Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons: An Introduction and Critical Inquiry

Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of contents
Notes on contributors
Acknowledgements
Introduction to the Collection
	Notes
	References
Part I
	1 Toward a unified theory of morality: An introduction to Part One of Reasons and Persons
		Introduction
		The Self-interest Theory
			What the Self-interest Theory is
			How the Self-interest Theory is indirectly self-defeating
			The failure of several objections to the Self-interest Theory
			Practical dilemmas
		Consequentialism
			What consequentialism is
			How consequentialism is indirectly self-defeating
			The failure of several objections to Consequentialism
			Practical dilemmas
			Mistakes in moral mathematics
		Common-sense morality
			What common-sense morality is
			How Common-Sense Morality is directly self-defeating
			Revising Common-Sense Morality
		The unified theory of morality
		Notes
		Bibliography
	2 Introduction to Part Two: Rationality and time
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 The Critical Present Aim Theory and intrinsically irrational desires
		2.3 The ‘best objection’ to S
		2.4 The appeal to full relativity
		2.5 Time-bias
		2.6 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	3 Introduction to Part Three: Personal identity
		3.1 Criteria of personal identity
		3.2 An objection to the psychological criterion
		3.3 Is personal identity always determinate?
		3.4 Divided minds
		3.5 Personal identity does not matter
		3.6 What matters when you divide?
		3.7 Personal identity and rationality
		3.8 Personal identity and morality
		Notes
	4 Parfit, Population Ethics and Pareto Plus
		Introduction
			Plan for this chapter
			Why worry about Pareto plus?
		Does mere addition make things better? Does it make things worse?
			The Two Outcome Case. Consider the following case
			Pareto plus
			Mere Addition Principle (MAP)
		If a better chance of existence makes things better, does the actual fact of existence also make things better?
		Conclusions
		Appendix A
		Notes
		Bibliography
	5 An Opinionated Guide to “What Makes Someone’s Life go Best”
		Preferencehedonism and the Theory of Pleasure and Pain
		The Unrestricted DesireFulfillment Theory and the problem of remote desires
		preferences and counterfactual wellbeing
		Summative vs. Global DesireFulfillment Theories
		Objective vs. Subjective vs. Hybrid Theories
		Bibliography
Part II
	6 In a different league: Intransitivity, betterness, and league-based satisficing
		Introduction
		6.1 Routes to the Repugnant Conclusion and Parfit’s proposed evasion
		6.2 An alternative way of evading the Repugnant Conclusion: The Continuum Argument for Intransitivity
		6.3 The Intransitivity Thesis and league-based satisficing
		6.4 Parfit’s proposed evasion revisited
		Conclusion
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	7 Conativism about personal identity
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 How do conations settle the SP-relation?
		7.3 Kinds of conations
		7.4 Direct private conativism
		7.5 Objections to direct private conativism
			7.5.1 The objection from implausible consequences
			7.5.2 The objection from empty concepts
		7.6 Different conations and the threat of pluralism
		7.7 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	8 Reasons and conscious persons
		Introduction
		Reductionism and personal identity
		Buddhist reductionism, personalism, and the no-self view
		Reflexivity, agency, and the unity of conscious experience
		Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	9 Transformative choice and the non-identity problem
		9.1 Transformative acts
		9.2 Self-creation
		9.3 The non-identity problem for transformative acts
			A. Two principles
			B. The Problem
		9.4 Possible responses
			A. Denying the intuition
			B. Denying the comparative notion of harm for selves
			C. Denying the Self-Affecting Principle
		9.5 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	10 Prudence and self-concern
		Prudence and self-concern
		Temporal neutrality
		Parfit on projects
		Brink’s defense of temporal neutrality
		On the other hand
		Is self-concern welfarist?26
		Conclusion
		Notes
	11 Reductionism, self-constitution, and the moral significance of personal identity
		The reductionist account of personal agency
			Irreducible normativity
			The requirements of rationality
			Reductionism, self-constitution, and Locke’s distinction
			An initial moral implication
		Comparison with Korsgaard’s view
			Irreducible normativity: Laws and constructivism
			The requirements of rationality: Their content and force
			Reductionism, self-constitution, and Locke’s distinction revisited
			Moral dimensions of a metaphysical disagreement
		Notes
		Bibliography
	12 Non-identical and impersonal1
		Notes
Index