Democracy and War: Institutions, Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict

Contents......Page 8
List of Tables and Figures......Page 14
Acknowledgments......Page 18
1. Introduction: Domestic Institutions, Political Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict......Page 22
Central Questions......Page 25
Methodology......Page 32
Overview of the Book......Page 34
Significance of the Project......Page 35
Notes......Page 36
2. The Impact of Institutions and Norms in International Crises......Page 39
Structural Explanations of the Democratic Peace......Page 41
Normative Explanations of the Democratic Peace......Page 48
Testing the Arguments......Page 50
The Dependent Variables......Page 55
Specific Hypotheses and Operationalizations......Page 59
Analysis and Results......Page 64
Case Studies......Page 69
The Suez Crisis: Why Don’t Monadic Norms and Institutions Constrain?......Page 70
Motives for British Intervention......Page 72
Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the British......Page 74
International Considerations for Britain......Page 77
Motives for French Intervention......Page 78
Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the French......Page 79
International Considerations for France......Page 80
Motives for Israeli Intervention......Page 81
Domestic Factors: Constraints and Opportunities for the Israelis......Page 82
International Considerations for Israel......Page 83
Conclusions from the Suez Crisis......Page 84
The Ecuador-Peru Dispute: Conflict in a Democratic Dyad......Page 87
Background......Page 88
Recent Crises......Page 89
Conclusions......Page 100
Appendix 2.1: Dropping the Aggressive Leader Assumption......Page 101
Appendix 2.2: Crisis Data Set: 337 Conflict Dyads in 301 International Crises......Page 104
Appendix 2.3: Crises from the ICB Data Set That Have Been Deleted or Merged......Page 110
Appendix 2.4: Sensitivity Analysis......Page 112
Notes......Page 113
3. International Disputes and the Evolution of Conflict......Page 121
The Dispute Data Set......Page 124
Hypotheses and Analysis......Page 126
Case Studies......Page 137
Israel and Egypt in the 1967 Six Days’ War......Page 138
Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus and the 1974 Invasion of Cyprus......Page 142
Conclusions......Page 150
Appendix 3.1: Dispute Data Set—223 International Conflicts......Page 151
Notes......Page 154
4. Institutional Constraint Versus Regime Type......Page 160
The Institutional Constraint Model......Page 161
Recent Research......Page 166
Variables and Specific Hypotheses......Page 169
Analyses and Results......Page 172
Case Studies......Page 178
Motives for Indian Intervention......Page 179
Domestic Factors......Page 181
International Considerations......Page 183
Decisions to Intervene......Page 184
El Salvador Versus Honduras in the 1969 Football War......Page 187
Institutional Structures in El Salvador......Page 188
Motives for Salvadoran Intervention......Page 191
Domestic Factors......Page 193
The War and Its Consequences......Page 194
The United Kingdom Versus the Soviet Union During the Russian Civil War......Page 195
Motives for British Intervention......Page 196
Domestic Factors......Page 200
Constraint and Two Monarchies: Saudi Arabia and Jordan......Page 203
Saudi Arabia......Page 204
Jordan......Page 208
Conclusions......Page 212
Appendix 4.1: Nested Versus Nonnested Models of the Democratic Peace......Page 214
Notes......Page 215
5. Political Norms Versus Institutional Structures......Page 222
A Typology of Norms......Page 227
Test 1: New Political Norms Variables for the Statistical Model......Page 229
Test 2: Testing Political Norms with a Logit Model......Page 235
Test 3: A Laboratory Experiment......Page 240
Hypotheses......Page 243
Research Design......Page 246
Experimental Findings......Page 248
Case Studies......Page 253
Motives for British Intervention in Iraq......Page 254
The Crisis......Page 256
Motives for British Intervention in Iran......Page 258
Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force......Page 260
Bay of Pigs, 1961 (United States Versus Cuba)......Page 262
Motives for U.S. Intervention......Page 263
Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force......Page 264
Consequences of Intervention......Page 268
Motives for U.S. Intervention......Page 271
Domestic Constraints on the Use of Force......Page 274
Conclusions......Page 277
Appendix 5.1: Scenario Wording by Dimension......Page 278
Appendix 5.2: Experimental Survey Instrument......Page 280
Notes......Page 281
Mansfield and Snyder’s Theoretical Argument......Page 289
Critics of Mansfield and Snyder’s Original Analysis......Page 291
Mansfield and Snyder’s Response......Page 292
Regime Change, Norms, and Structures......Page 293
The Data Set, Hypotheses, and Variables......Page 295
Somalia Versus Ethiopia......Page 302
The Teschen Crisis, 1919 (Czechoslovakia Versus Poland), and the Hungarian War, 1919 (Czechoslovakia Versus Hungary)......Page 313
Conclusions......Page 321
Notes......Page 322
7. The Evolution of Conflicts, Institutions, and Norms: An Agent-Based Simulation......Page 327
Strengths and Weaknesses of Agent-Based Computer Simulations......Page 328
Cederman’s Agent-Based Model......Page 330
Expanding Phases of Conflict......Page 335
Traits......Page 336
Learning......Page 339
Incorporating Domestic Political Opposition......Page 340
Simulation Results......Page 342
Conclusions......Page 347
Appendix 7.1: DomGeoSim Parameter Dictionary and Comparison of Parameters with GeoSim......Page 349
Notes......Page 358
8. Conclusions......Page 360
Synthesizing Across Cases: The Breakdown of Structural and Normative Constraints......Page 362
Future Research......Page 368
Notes......Page 370
Bibliography......Page 372
B......Page 396
C......Page 397
E......Page 398
I......Page 399
L......Page 400
N......Page 401
P......Page 402
S......Page 403
U......Page 404
Y......Page 405