Covid-19 And Capitalism: Success And Failure Of The Legal Methods For Dealing With A Pandemic

Preface
Legal Disclaimer
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Origin and Causes of Covid-19
	1.1 Origin of Covid-19
		1.1.1 The Covid-19 Epidemic: A Basic Chronology
		1.1.2 Nature of Covid-19
		1.1.3 Plausible Causes of the Covid-19 Outbreak
	1.2 How Capitalism (Ab)uses the Earth and Its Resources
	1.3 Further Impact of Globalization
	1.4 Capitalist Exploitation Methods as an Obvious Recipe for a Pandemic
	References
Chapter 2: Initial (State) Response to Covid-19
	2.1 The Neoliberal State as the Socio-Economic Background Against Which Covid-19 Hit the World
		2.1.1 Neoliberal Diminishment of the Welfare State Model vs the Ideal Neoliberal State Model
		2.1.2 Underlying Neoliberal Doctrines
		2.1.3 Possible National Accents
		2.1.4 Some Further Specifics on the US Economic and Public Policy in the Period 2016-2018, with Its Impact on Healthcare
			2.1.4.1 Overall Intent of the Public Policy of the Trump Administration in Matters of Socioeconomics
			2.1.4.2 Healthcare Reform (Attempts)
			2.1.4.3 How Donald Trump´s Health Policy Has Undermined the US-and the World´s-Ability to Deal with Covid-19
	2.2 Other Examples of Neoliberal Ideas and Working Methods Which Have Been Ideal for Helping to Spread Covid-19
		2.2.1 General
		2.2.2 Capitalist Agricultural Methods
		2.2.3 Travelling and Tourism
			2.2.3.1 General
			2.2.3.2 Arrival of Covid-19 in Europe
			2.2.3.3 Arrival of Covid-19 in the United States (via Inbound Travellers from China and Italy)
			2.2.3.4 Provisional Conclusions
		2.2.4 Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer
		2.2.5 The (Abominable) Situation of the Health Care Sector at the Beginning of 2020
		2.2.6 The (Abominable) Situation of the Nursing Home Sector in Early 2020
		2.2.7 Supremacy of Economic Interests
		2.2.8 Neoliberal Education (as a System of Childcare for Working Parents)
		2.2.9 In-Between Conclusion: Neoliberal Public Policy Choices Having Delivered Some of the Main Reasons for the Fast Spread of...
	2.3 The EU´s Utter Lack of Coordination in Responding Early to the Covid-19 Crisis During February and Early-March 2020
	2.4 Covid-19 Response in Some Specific European Countries
		2.4.1 First Indications of Trouble (March 2020)
			2.4.1.1 An Italian Wakeup Call
			2.4.1.2 The Role of Ischgl in the Contamination of the European Continent Revisited
			2.4.1.3 Attempts at Classification
		2.4.2 Response of European Countries During the First Year of the Covid-19 Pandemic (±March 2020 to ±March 2021)
			2.4.2.1 Countries That Have Reacted-More or Less-Decently
				2.4.2.1.1 Nordic and Baltic States
				2.4.2.1.2 Greece
				2.4.2.1.3 Germany
				2.4.2.1.4 Austria
			2.4.2.2 European Countries That (Initially) Responded (Rather) Poorly
				2.4.2.2.1 Sweden
				2.4.2.2.2 Czechia
			2.4.2.3 European Countries That (Already from the Start) Responded (Rather) Miserably
				2.4.2.3.1 Italy
				2.4.2.3.2 France
				2.4.2.3.3 Spain
				2.4.2.3.4 The Netherlands
				2.4.2.3.5 The United Kingdom
					2.4.2.3.5.1 Failed Attempts of Coping with the Covid-19 Pandemic
					2.4.2.3.5.2 Economic Impact During 2020
						2.4.2.3.5.2.1 Overall Economic Consequences
						2.4.2.3.5.2.2 Estimates About the UK Government Spending
					2.4.2.3.5.3 The UK Roadmap Out of Lockdown
				2.4.2.3.6 Belgium
					2.4.2.3.6.1 Introduction
					2.4.2.3.6.2 February 2020: ``Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer´´ (or ``No Need To Be Drama Queens´´)
					2.4.2.3.6.3 March 2020: Containment Measures
					2.4.2.3.6.4 April 2020: Reopening of the Economy
