Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Tables......Page 8
Figures......Page 11
Acknowledgments......Page 15
Abbreviations......Page 19
Decentralized Authoritarianism in China......Page 21
1 Authoritarianism and Decentralization......Page 23
Decentralization, chinese style......Page 25
The Political Consequences of Decentralization......Page 31
Decentralization and the Erosion of the Capacity of the Central State......Page 34
The Fiscal Reforms of 1993–1994......Page 36
Maintaining political control during decentralization......Page 37
The Role of Party Institutions during Economic Reform: The CPSU Compared with the CCP......Page 40
The Institutional Position of the CCP......Page 43
Organization of the book......Page 47
Measures of Decentralization......Page 50
Selection Effect......Page 51
Measuring Regimes......Page 53
Appendix 1a.2: the relationship between decentralization and political regimes......Page 55
Impact of Decentralization on Regime......Page 56
2 Organizing Decentralization......Page 59
Reforming the appointment system......Page 63
“One Level Down” Management of Local Officials......Page 64
The Policy Reversal of 1983/84: One-Level-Down Management Returns......Page 68
The National Conference on Organizational Work (July 1983)......Page 70
One Level Down in the 1990s......Page 72
Managing local government structures......Page 73
Local Government Structures in the State and Party Constitutions......Page 75
Party Leadership and Party Structures at the Local Level......Page 78
The Evolution of Local Governments: 1982–2004......Page 79
Line-Item Cities......Page 85
Deputy Provincial Municipalities (DPMs)......Page 88
Deputy Prefecture–Level Cities......Page 90
County-Level Cities......Page 91
Conclusion......Page 100
3 Promoting High-Level Generalists......Page 102
Municipal Governance in the Era of Marketization......Page 104
China’s mayors......Page 108
Term Limits......Page 111
Cadre Policy, Tenure, and the Struggle against Corruption......Page 114
Dependent Variable......Page 117
Independent Variables......Page 121
Results and discussion......Page 123
The Impact of Cadre Characteristics......Page 128
Conclusion......Page 136
4 Organizational Power......Page 138
Do individual perceptions vary?......Page 141
Elite Transformation and Value Change......Page 142
Implications for the Perception of the Organizational System......Page 145
Political-Economic Explanations......Page 147
Bureaucratic Approaches......Page 149
Obtaining Rank Orderings......Page 150
The CCP, the County Government, and the People’s Congress......Page 155
Model......Page 163
Conclusion......Page 171
Appendix 4a: designing the jiangsu elite study......Page 174
Site Selection for the Jiangsu Elite Survey (JES)......Page 175
Sample Structure......Page 177
Data Quality and Data Reliability......Page 179
Possible Source of Bias......Page 180
5 Explaining Cadre Rank......Page 184
Measuring cadre rank and cadre promotion......Page 190
Cadre Retirement......Page 192
Substantive Goals of Personnel Policy......Page 194
Expectations Regarding the Relationship between Professional Experiences and Rank......Page 202
Institution-Specific Hypotheses Mapping Experience to Cadre Promotion......Page 204
Party Experience as a Vehicle for Cadre Promotion......Page 213
The Effect of Mass-Organization Experience......Page 216
The Importance of Regular Tertiary Education......Page 218
Enterprise Experience......Page 220
Township Experience......Page 221
Conclusion......Page 223
Accounting for Retrospective Sample Bias in the Jiangsu Elite Survey......Page 228
6 The Impact of Village Elections on the Appointment of Party Branch Secretaries......Page 243
Party–village relations, post-election reform......Page 246
Impetus for Village Reform......Page 247
The Degree of Party Control of Village Elections, 1982–1998......Page 250
Co-optation and Promotion of Village Committee Chairmen......Page 253
Party Penetration of Village Committees......Page 258
Testing the impact of institutional change on the promotion of village leaders......Page 262
Dependent Variable: Promotion of Village Committee Chairman to Party Branch Secretary......Page 264
Independent Variables......Page 265
Results and discussion......Page 271
Villages vs. Neighborhood Committees......Page 272
Economic Performance......Page 275
Conclusion......Page 277
The ccp’s adaptation to extensive decentralization......Page 279
The relative decline of the state in the economy......Page 284
Policy shift in the hu-wen administration?......Page 285
References......Page 291
Index......Page 313