Dividing Reality

Contents
1. The Division Problem
	1. Introduction to the Problem
	2. Classificatory and Individuative Strangeness
		a. Individuative Strangeness and Ontological Commitment
		b. The Believer and the Disbeliever
		c. The Hybrid Meta-Language
		d. Individuative Strangeness without Classificatory Strangeness
	3. Strange Languages and Strange Thoughts
		a. Strong and Weak Versions of Strangeness
		b. Thinking in a Strange Language
		c. Synonymy and Strangeness
		d. Strange Propositions
		e. Strange Primitives
	4. Further Examples of Strangeness
		a. Classificatory Examples
		b. Individuative Examples
	5. The Weight of the Intuitions
	6. The Distinctness of the Division Problem
2. Projectibility and Strange Languages
	1. Goodman's Problem and the Division Problem
	2. The Projectibility Principle
		a. Projectible Terms
		b. The Epistemological Claim
		c. The Similarity Principle
		d. Another Argument for the Epistemological Claim
		e. Transcendental Arguments and the Epistemological Claim
	3. Projectibility and Ostensive Learning
	4. Projectibility, Similarity, and Individuation
		a. Strange Similarity Classes
		b. Intrinsic Similarity Classes
		c. Similarity and Salience
		d. Predictable Things
3. Reality's Joints I: Properties
	1. Reality's Joints and the Division Problem
	2. Natural Properties
	3. The Similarity Analysis
		a. The Problem of Imperfect Community
		b. Dimensions of Comparison
		c. The Property P*
		d. Other Consequences of (N)
	4. The Causal Analysis
		a. The Standard Causal Analysis
		b. A Modified Causal Analysis
		c. Metaphysical versus Nomic Naturalness
	5. Against Egalitarianism
		a. The Counterintuitiveness of Egalitarianism
		b. The Empirical Argument
		c. The A Priori Argument
	6. Degrees of Naturalness
		a. Degrees of Metaphysical Naturalness
		b. Degrees of Nomic Naturalness
		c. The Overall Scale
	7. Explanation and Classification
		a. The Explanation Claim
		b. Putnam's Constraint
		c. Strict Correctness and Pragmatic Adequacy
		d. Explanatory Equivalence and the Strange Languages
4. Reality's Joints II: Things
	1. Natural Things
		a. Egalitarian and Inegalitarian Views
		b. Analyses of Thing-Naturalness
		c. Four Problems for (P)
		d. How Deep Is Thing-Naturalness?
	2. The Semantic Argument
		a. Objections to the Argument
		b. Objections to the Revised Argument
		c. Normative and Modal Arguments
	3. Inscrutability
		a. Pseudo-Languages
		b. Truth-Conditional and Inscrutability Theses
		c. Constraints on Reference Schemes
		d. Interpretive Charity
5. The Pragmatic Response
	1. Extreme Relativism versus Pragmatism
	2. Salience
		a. Salience and Ostensive Learning
		b. Salience and Perceptual Speed
		c. The Salience Principle
	3. Important Properties and Things
		a. Importance and Salience
		b. Which Properties Are Important?
		c. The Attention Claim
		d. Attention and Projectibility
		e. Important Things
		f. Summary of the Argument Thus Far
	4. Economy
		a. The Economy Principle
		b. Economy and Incompatibility Languages
		c. Scopes of Attention
		d. How Fundamental Is Economy?
		e. Stylistic Economy versus Inductive Simplicity
		f. Heuristic Devices
	5. The Pure Pragmatic Position
6. The Order of Understanding
	1. The Impossibility Claim
	2. Concept-Dependence Claims
		a. The Interpretation of the Claims
		b. "Having a Concept"
		c. Analysis and Concept-Dependence Claims
		d. The Intuitiveness of the Claims
	3. Fine-Grained Propositions and Concept-Dependence
		a. The Fine-Grained Doctrine
		b. Natural Constituents
		c. Derivation of Concept-Dependence Claims
		d. Asymmetric Concept-Dependence
		e. Further Applications
	4. Derivation of the Impossibility Claim
		a. Strange Propositions
		b. The Derivation of IC
		c. The Thesis of the Necessity of Language
	5. A "Solution" to the Division Problem
		a. The Fundamental Case
		b. Secondary Strange Languages
		c. Weak Strange Languages
		d. The Lexicon of a Natural Language
		e. The Altered Perspective
7. Ontology and the Division Problem
	1. Ontology and the Order of Understanding
		a. Propositions as Individuals
		b. The Relevance of Ontological Inegalitarianism
		c. The Bare Argument
	2. Soft and Hard Ontology
		a. Soft Questions and Verbal Questions
		b. Hard Ontology
		c. Soft Ontology
		d. Soft Semantic Questions
		e. Implications of Softness
		f. Connections between Hard and Soft
	3. Prospects for the Impossibility Claim
		a. The Mysterious Attraction
		b. Functionalism and the Mysterious Attraction
		c. Comparing Classification and Individuation
		d. The Difficulty of Degrees
	4. Concluding Remarks
Appendix 1. Projectible Terms
	1. Relative and Absolute Projectibility
	2. Which Terms Are Projectible?
	3. Projectible Terms and Hypotheses
Appendix 2. Similarity and Natural Properties
	1. Quine's Similarity Condition
	2. Boundary Requirements
	3. Imperfect Community Reconsidered
	4. (N) and Complementary Properties
	5. The Problem of Conjunctive Entailment
Appendix 3. The Fine-Grained Doctrine
	1. Fine-Grained Propositions
	2. Analysis
	3. A Kripkean Problem for the Fine-Grained Doctrine
	4. Fine-Grained Properties
References
Index
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