					2.4.2.3.6.5 In-Between Assessment of Belgium´s Handling of the First Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic
					2.4.2.3.6.6 May 2020: Towards the Second Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic
					2.4.2.3.6.7 October to November 2020: Belgium´s Second Wave
					2.4.2.3.6.8 Early 2021
			2.4.2.4 By Comparison (1): The Successful Examples of Taiwan, New Zealand and South Korea
				2.4.2.4.1 Taiwan
				2.4.2.4.2 New Zealand
				2.4.2.4.3 Some Ups and Downs of the Covid-19 Containment Attempts in South Korea
				2.4.2.4.4 Lessons from the Approach of Taiwan, New Zealand, and South Korea for Other Countries
			2.4.2.5 By Comparison (2): The Failed Example of Brazil
		2.4.3 Second Year-and Third Wave-of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the EU and Its Member States
			2.4.3.1 When, Despite Several WHO Warnings, the Third Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic Still Hit Europe
			2.4.3.2 End-March 2021 Containment Measures
			2.4.3.3 Looking for Explanations
				2.4.3.3.1 Introduction
				2.4.3.3.2 New SARS-CoV-2 Variants
				2.4.3.3.3 The EU Vaccination Disaster
				2.4.3.3.4 Covid-19 Pandemic Fatigue
			2.4.3.4 End-April 2021: Relaxing the Covid-19 Lockdown Measures
	2.5 Covid-19 Response in the United States
		2.5.1 The Early Days
		2.5.2 President Donald Trump´s Many Political Shenanigans in (Not) Dealing with the Covid-19 Pandemic
		2.5.3 America´s Withdrawal from the WHO
		2.5.4 Practical Handling of the Covid-19 Crisis in the United States by the Trump Administration
			2.5.4.1 The Missing First Six Weeks
			2.5.4.2 March 2020 to April 2020: On Proclaiming Covid-19 a Hoax, Advising the Use of Hydroxychloroquine, Disinfectant, and UV...
				2.5.4.2.1 Overview of the Trump Administration´s Health Policy of March 2020
				2.5.4.2.2 The Political Debate on Hydroxychloroquine
			2.5.4.3 May 2020 to June 2020: Reopening the Economy, While Facing Rising Figures
			2.5.4.4 Summer 2020: New Signs of Trouble
			2.5.4.5 August 2020: The Sturgis Motorcycle Rally
			2.5.4.6 September 2020: Some New Insights and Measures
			2.5.4.7 October 2020: The US President and First Lady Catch Covid-19
			2.5.4.8 New England Journal of Medicine Editorial Interim Evaluation
			2.5.4.9 October 2020 to December 2020: Rising Number of Cases and Deaths
		2.5.5 Assessment of the Trump Administration´s Policy on Covid-19
		2.5.6 Situation in the United States Early-March 2021
		2.5.7 The Third Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the United States
		2.5.8 Tragedy in the US Prisons
	2.6 Conclusions
	References
Chapter 3: Monetary Response to and Financial Implications of Covid-19
	3.1 Monetary Response to Covid-19 in General
	3.2 Monetary Response by the European Monetary Union
		3.2.1 General
			3.2.1.1 Background of the ECB Monetary Policy from 2008 Until 2020
			3.2.1.2 A Legal Discussion
		3.2.2 Interest Rate Policy
		3.2.3 Deploying Monetary Tools in Response to the Covid-19 Outbreak
			3.2.3.1 Refinancing Operations
				3.2.3.1.1 General
				3.2.3.1.2 Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)
				3.2.3.1.3 Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs)
				3.2.3.1.4 Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (PELTROs)
			3.2.3.2 Quantitative Easing
				3.2.3.2.1 General
				3.2.3.2.2 Asset Purchase Programme (APP)
				3.2.3.2.3 Use of the APP During the Covid-19 Pandemic
				3.2.3.2.4 Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme (PEPP)
			3.2.3.3 Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP)
		3.2.4 EMU Collateral Framework
			3.2.4.1 Origin and Original Scope
			3.2.4.2 Adaptation to the EMU Collateral Framework due to Covid-19
		3.2.5 Currency Repo and Swap Lines
		3.2.6 Evaluation
