Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar

Preface......Page 4
Contents......Page 6
Figures......Page 10
Tables......Page 12
Summary......Page 14
Acknowledgements......Page 22
Abbreviations......Page 24
CHAPTER ONE - Introduction......Page 26
Purpose......Page 30
Basic Concepts and Monograph Organization......Page 31
CHAPTER TWO - A Conceptual Framework......Page 36
The Mechanisms of Cyberspace......Page 37
External Threats......Page 38
Insiders......Page 45
Supply Chain......Page 46
In Sum......Page 47
Defining Cyberattack......Page 48
Defining Cyberdeterrence......Page 52
CHAPTER THREE - Why Cyberdeterrence Is Different......Page 64
Do We Know Who Did It?......Page 66
Can We Hold Their Assets at Risk?......Page 77
Can We Do So Repeatedly?......Page 81
If Retaliation Does Not Deter, Can It at Least Disarm?......Page 84
Will Third Parties Join the Fight?......Page 87
Does Retaliation Send the Right Message to Our Own Side?......Page 89
Do We Have a Threshold for Response?......Page 90
Can We Avoid Escalation?......Page 94
What If the Attacker Has Little Worth Hitting?......Page 95
Yet the Will to Retaliate Is More Credible for Cyberspace......Page 96
A Good Defense Adds Further Credibility......Page 98
CHAPTER FOUR - Why the Purpose of the Original CyberattackMatters......Page 100
Oops......Page 101
No, You Started It......Page 102
The Command-and-Control Problem......Page 103
Coercion......Page 104
Force......Page 107
Other......Page 111
Implications......Page 115
CHAPTER FIVE - A Strategy of Response......Page 116
Should the Target Reveal the Cyberattack?......Page 117
When Should Attribution Be Announced?......Page 118
Should Cyberretaliation Be Obvious?......Page 119
Is Retaliation Better Late Than Never?......Page 121
Retaliating Against State-Tolerated Freelance Hackers......Page 123
What About Retaliating Against CNE?......Page 127
Should Deterrence Be Extended to Friends?......Page 129
Should a Deterrence Policy Be Explicit?......Page 131
Can Insouciance Defeat the Attacker’s Strategy?......Page 133
Confrontation Without Retaliation......Page 134
The Attacker’s Perspective......Page 137
Signaling to a Close......Page 139
CHAPTER SIX - Strategic Cyberwar......Page 142
The Purpose of Cyberwar......Page 143
The Plausibility of Cyberwar......Page 146
The Limits of Cyberwar......Page 147
The Conduct of Cyberwar......Page 150
Cyberwar as a Warning Against Cyberwar......Page 151
Preserving a Second-Strike Capability......Page 152
Sub-Rosa Cyberwar?......Page 153
A Government Role in Defending Against Cyberwar......Page 154
Managing the Effects of Cyberwar......Page 156
Terminating Cyberwar......Page 160
Conclusions......Page 162
CHAPTER SEVEN - Operational Cyberwar......Page 164
Cyberwar as a Bolt from the Blue......Page 168
Dampening the Ardor for Network-Centric Operations......Page 174
Attacks on Civilian Targets......Page 178
Organizing for Operational Cyberwar......Page 179
Conclusions......Page 183
CHAPTER EIGHT - Cyberdefense......Page 184
The Goal of Cyberdefense......Page 185
Architecture......Page 190
Policy......Page 192
Strategy......Page 194
Operations......Page 195
Deception......Page 196
Conclusions......Page 198
CHAPTER NINE - Tricky Terrain......Page 200
APPENDIX A - What Constitutes an Act of War in Cyberspace?......Page 204
APPENDIX B - The Calculus of Explicit Versus Implicit Deterrence......Page 208
APPENDIX C - The Dim Prospects for Cyber Arms Control......Page 224
References......Page 228