Dynamic Federalism; A New Theory for Cohesion and Regional Autonomy

Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Illustrations
Preface
Acknowledgement
Introduction
PART I: Theoretical framework
	1. What is federalism? In search of building blocks for a new federal theory
		1.1. The importance of defining federations
			1.1.1. Why a pragmatic approach to the definition of federal systems is insufficient
			1.1.2. Why definitions matter
		1.2. Defining federations: the problems of traditional approaches
			1.2.1. Hamilton, or a narrow approach to defining federations
				1.2.1.1. The Hamiltonian tradition
				1.2.1.2. What is wrong with the Hamiltonian approach?
			1.2.2. Elazar, or a broad approach to defining federalism
				1.2.2.1. The Elazarian approach
				1.2.2.2. What is wrong with the Elazarian approach?
		1.3. The value of federalism
		1.4. Conclusion: building blocks for a renewed federal theory
	2. Dynamic federalism: ‘federalism as a process’ revisited
		2.1. Friedrich on federalism as a process
		2.2. Contours of a theory of dynamic federalism
			2.2.1. Multi-tiered systems in search of a proper balance
				2.2.1.1. A constitutionally defined concept
				2.2.1.2. An essentially contested concept
			2.2.2. A categorization of forms of state
			2.2.3. The development of indicators
				2.2.3.1. Aubert: an inventory of institutional arrangements
				2.2.3.2. Baldi, Requejo: unitary/federalism and de/centralisation axes
				2.2.3.3. Hooghe et al.: the Regional Authority Index
				2.2.3.4. Ivanyna & Shah: the World Bank’s Fiscal Decentralization Index
				2.2.3.5. Sahadžicʹ: measuring constitutional asymmetry
				2.2.3.6. Conclusion
		2.3. The theory of dynamic federalism put to the test
			2.3.1. The specificity test
			2.3.2. The universality test
			2.3.3. The flexibility test
		2.4. Conclusion: setting the scene
PART II: Measuring cohesion and autonomy
	3. Preliminary notes: representation, and the Belgian case study
		3.1. Which interests are voiced?
		3.2. The Belgian case
			3.2.1. Context
			3.2.2. Results
	4. Status
		4.1. Constitutional self-definition
		4.2. The constitutional level
			4.2.1. The central level: constitutional reform
			4.2.2. The subnational level: constitutional autonomy
		4.3. The legislative level
		4.4. The executive level
		4.5. The international and supranational levels
			4.5.1. International treaties
				4.5.1.1. Treaties concluded by the central authorities
				4.5.1.2. Treaties concluded by the subnational authorities
			4.5.2. Multilevel governance systems: The European Union
				4.5.2.1. EU treaties
				4.5.2.2. The Council of Ministers
		4.6. Organization of courts
	5. Powers
		5.1. The scope of powers
		5.2. Allocation techniques
			5.2.1. Basic allocation techniques
				5.2.1.1. Exclusive vs shared powers
				5.2.1.2. Legislative vs administrative functions
			5.2.2. Constraining allocation principles
		5.3. Federalism dispute resolution
			5.3.1. Political mechanisms
			5.3.2. Judicial mechanisms
	6. Fiscal arrangements
		6.1. Fiscal equalization and other cohesive arrangements
		6.2. Revenues and spending powers
			6.2.1. Subnational taxes
			6.2.2. Borrowing powers
			6.2.3. Shared Tax Revenues
			6.2.4. Spending powers: conditional grants
			6.2.5. Spending powers: (E) fiscal discipline rules
PART III: Measuring change
	7. Contours for a theory of change
		7.1. Measuring federal dynamics
		7.2. Processes of change
			7.2.1. Sources
			7.2.2. Catalysts
			7.2.3. Strategies
			7.2.4. Actors
		7.3. Why institutions matter in processes of change
			7.3.1. Institutional change as a result of informal change
			7.3.2. Impact of institutional change on noninstitutional developments
			7.3.3. Institutional actors
		7.4. Conclusion
	8. Institutional hubs for change
		8.1. Constitutional amendments
		8.2. De-constitutionalization
			8.2.1. Ordinary laws
			8.2.2. Special majority laws
			8.2.3. Intergovernmental agreements
		8.3. Allocation techniques
		8.4. Adjudicating federalism conflicts
			8.4.1. Judicial adjudicators
				8.4.1.1. Legal-structural factors
				8.4.1.2. Attitudinal preferences
				8.4.1.3. Strategic considerations
				8.4.1.4. Conclusion
			8.4.2. Nonjudicial adjudication of federalism conflicts
		8.5. Global governance
			8.5.1. International treaties
			8.5.2. Conferral of powers
			8.5.3. International courts
		8.6. Conclusion
Conclusion: findings and way forward
Appendix: The Belgian showcase
Bibliography
Index