	3.3 United States
		3.3.1 General
		3.3.2 Interest Rate Policy and Forward Guidance
		3.3.3 Measures to Support Financial Markets
			3.3.3.1 General
			3.3.3.2 Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)
			3.3.3.3 Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF)
			3.3.3.4 Repo Market Policy
		3.3.4 Loans to Banks
		3.3.5 Quantitative Easing
		3.3.6 Support Measures for Corporations and Businesses
			3.3.6.1 Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities
			3.3.6.2 Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
		3.3.7 Main Street Lending Program (and Similar Programs)
		3.3.8 Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility
		3.3.9 Further Support to Households and Consumers
		3.3.10 Supporting State and Municipal Borrowing
		3.3.11 US Money Markets Policy
		3.3.12 Evaluation of the FED´s Covid-19 Policy
	3.4 IMF
		3.4.1 IMF Policy in General
		3.4.2 IMF Monitoring and Coordination
		3.4.3 IMF´s General Debt Policy
		3.4.4 IMF Support Through Loans
			3.4.4.1 General
			3.4.4.2 (Eased Conditions of Borrowing Under the IMF) Stand-By Arrangement (SBA)
			3.4.4.3 (Eased Conditions of Borrowing Under the IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
			3.4.4.4  Rapid Credit Facility (RCF)
			3.4.4.5  Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI)
			3.4.4.6 Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL)
			3.4.4.7 Extended Credit Facility (ECF)
			3.4.4.8 Flexible Credit Line (FCL)
			3.4.4.9 Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL)
			3.4.4.10 Standby Credit Facility (SCF)
			3.4.4.11 Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT)
			3.4.4.12 Overview in Some Tables
		3.4.5 IMF Surveillance
			3.4.5.1 General
			3.4.5.2 Country Surveillance
				3.4.5.2.1 General Characteristics
				3.4.5.2.2 The 2020 Article IV Report with Regard to the United States
			3.4.5.3 Regional Surveillance
				3.4.5.3.1 General
				3.4.5.3.2 The 2020 Article IV Report Concerning the Euro Area
			3.4.5.4 Global Surveillance
	3.5 Increase of Debt
		3.5.1 Introduction
		3.5.2 Global Debt in General and Government Debt in Particular
			3.5.2.1 Findings of the Institute of International Finance
			3.5.2.2 Findings of Eurostat
			3.5.2.3 Findings of the ``World Debt Clock´´
			3.5.2.4 Assessment by the IMF
			3.5.2.5 Public Debt-to-GDP Ratio in the EU
		3.5.3 Private Debt
			3.5.3.1 Findings of the Institute of International Finance
			3.5.3.2 Findings of Eurostat
	3.6 Conclusions
	References
	I. Doctrine
Chapter 4: Fiscal Policy and State Aids
	4.1 General
	4.2 Fiscal Policy and State Aids in the EU, the Euro Area and Their Respective Member States
		4.2.1 Introduction
		4.2.2 Background of the EU Fiscal Support Policy
			4.2.2.1 Initial Covid-19 Response by the EU-Authorities
			4.2.2.2 Measures Regarding the Stability and Growth Pact: Activation of the General Escape Clause
			4.2.2.3 Further Fiscal Policy Considerations About the Impact of Covid-19 on the Economic Situation
				4.2.2.3.1 Economic Impact and Outlook of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the EU and the Euro Area
				4.2.2.3.2 Early Expectations of Implementing the Next Generation EU Programme
		4.2.3 Instalment of Specific EU Measures Allowing for Covid-19 Support
			4.2.3.1 General Overview of the EU Support and Recovery Plans and Measures
			4.2.3.2 Safety Nets for Workers, Enterprises, and Member States
				4.2.3.2.1 Early Covid-19 Initiatives
				4.2.3.2.2 Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE)
					4.2.3.2.2.1 Establishment of SURE
					4.2.3.2.2.2 Overview of SURE Support by March 2021
					4.2.3.2.2.3 Legal Aspects of SURE
					4.2.3.2.2.4 The Example of Belgium
