Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy

Contents......Page 10
Abbreviations......Page 13
INTRODUCTION......Page 14
1.1.1 The active principle......Page 29
1.1.2 Causation......Page 31
1.1.3 Motions and qualitative states......Page 34
1.2 Teleological determinism defined......Page 41
1.3 Causal determinism defined......Page 46
1.3.1 The anti-Stoic argument for spontaneous motions......Page 47
1.3.2 Chrysippus' reply......Page 49
1.3.3 Causal determinism......Page 51
1.4 Fate......Page 57
1.4.1 Fate is God is Providence is Nature is the Active Principle…......Page 58
1.4.2 The main aspects of fate......Page 60
1.4.3 Teleological and mechanical aspects of Stoic determinism combined......Page 66
1.4.4 The Fate Principle......Page 69
2.1 Causal determinism and the Principle of Bivalence......Page 72
2.1.1 Chrysippus' Bivalence Argument......Page 74
2.1.2 Chrysippus versus Epicurus on truth and fate......Page 88
2.2.1 Chrysippus' concept of divination......Page 100
2.2.2 Chrysippus' proof of fate through the existence of divination......Page 101
2.2.3 Causal determinism as necessary condition for the existence of divination......Page 106
3.1 Modal logic and the threat of determinism......Page 110
3.1.1 Hellenistic modalities in general......Page 111
3.1.2 Diodorus and necessitarianism......Page 115
3.1.3 Philo and conceptual or essentialist modalities......Page 121
3.1.4 Chrysippus' modal system......Page 125
3.1.5 Contingency and freedom......Page 129
3.1.6* Appendix: Identification of Chrysippus' modal notions......Page 132
3.2 Objection: Stoic determinism and Stoic modal logic are incompatible......Page 135
3.3 A Stoic reply: fate and epistemic modalities......Page 144
3.4.1 The textual evidence......Page 149
3.4.2 Necessity and that which is necessary and their relation to fate......Page 153
4 DIVINATION, MODALITY, AND UNIVERSAL REGULARITY......Page 157
4.1.1 The divinatory theorem......Page 158
4.1.2 The second argument against the Stoics......Page 159
4.1.3 The first argument against the Stoics......Page 163
4.1.4 The relation between the two arguments......Page 165
4.1.5 Chrysippus' modal notions conflict with divination......Page 166
4.2.1 Negated conjunctions in lieu of conditionals......Page 169
4.2.2 Divinatory theorems, sign-relations, and causation......Page 172
4.2.3 A modification of the anti-Stoic objection......Page 183
4.2.4 Divination, determinism, and human action......Page 186
4.2.5 Appendix: Conditional predictions......Page 188
5 FATE, ACTION, AND MOTIVATION: THE IDLE ARGUMENT......Page 193
5.1.1 Exposition of the argument......Page 195
5.1.2 The plausibility of the argument......Page 198
5.1.3 Futility and goal-directed activity......Page 204
5.1.4 Is the Idle Argument a sophism?......Page 206
5.2.1 Cicero, On Fate 30......Page 212
5.2.2 Origen, Against Celsus II 20, 342.71–82......Page 218
5.2.3 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 6.8.25–38......Page 221
5.3.1 Simply fated occurrents reconsidered......Page 230
5.3.2 Co-fatedness and causation......Page 234
5.3.3 Chrysippus' refutation and its implications for his determinism......Page 239
5.3.4 Critique of Chrysippus' refutation......Page 244
6 DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHRYSIPPUS' COMPATIBILISM......Page 247
6.1.1 Overview of the central passages......Page 248
6.1.2 Chrysippus' conception of mind and action......Page 252
6.2 Another argument against fate: fate renders moral appraisal unjust......Page 255
6.2.1 The argument in Gellius......Page 256
6.2.2 The argument in Cicero......Page 258
6.3.1 Chrysippus' counter in Gellius......Page 263
6.3.2 Chrysippus' formal refutation of the argument in Cicero......Page 268
6.3.3 The cylinder and cone analogy......Page 271
6.3.4 Another Chrysippean argument for moral responsibility......Page 284
6.3.5 Freedom, moral responsibility, and that which depends on us......Page 289
6.3.6 Moral responsibility and the determination of character......Page 303
6.3.7 The relation between antecedent causes, fate, and necessity......Page 314
6.4 A later interpretation of Chrysippus' concept of fate?......Page 327
6.4.1 The 'framework story' in Cicero's On Fate......Page 328
6.4.2 Plutarch's dilemma......Page 337
7 FREEDOM AND THAT WHICH DEPENDS ON US: EPICTETUS AND EARLY STOICS......Page 343
7.1 Epictetus and that which depends on us......Page 344
7.2 Freedom (Omitted)......Page 351
7.2.1 The early Stoics on freedom (Omitted)......Page 352
7.2.2 Epictetus on freedom (Omitted)......Page 354
7.2.3 Is (Omitted) the only true freedom?......Page 356
7.2.4* Freedom (Omitted) and that which depends on us in later antiquity......Page 357
7.3 Cleanthes, Epictetus, the dog, and the cart......Page 358
7.3.1 Cleanthes on Destiny......Page 359
7.3.2 Epictetus on Cleanthes on Destiny......Page 362
7.3.3 The dog and cart simile......Page 364
8 A LATER STOIC THEORY OF COMPATIBILISM......Page 371
8.1* Some notes on the sources and the origin of the theory......Page 372
8.2 PHILOPATOR'S causal determinism......Page 383
8.3 The role of fate in PHILOPATOR'S theory......Page 388
8.4 PHILOPATOR'S conception of that which depends on us......Page 391
8.5 PHILOPATOR'S compatibilism......Page 400
8.6 The cylinder in later Stoic fate theory......Page 407
8.7 The rise and fall of the problem of freedom to do otherwise and causal determinism......Page 409
Bibliography......Page 426
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