Demystifying Legal Reasoning

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 5
Title......Page 7
Copyright......Page 8
Contents......Page 9
Introduction......Page 11
PART ONE: Law and Its Function......Page 17
I. Settlement......Page 19
II. The Dilemma of Rules......Page 25
III. The Possibility of Determinate Rules......Page 28
IV. The Nature of Law......Page 34
PART TWO: Common-Law Reasoning: Deciding Cases When Prior Judicial Decisions Determine the Law......Page 37
CHAPTER II: Ordinary Reason Applied to Law Natural Reasoning and Deduction from Rules......Page 41
I. The Natural Model of Common-Law Reasoning......Page 42
II. The Rule Model of Common-Law Reasoning......Page 50
III. Comparing the Models......Page 52
A. PROMULGATION OF RULES......Page 60
B. IDENTIFICATION OF PRECEDENT RULES......Page 63
C. THE PERSISTENCE OF PRECEDENT RULES......Page 68
CHAPTER III: The Mystification of Common-Law Reasoning......Page 74
I. Analogical Reasoning from Case to Case......Page 76
A. CONSTRAINT BY SIMILARITY......Page 78
B. A FORTIORI CONSTRAINT......Page 86
C. DISTINGUISHING PRECEDENTS......Page 93
D. SUMMARY: WHY PURELY ANALOGICAL DECISION MAKING DOES NOT EXIST......Page 97
II. Reasoning from Legal Principles......Page 98
A. THE NATURE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES......Page 99
B. FAULTY LOGIC......Page 105
C. PERNICIOUS EFFECTS......Page 108
D. THE FAILURE OF PROPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LEGAL PRINCIPLES......Page 110
E. SUMMARY: WHY LEGAL PRINCIPLES DO NOT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE A ROLE IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING......Page 112
CHAPTER IV: Common-Law Practice......Page 114
I. Judges as Rule Makers......Page 117
A. INATTENTION......Page 118
B. COGNITIVE BIAS......Page 119
C. OVERRULING PROBLEMS......Page 124
D. SUMMARY: WHY JUDGES ARE POOR RULE MAKERS......Page 127
A. THE METHOD OF ANALOGY......Page 128
B. RESTRICTIONS ON THE SCOPE OF PRECEDENT RULES......Page 130
C. DISTINGUISHING AND OVERRULING......Page 132
III. Rationality and Sustainability of Judicial Practice......Page 135
PART THREE: Reasoning from Canonical Legal Texts......Page 139
CHAPTER V: Interpreting Statutes and Other Posited Rules......Page 141
I. The Goal of Legal Interpretation: The Lawmaker’s Intended Meaning......Page 142
II. What Is the State of Mind That Constitutes the Lawmaker’s Intended Meaning?......Page 151
A. THE MULTIPLICITY OF THE RULE MAKER ’ S INTENTIONS......Page 155
B. LEVELS OF GENERALITY OF INTENTIONS......Page 160
C. “TRANSLATING” THE RULE MAKER' S RULE IN LIGHT OF HIS MISTAKES......Page 162
D. THE DETERMINACY OF INTENDED MEANING : THE “KRIPKENSTEIN” CRITIQUE......Page 170
IV. Conclusion......Page 175
CHAPTER VI: Infelicities of the Intended Meaning of Canonical Texts and Norms Constraining Interpretation......Page 177
I. Absurd, Unjust, and Pointless Intended Meanings......Page 178
II. Opaque Intended Meanings......Page 180
III. Conflicting Multiple Intended Meanings......Page 181
1. Norms for Avoiding Substantively Infelicitous Results......Page 183
2. Norms for Effectuating Specific Policies......Page 185
1. Norms of Form......Page 188
2. Norms for Failed Law......Page 192
3. Levels of Generality of Rule Makers’ Intentions......Page 195
CHAPTER VII Nonintentionalist Interpretation......Page 201
A. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PURE (INTENTION-FREE) TEXTUALISM......Page 202
1. Argument One: Texts Cannot Declare the Language in Which They Are Written......Page 205
2. Argument Two: Texts Cannot Declare That They Are Texts......Page 206
3. Argument Three: Meaning Cannot Be Autonomous from Intent – One Must Always Identify an Author......Page 208
4. Argument Four: Texts Can Have “Deviant” Meanings Because Those Meanings Are Intended......Page 209
1. The Algorithmic Textualist......Page 210
2. Four Nonalgorithmic Textualisms......Page 214
II. Dynamic Interpretation of Canonical Legal Rules......Page 223
A. ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING......Page 225
B. CONCEPTS, NATURAL KINDS, AND UNDERLYING PURPOSES (SPIKE LEE)......Page 227
CHAPTER VIII: Is Constitutional Interpretation Different? Why It Isn’t and Is......Page 230
I. The Constitution as Super Statute......Page 231
A. THE “DEAD HAND OF THE PAST” CRITICISM AND THE NOTION OF THE “LIVING CONSTITUTION”......Page 235
B. THE “PARADIGM CASE” METHODOLOGY OF INTERPRETATION......Page 237
III. Supreme Court Precedents and Constitutional Interpretation......Page 239
IV. Changes in the Rule of Recognition and the Identity of the Constitution’s Authors......Page 240
Epilogue: All or Nothing......Page 243
Selected Bibliography......Page 247
Index......Page 257