			4.2.3.3 A Recovery Plan for Europe
				4.2.3.3.1 Decision-Making Steps
				4.2.3.3.2 Two Main Parts of the Recovery Plan for Europe
				4.2.3.3.3 Three Pillars of NextGenerationEU
					4.2.3.3.3.1 Pillar I: Recovery Support
						4.2.3.3.3.1.1 Overview
						4.2.3.3.3.1.2 Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)
						4.2.3.3.3.1.3 React-EU
						4.2.3.3.3.1.4 Supporting the Green Transition
					4.2.3.3.3.2 Pillar II: Kick-Starting the Economy
						4.2.3.3.3.2.1 General
						4.2.3.3.3.2.2 InvestEU
						4.2.3.3.3.2.3 Proposal for a Solvency Support Instrument
					4.2.3.3.3.3 Pillar III: Learning Lessons from the Covid-19 Crisis
						4.2.3.3.3.3.1 General
						4.2.3.3.3.3.2 New Health Program ``EU4Health´´
						4.2.3.3.3.3.3 Reinforcing ``rescEU´´
	4.3 Actual Fiscal Policy of the EU and the EU/Euro Area Member States in Times of Covid-19
		4.3.1 The National Fiscal Policy Responses: Addressing the Covid-19 Pandemic, Sustaining the Economy and Supporting a Sustaina...
			4.3.1.1 Findings by the EU Commission
			4.3.1.2 Illustration: The Example of France
		4.3.2 The EU Policy Response: Making Best Use of the General Escape Clause and `Next Generation EU´
	4.4 United States
		4.4.1 Overview
		4.4.2 The ``Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act´´ (or ``CARES Act´´)
			4.4.2.1 Passing of the CARES Act
			4.4.2.2 General Budgetary Impact of the CARES Act
			4.4.2.3 Content of the CARES Act, in Headlines
			4.4.2.4 Further Details About Specific Components/Programs of the CARES Act
				4.4.2.4.1 Paycheck Protection Program
				4.4.2.4.2 Federal Stimulus Relief for Severely Distressed Economic Sectors
				4.4.2.4.3 Passenger Air Carriers and Related Enterprises in Particular
				4.4.2.4.4 Support for FED Liquidity Programs and Facilities
				4.4.2.4.5 Further Measures of Relief to Enterprises
					4.4.2.4.5.1 Credit for Covering Part of Employee Wages
					4.4.2.4.5.2 Delay of Employer Payroll Taxes
				4.4.2.4.6 Tax Rebates and Other Measures to the Benefit of Individuals and Families
				4.4.2.4.7 Healthcare Provisions
				4.4.2.4.8 Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF)
		4.4.3 The Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA), 2021
		4.4.4 The American Rescue Plan Act, 2021
	4.5 Conclusions
	References
	I. Legislation
Chapter 5: General Healthcare
	5.1 Theoretical Debate
		5.1.1 General: Towards the Marketization of the Healthcare Sector
		5.1.2 Left-Wing Criticism and (Neo)conservative Ethics Feeding Neoliberal Reforms
			5.1.2.1 General
			5.1.2.2 The Marriage of Left-Wing, Neoliberal, and Conservative Ideas on Healthcare in the United States
			5.1.2.3 The Marriage Between Left-Wing, Neoliberal and Conservative Ideas on Healthcare in Western Europe
			5.1.2.4 Neoliberal Reform of the Healthcare Sector as of the 1980s
			5.1.2.5 Some Further Ideas from After the Year 2000
			5.1.2.6 The Result: Towards a ``Marketized´´ Health Care System
			5.1.2.7 The Impact of Neoliberal Politics on the Quality of Healthcare
			5.1.2.8 Some (Scarce) Further Data on the Impact of Neoliberal Policy Choices
			5.1.2.9 Further Research Methodology
	5.2 Practical Outlook of the Healthcare Sector Before Covid-19
		5.2.1 The EU
			5.2.1.1 General Characteristics of the European Healthcare Sector in 2018
				5.2.1.1.1 Introduction
				5.2.1.1.2 Health Insurance Coverage
				5.2.1.1.3 Extent of Healthcare Coverage
				5.2.1.1.4 Availability of Doctors
				5.2.1.1.5 Availability of Nurses
				5.2.1.1.6 Hospital Beds
			5.2.1.2 Impact of EU Neoliberal Austerity
				5.2.1.2.1 EU Monetary and Fiscal Policy as a Method of Inciting EU Member States to Take Austerity Measures Regarding Their He...
