Digital Relationships: Network Agency Theory and Big Tech

CONTENTS\nPREFACE\nPART I PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS IN NETWORKS Conflicting Interests in Networking and Their Effects\n1 Networks Are the Problem CONFRONTING THE SOCIAL CAPITAL CONSENSUS\n2 Too Many Ties DIVERGENT INTERESTS WITH THE FALLING COSTS OF DIGITAL NETWORKING\n3 Ties Too Weak INSUFFICIENT FIRM-SPECIFIC SOCIAL INVESTMENTS TO MOBILIZE DIVERSITY\n4 Entrenched Brokers and Ossified Bridges MONOPOLIES OF INFORMATION AND CONTROL\n5 Scale Too Free NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF INEQUALITY IN SOCIAL CAPITAL\nPART II THEORY OF THE FIRM Network Agency Problems in the Organizational Context\n6 Persistence MANAGERIAL INTERVENTION TRANSIENCE AND THE REEMERGENCE OF AGENCY PROBLEMS\n7 Agentic Function of the Executive STRATEGIC SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE WORK-FROM-HOME EXPERIMENT\n8 Network Governance REINTERPRETING ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND BOUNDARIES\n9 Network Agency over the Life Cycle ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INNOVATION ECOSYSTEMS\n10 A Research Agenda MORE CASES, MORE MODELS, MORE EXPERIMENTS\nAfterword\nAPPENDIX Blue-Sky Model of Organizational Networking\nNOTES\nREFERENCES\nINDEX