94
6.3 Economists should be in favour of reversed weighting!......Page 101
6.4 Some qualifications......Page 103
6.5 Concluding remarks......Page 108
7 Economics versus Politics......Page 110
Part II: How Much Should the Government Spend?......Page 114
8.1 Some simple theories of government spending......Page 116
8.2 Inefficiency in public spending may increase its optimal level......Page 119
8.4 Diamond effects and burden-free taxes......Page 122
8.5 Relative-income effects bias against public expenditure......Page 124
8.6 The unimportance of absolute income......Page 126
8.7 Welfare-improving public expenditures......Page 130
8.8 Concluding remarks......Page 131
9.1 The conventional view......Page 135
9.2 Kaplow\'s argument and the principle of \'a dollar is a dollar\'......Page 137
9.3 Reconciling Kaplow and Feldstein......Page 141
9.4 Concluding remarks......Page 145
10 Concluding Remarks......Page 146
A2. Direct access to intense pleasure......Page 148
A4. Safe and long-lasting pleasure......Page 149
B1. Why is happiness the only ultimate consideration?......Page 152
B3. The libertarians......Page 154
B4. Rawls......Page 155
B5. Pure and welfare egalitarianism......Page 156
B6. Sen and capability egalitarianism......Page 159
B7. Concluding remark......Page 161
Appendix C: Economic Growth Increases the Optimal Share of the Public Sector......Page 162
D1. The Pareto principle......Page 169
D2. When the weak Pareto principle is unaccceptable......Page 170
D3. The case of affective altruism......Page 172
D4. Should voters be asked to suppress their non-affective altruism?......Page 173
Appendix E: The Bergson–Samuelson Tradition Implies Individualism, Independence, and Ordinalism......Page 174
Appendix F: Inefficiency in Provision May Increase Optimal Public Spending......Page 175
Notes......Page 176
References......Page 180
F......Page 195
M......Page 196
W......Page 197
Z......Page 198
O......Page 199
Z......Page 200