				5.2.1.2.2 Methods of Deploying EU (Monetary and Fiscal) Austerity Policy in Practice
					5.2.1.2.2.1 General
					5.2.1.2.2.2 A Letter from the ECB to Italy on 5 August 2011
					5.2.1.2.2.3 European Semester
					5.2.1.2.2.4 Further Implementation of the Neoliberal Austerity Agenda on Healthcare
				5.2.1.2.3 The Resulting Outlook of the Healthcare Sector (by the Time Covid-19 Hit the European Continent)
				5.2.1.2.4 Further Data on the Impact of EU Austerity Policy in the Healthcare Sector in Some EU Member States
					5.2.1.2.4.1 Italy
					5.2.1.2.4.2 Spain
					5.2.1.2.4.3 Greece
					5.2.1.2.4.4 Germany
					5.2.1.2.4.5 Ireland
					5.2.1.2.4.6 Belgium
				5.2.1.2.5 Some Specific Facts and Opinions on the Impact of the Austerity Policy in the Healthcare Sector of the United Kingdo...
			5.2.1.3 Provisional Conclusions
		5.2.2 Looking for an Equilibrium Between Marketization and Governance Aid in the United States
			5.2.2.1 Healthcare in the United States Before 2008
			5.2.2.2 Medicare
				5.2.2.2.1 General Characteristics of Medicare
				5.2.2.2.2 A Brief History of Medicare
			5.2.2.3 Medicaid
			5.2.2.4 Obamacare
				5.2.2.4.1 Enactment of the ACA/Obamacare
				5.2.2.4.2 Main Impact of Obamacare on the US Healthcare System
			5.2.2.5 The General Outlook of the US Hospital Sector
			5.2.2.6 Further Decline of the Healthcare Sector Under President Donald Trump
				5.2.2.6.1 General Assessment of Trump´s Healthcare Policy
				5.2.2.6.2 ACA Under Trump
					5.2.2.6.2.1 Neoliberal Healthcare Policy of the Trump Administration in General
					5.2.2.6.2.2 Attempts to Repeal the ACA
					5.2.2.6.2.3 Attacks of the Trump Administration on Medicaid
					5.2.2.6.2.4 Trump´s Healthcare Financing Vision and Some Further Implications of Trump´s Healthcare Marketization Efforts
	5.3 Impact of Covid-19
		5.3.1 The EU: When the Free Market Becomes a Killing Machine-Part 1
			5.3.1.1 The Devastating Impact of EU Neoliberal Austerity on Private Hospitals´ Lesser Use in Fighting Covid-19
				5.3.1.1.1 ICU Beds Shortages and Their Causes
				5.3.1.1.2 Some Further Findings of the Corporate Europe Observatory
				5.3.1.1.3 Some Further Research Results on the Detrimental Impact of Neoliberal Policy
			5.3.1.2 Situation in Some European Countries
				5.3.1.2.1 Belgium
				5.3.1.2.2 Italy
				5.3.1.2.3 Spain
