Economic Elites, Political Parties and the Electoral Arena: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in Comparative Perspective (Latin American Political Economy)

Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Tables
1 Introduction
	1.1 Economic elites and political power
	1.2 The Puzzle
	1.3 The Argument
	1.4 The Method
	References
2 An Explanation of Three Types of Links between Economic Elites and Parties
	2.1 The Cohesion of Economic Elites
	2.2 Mobilization of Popular Sectors
	2.3 Causal Factors in Historical Junctures
		2.3.1 The Independence Juncture
		2.3.2 The First Democratization Juncture
	References
3 Chile: Economic Elites with Their Own Parties
	3.1 The Colonial Roots of Elite Cohesion
	3.2 The Independence Juncture: Cohesive Elites and Popular Demobilization
	3.3 A Long and Stable Oligarchic Order
	3.4 Gradual Democratization: Cohesion Above and Demobilization Below
	3.5 The Functional Stability of Elite Forms of Political Involvement
	References
4 Argentina: Economic Elites Outside the Party System
	4.1 Late Colonization and Territorial Fragmentation
	4.2 The War of Independence: Fragmentation from Above, Mobilization from Below
	4.3 The Long Road to Short-Lived Stability
	4.4 Divided Elites, Popular Mobilization and Accelerated Democratization
	4.5 Economic Elites and the Strategy of Politics Without Parties
	References
5 Uruguay: Economic Elites Within Polyclass Parties
	5.1 Colonial Roots of Elite Weakness
	5.2 The Independence Process: Popular Mobilization and Volatile Elites
	5.3 Economic Elites and the Birth of a Stable Party System
	5.4 The Period of Incorporation, Democracy, and Social Reformism
	5.5 Economic Elites, Polyclass Parties, and Democracy
	References
6 Conclusions
	References
References
Index