Economic Openness and Territorial Politics in China

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Tables......Page 11
Figures......Page 13
Acknowledgments......Page 15
Abbreviations......Page 21
1.1 Introduction......Page 23
1.2.1 Terminology and Scope......Page 27
1.2.2 Economic Globalization and Central Political Control......Page 29
1.2.3 Political Control, Fiscal Extraction, and Economic Growth......Page 33
1.3.1 A Subnational Research Design......Page 34
1.3.2 Data and Possible Endogeneity......Page 35
1.4 Broader Implications......Page 37
1.5 Précis......Page 39
2.1 Introduction......Page 42
2.2.1 Economic Openness and National Political Decline......Page 43
2.2.2 A Quasireplication......Page 47
2.3.1 Actors, Incentives, and Institutions......Page 49
2.3.2 Centralized Political Parties......Page 55
2.3.3 Central Political Control at the Subnational Level......Page 60
2.3.4 Consequences......Page 64
2.4 Conclusion......Page 68
Appendix: Cross-National Data......Page 69
3.1 Introduction......Page 71
3.2.1 China’s Embrace of the Global Markets......Page 72
3.2.2 National Policy Impetus......Page 75
3.2.3 Foreign Trade Liberalization and Decentralization......Page 76
3.3.1 Preferential Policies......Page 79
3.3.2 Explaining the Regional Tilt......Page 84
3.4 Regional Disparity and Discontent......Page 87
3.4.1 Provincial Variation in Economic Openness......Page 88
3.4.2 Winners and Losers......Page 92
3.4.3 Centrifugal Tendencies......Page 94
3.5.1 Putative Central Fiscal Decline......Page 98
3.5.2 Assessing Central Fiscal Capacity......Page 102
3.5.3 Central Fiscal Redistribution......Page 106
3.6 Conclusion......Page 114
Appendix: Chinese Economic Data......Page 115
A3.1 Year Coverage and Sources......Page 116
A3.2 Coding of Economic Variables......Page 120
4.1 Introduction......Page 122
4.2.1 Party Primacy Under Single-Party Rule......Page 124
4.2.2 Political Predominance by the Center......Page 128
4.2.3 Central Nomenklatura Powers......Page 132
4.3.1 Provincial Policy Compliance and Provincial Leaders......Page 135
4.3.2 Role of Provincial Party Secretaries......Page 139
4.4.1 New Appointments......Page 142
4.4.2 Native Sons......Page 144
4.4.3 Bureaucratic Integration......Page 145
4.4.4 National Trends and Regional Patterns......Page 151
4.5 Conclusion......Page 158
A4.2 Provincial Party Secretaries in the Dataset......Page 160
A4.3 Issues of “Separately Listed Cities”......Page 162
5.1 Introduction......Page 165
5.2.1 Data and Hypothesis......Page 167
5.2.2 Model Specifications and Estimation Issues......Page 172
5.2.3 Findings......Page 177
5.3.1 Reverse Causality......Page 185
5.3.2 Determinants of Provincial Preferential Policies......Page 188
5.3.2.1 Cross-sectional Analysis......Page 189
5.3.2.2 Time-Series Cross-section Analysis......Page 193
5.4 Conclusion......Page 196
A5.1 New Appointments and Native Sons......Page 197
A5.2 The Role of “Separately Listed Cities”......Page 202
6.1 Introduction......Page 203
6.2.1 Role of Provincial Governments in Central Fiscal Extraction......Page 205
6.2.2 Trends at the National Level......Page 207
6.2.3 Provincial-level Evidence......Page 211
6.3.1 Credible Commitment and Market-Preserving Federalism......Page 217
6.3.2 Hypotheses......Page 221
6.4.1 Model Specifications and Estimation Issues......Page 224
6.4.2 Results......Page 227
6.4.3 Summary and Discussion......Page 232
6.5 Conclusion......Page 237
Appendix: Accounting for “Separately Listed Cities”......Page 239
7.1 Introduction......Page 243
7.2.1 Economic Globalization and Centralized Political Parties......Page 244
7.2.1.1 Vietnam......Page 245
7.2.1.2 The Former Soviet Union......Page 251
7.2.2 Political Decentralization......Page 255
7.3.1 Economic Transition......Page 257
7.3.2 Political Transition......Page 260
7.4 Conclusion......Page 265
References......Page 267
Index......Page 293