				5.3.1.2.4 The United Kingdom
		5.3.2 The United States
			5.3.2.1 Introduction
			5.3.2.2 Shortages
			5.3.2.3 Looking for Solutions
	5.4 Trump´s Disregard for Workers´ Health During the Covid-19 Pandemic
	5.5 Conclusions
		5.5.1 Assessment by the Corporate Europe Observatory
		5.5.2 Taking the Reform Debate One (Big) Step Further
	References
	I. Doctrine
Chapter 6: Covid-19 and the Sector of the Long-Term Nursing Homes
	6.1 The Long-Term Nursing Home Sector Before Covid-19
		6.1.1 Europe
			6.1.1.1 European Privatization Climate as of the 1990s
			6.1.1.2 Methods Deployed for Privatizing Public (Health) Institutions in General
			6.1.1.3 General Public Policy Supporting the Privatization of Nursing Homes
			6.1.1.4 Some Figures
				6.1.1.4.1 Public Versus Private Nursing Homes
				6.1.1.4.2 Available Beds in Nursing Homes
				6.1.1.4.3 Size of the Nursing Homes
				6.1.1.4.4 Number of Staff
				6.1.1.4.5 Number of Service Users
		6.1.2 The United States
			6.1.2.1 The Changing Structure of the Nursing Home Industry in the 1980s
			6.1.2.2 Present-Day Outlook of the Nursing Home Sector
	6.2 Impact of Covid-19
		6.2.1 Europe: When the Free Market Becomes a Killing Machine-Part 2
			6.2.1.1 Why European Nursing Homes Were Unprepared for Covid-19
				6.2.1.1.1 The General Landscape of Nursing Homes by 2020
				6.2.1.1.2 Issues with Quality
			6.2.1.2 Covid-19 Hitting the Sector of the EU Nursing Homes Hard
				6.2.1.2.1 General Unpreparedness of the EU Nursing Homes Sector
				6.2.1.2.2 Some Elementary Numbers
			6.2.1.3 Covid-19 Hitting the Nursing Homes of Some Countries
				6.2.1.3.1 The Disastrous Impact of Covid-19 on the Belgian Nursing Homes
				6.2.1.3.2 Spain
					6.2.1.3.2.1 Finding the Dead in Nursing Home Beds
					6.2.1.3.2.2 Figures Released on 3 March 2021
				6.2.1.3.3 The United Kingdom
			6.2.1.4 Aftermath
		6.2.2 The United States
			6.2.2.1 Covid-19 in American Long-Term Nursing Homes
				6.2.2.1.1 Numbers and Cases
				6.2.2.1.2 Causes
			6.2.2.2 The United States´ Own Aftermath
	6.3 Conclusions
	References
	I. Legislation
	II. Doctrine
Chapter 7: Covid-19´s Impact on Labour
	7.1 Introduction
		7.1.1 Neoliberalism and Its Disturbed Relationship with Labour: Hence, with Man
		7.1.2 Some Further Insights in the Theoretical Background Regarding the Hierarchy Scale Between Capital and Labour Within (Neo...
