Econometrica 2010 Vol.78 No.2

Introduction......Page 3
Firms and States......Page 7
Organizational Forgetting......Page 8
Demand......Page 9
Bellman Equation......Page 10
Equilibrium......Page 11
Baseline Parameterization......Page 12
Homotopy Algorithm......Page 14
Pakes and McGuire (2004) Algorithm......Page 17
Equilibrium Correspondence......Page 20
Types of Equilibria......Page 24
Sunspots......Page 25
Industry Dynamics......Page 26
Price Bounds......Page 31
Wells......Page 35
Part 1. Trench Sustains Leadership......Page 36
Part 3. Value Induces Trench......Page 37
Sideways Trenches......Page 38
Dominance Properties......Page 39
Summary......Page 40
Organizational Forgetting and Multiple Equilibria......Page 42
Robustness Checks......Page 44
Outside Good......Page 45
Learning-by-Doing......Page 46
Conclusions......Page 47
Appendix......Page 48
References......Page 55
Author\'s Addresses......Page 58
Introduction......Page 59
The Model Environment......Page 62
Learning From Search......Page 65
A Worker\'s Value Function......Page 66
Free Entry of Firms and the Equilibrium Definition......Page 68
Existence of an Equilibrium......Page 70
Monotonicity of Workers\' Desired Wages......Page 71
Further Characterization of Equilibrium Paths......Page 75
Steady State Distributions and Worker Flows......Page 77
Appendix......Page 80
Proof of Theorem 3.1......Page 81
Proof of Theorem 4.1......Page 82
Proof of Theorem 5.1......Page 84
References......Page 85
Author\'s Addresses......Page 87
Introduction......Page 88
The Model......Page 92
The Main Results......Page 96
Common Search Technologies......Page 102
The Equilibrium Price Schedule......Page 104
Efficiency of the Decentralized Allocation......Page 105
Directed Search......Page 106
Random Search......Page 108
Vanishing Frictions and Convergence to the Walrasian Equilibrium......Page 109
Conclusion......Page 111
Appendix......Page 112
References......Page 122
Author\'s Addresses......Page 123
Introduction......Page 124
IV Models and Their Identifying Power......Page 126
Model......Page 127
Identification......Page 129
Intersection Bounds......Page 130
Sharpness......Page 131
Illustrations and Elucidation......Page 132
The Identified Set......Page 133
Sharpness......Page 135
Numerical Example......Page 136
Three Valued Outcomes......Page 140
Ordered Outcomes: A Parametric Example......Page 141
Concluding Remarks......Page 143
Appendix......Page 146
References......Page 149
Author\'s Addresses......Page 150
Introduction......Page 151
The Puzzle Confirmed......Page 154
A Solution From Two Financial Frictions......Page 156
The Model Environment......Page 157
Equilibrium and the Solution Strategy......Page 159
Calibration......Page 161
Quantitative Results......Page 163
The Complete Markets Model......Page 165
The Enforcement Model......Page 167
The Bond Model......Page 170
Interaction of Two Frictions......Page 171
Time-Series and Cross-Section Predictions......Page 173
Conclusion......Page 175
Country Sample......Page 176
Appendix B: Estimation of the World Productivity Process......Page 177
References......Page 178
Author\'s Addresses......Page 180
Introduction......Page 181
Framework......Page 185
Deferred Acceptance......Page 186
First Characterization of Deferred Acceptance Rules......Page 187
Second Characterization of Deferred Acceptance Rules......Page 190
Efficient Deferred Acceptance Rules......Page 192
Appendix......Page 194
References......Page 200
Author\'s Addresses......Page 201
Introduction......Page 202
A Nonextensional Model of Decision Making......Page 205
Partition-Dependent Expected Utility......Page 208
Basic Axioms......Page 211
Pi Is a Filtration......Page 213
Pi Is the Collection of All Finite Partitions......Page 215
Binary Bet Acyclicity and the Product Rule......Page 218
Transparent Events and Completely Overlooked Events......Page 219
Transparent Events......Page 220
Completely Overlooked Events......Page 221
Appendix A: Preliminary Observations......Page 223
Appendix B: Proofs for Section 4.2......Page 227
Appendix C: Proofs for Section 4.3......Page 229
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 5......Page 234
Appendix E: Proofs for Section 5......Page 237
References......Page 241
Author\'s Addresses......Page 242
Introduction......Page 243
Definitions and Implementation......Page 244
Motivation and Discussion of Theoretical Results......Page 247
Regularity Conditions and Formal Results......Page 249
Design......Page 254
Estimators......Page 255
Results......Page 256
References......Page 263
Author\'s Addresses......Page 264
Introduction......Page 265
Basic Assumptions......Page 266
Conditional Inference......Page 268
Basic Assumptions......Page 269
Model Justification and Related Issues......Page 271
Conditional Distribution Given the Total Score......Page 273
Structural Parameters Identification via Conditional Likelihood......Page 274
Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator......Page 276
References......Page 277
Author\'s Addresses......Page 279
Introduction......Page 280
Confidence Sets for the Identified Set......Page 283
General Model......Page 284
Illustrative Example......Page 286
Criterion Function......Page 287
Estimation of the Identified Set......Page 288
Bootstrap Procedure for the General Model......Page 289
Bootstrap Procedure for the Conditionally Separable Model......Page 290
Asymptotic Properties......Page 292
Subsampling......Page 293
Asymptotic Approximation......Page 295
Conclusion......Page 296
References......Page 297
Author\'s Addresses......Page 298
Introduction......Page 299
Transitivity......Page 300
The Present Model......Page 301
Axioms......Page 302
Unanimity Representation of Objective Rationality......Page 304
Relating Objective and Subjective Rationality......Page 305
Related Literature......Page 307
Appendix A: Proofs and Related Material......Page 308
Appendix B: Supplementary Material......Page 310
Final Technical Remarks......Page 312
References......Page 313
Author\'s Addresses......Page 314
Introduction......Page 315
Social Efficiency......Page 318
Mechanism and Equilibrium......Page 319
Scheduling: An Example......Page 320
The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism......Page 322
Learning and Licensing......Page 330
References......Page 332
Author\'s Addresses......Page 333
Introduction......Page 334
Social Efficiency......Page 337
Mechanism and Equilibrium......Page 338
Scheduling: An Example......Page 339
The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism......Page 341
Learning and Licensing......Page 349
References......Page 351
Author\'s Addresses......Page 352
Introduction......Page 353
A Mechanism Game......Page 355
Recommendation Mechanisms......Page 356
Equilibrium Allocations......Page 357
The Structure of a Recommendation Mechanism......Page 360
With One or Two Agents......Page 361
References......Page 362
Author\'s Addresses......Page 363
Introduction......Page 364
Economics......Page 366
Optimality......Page 367
Solution......Page 368
Approximation......Page 369
Econometrics......Page 370
Smolyak Kalman Filter......Page 371
Smolyak Sum Filter......Page 372
Parallel Mixing Metropolis-Hastings......Page 373
Results......Page 374
Estimation......Page 375
Likelihood......Page 376
Parameters......Page 378
References......Page 380
Author\'s Addresses......Page 382
Introduction......Page 383
Notation, Definitions, and Theorem 4 of FL......Page 384
A Counterexample......Page 385
Strongly Consistent Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium......Page 387
Appendix......Page 391
Author\'s Addresses......Page 392
NPL Method......Page 394
Illustration......Page 395
Appendix: Proof of the Limit Result......Page 397
Properties of gM......Page 399
Author\'s Addresses......Page 402