		7.1.3 The Role of the State in Regulating Labour Markets
	7.2 The Impact of Covid-19 on Labour
		7.2.1 General
		7.2.2 The Unequal Impact of the Crisis
		7.2.3 Collapse in Employment and Hours Worked
		7.2.4 Unemployment
		7.2.5 Changes in Wages and Incomes
	7.3 (Re-)Organizing the Working Floor
		7.3.1 Introduction
		7.3.2 Telework
		7.3.3 Adopting Strict Health and Safety Standards in the Workplace
		7.3.4 Unaddressed Mental Health Issues
	7.4 Providing Sickness Benefits and Paid Leave to All Workers
	7.5 Addressing Unforeseen Care Needs
	7.6 Addressing Discrimination, Stigma, and Exclusion
	7.7 Securing Jobs, Supporting Companies, and Maintaining Essential Service Provision
		7.7.1 Introduction
		7.7.2 Job-Retention Schemes: Short-Time Work and Wage-Subsidies
		7.7.3 Limiting Economic Dismissals and Protecting Workers Against Unfair Dismissals, or From Becoming Irregular Workers
		7.7.4 Liquidity Support for Enterprises
	7.8 Income Support for Those Losing Their Job or Self-Employment Income
	7.9 Employment Services and Training for Jobseekers and Workers
	7.10 Plans for Reopening the Economy
		7.10.1 Neoliberal Strategies of Reopening the Economy (and Why These Can Be Lethal)
			7.10.1.1 Underlying Neoliberal Ideas
			7.10.1.2 Trump´s Plan for ``Opening Up America Again´´
			7.10.1.3 In-Between Evaluation
		7.10.2 Ensuring the Safety of Re-Opened Workplaces (Enough)
		7.10.3 Adapting Job Retention Programmes
		7.10.4 Ensuring Adequate Income Protection
	7.11 Some Case Studies
		7.11.1 Meat Processing Factories
			7.11.1.1 Introduction
				7.11.1.1.1 Economic Background: The Iron Law of the Wages Having More Lives Than the Proverbial Cat
				7.11.1.1.2 The Meat Processing Industry as One of the Spreading Industries of Covid-19
					7.11.1.1.2.1 Working Floor Conditions
					7.11.1.1.2.2 Socio-Demographic Factors and Working Conditions
			7.11.1.2 Outbreaks in Specific Regions/Countries
				7.11.1.2.1 General
				7.11.1.2.2 The United States
					7.11.1.2.2.1 The US Livestock- and Poultry-Processing Industry and Its Inherent Vulnerability for Covid-19
					7.11.1.2.2.2 The Case of Smithfield Foods Pork-Processing
				7.11.1.2.3 Germany
					7.11.1.2.3.1 Introduction
					7.11.1.2.3.2 Several Early Outbreaks in Meat Processing Factories
					7.11.1.2.3.3 Tönnies
					7.11.1.2.3.4 Change of the Law
				7.11.1.2.4 The Netherlands
				7.11.1.2.5 Belgium
				7.11.1.2.6 The United Kingdom
			7.11.1.3 Long-Term Policy Considerations
		7.11.2 Revisiting the Case of Amazon
			7.11.2.1 The Issue of Labour Conditions in the Amazon-Empire Before the Covid-19 Pandemic
			7.11.2.2 Amazon in Times of Covid-19
				7.11.2.2.1 Rising Market Shares
				7.11.2.2.2 Impact on Amazon´s Labourers of Covid-19
				7.11.2.2.3 Failed Attempts to Unionize
	7.12 Conclusions
	References
		I. Doctrine
Chapter 8: Covid-19 and Schools
	8.1 Problems with School Closures
		8.1.1 General
		8.1.2 2020 Joint Report by UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank Measuring the Impact of School Closures and Remote Schooling
			8.1.2.1 Key-Elements on Assessing the Impact of School Closures
				8.1.2.1.1 School Closures in General
				8.1.2.1.2 Closures of Higher Education Institutions in Particular
			8.1.2.2 Key-Elements on Assessing the Impact of Distant Learning
			8.1.2.3 The Debate on the Reopening of Schools
		8.1.3 Evaluation of the Effectiveness of School Closures as NPIs
	8.2 Problems Resulting from School Closures
		8.2.1 Lost Learning Opportunities
		8.2.2 Learning Assessment and Monitoring
			8.2.2.1 Learning Assessment and Monitoring in Primary and Secondary School Settings
			8.2.2.2 Learning Assessment and Monitoring in HEIs
		8.2.3 Health, Mental and Other Similar Problems
			8.2.3.1 A Global Problem
			8.2.3.2 The United Kingdom
			8.2.3.3 The United States
		8.2.4 Health and Mental Problems of Teachers
		8.2.5 Problems for Parents
		8.2.6 School Closures and Social Inequalities
		8.2.7 Costs to Schools and Economic Impact of School Closures
		8.2.8 Specific Problems Related to Higher Education
	8.3 Search for Alternative Solutions
		8.3.1 General
		8.3.2 Distant Learning
			8.3.2.1 Distant Learning in General
			8.3.2.2 Distant Learning in HEIs in Particular
		8.3.3 Policies to Improve Access to Online Learning
		8.3.4 Teacher Support Policies
		8.3.5 Further Public and Private Initiatives to Ensure Access to Technologies
		8.3.6 Support for Parents
		8.3.7 Government Support for HEIs
	8.4 Reopening of Schools
		8.4.1 Policy Considerations
		8.4.2 Re-Opening Plans and Strategies
		8.4.3 Safeguard Measures and Health Protocols
			8.4.3.1 General
			8.4.3.2 Prevalence and Content of Health and Hygiene Protocols
			8.4.3.3 Resources for Implementing Health and Hygiene Protocols
		8.4.4 Risks to Staff
		8.4.5 Evaluation of the Impact of the Reopening of Schools
	8.5 Conclusions
	References
Chapter 9: Covid-19 Vaccines and Medicines
	9.1 General
	9.2 Free Market Organization
		9.2.1 General: Impact of the Pursuit of Profits as Leading Societal Principle
		9.2.2 Free Market Organized Research and Innovation
		9.2.3 A First Idea of the Real Benefits
			9.2.3.1 Introduction
			9.2.3.2 Pfizer and BioNTech
			9.2.3.3 Moderna
			9.2.3.4 Johnson and Johnson (JandJ)
			9.2.3.5 Oxford-AstraZeneca (Ox-AZ)
		9.2.4 Calls for an Alternative Approach
	9.3 Some Major Milestones in the Race for the Development of Covid-19 Vaccines, -Drugs and -Tests
		9.3.1 The Race for the Development of Covid-19 Vaccines
			9.3.1.1 Underlying Research
			9.3.1.2 Early Development of the Covid-19 Vaccines
			9.3.1.3 Some Milestones Regarding the Further Development, Testing and Regulatory Approval of the Covid-19 Vaccines
			9.3.1.4 Problems with AstraZeneca´s and Johnson and Johnson´s Regulatory Authorisation in the United States and Elsewhere
				9.3.1.4.1 Regulatory Issues with AstraZeneca´s Covid-19 Vaccine
				9.3.1.4.2 Regulatory Issues Concerning the Johnson and Johnson Vaccine
				9.3.1.4.3 Other Effects of Regulatory Issues Related to the Oxford-AstraZeneca and Johnson and Johnson Covid-19 Vaccines
			9.3.1.5 Interval and Mixed Dosing in Relation to the Need for a Third Dose and Regular Booster Injections
			9.3.1.6 Ethical Considerations of the Catholic Church
		9.3.2 Medicines and Treatments for Covid-19
			9.3.2.1 General
			9.3.2.2 Rest and Hydration
			9.3.2.3 Antiviral Drugs
				9.3.2.3.1 General
				9.3.2.3.2 Ibuprofen and Acetaminophen
				9.3.2.3.3 Remdesivir
				9.3.2.3.4 Baricitinib
				9.3.2.3.5 Lopinavir and Ritonavir
			9.3.2.4 Immunosuppressive/Anti-Inflammatory Drugs
			9.3.2.5 Corticosteroids
			9.3.2.6 Monoclonal Antibody Treatments
				9.3.2.6.1 Overview
				9.3.2.6.2 Regulatory Approvals
			9.3.2.7 Convalescent Plasma
			9.3.2.8 Steroids
			9.3.2.9 Interferon Beta
			9.3.2.10 Hydroxychloroquine
				9.3.2.10.1 The Science
				9.3.2.10.2 The Politics
			9.3.2.11 Medication for Blood Clots
			9.3.2.12 Vitamins
		9.3.3 Covid-19 Tests
			9.3.3.1 General
			9.3.3.2 Molecular tests: RNA-PCR
			9.3.3.3 Antigen Tests
			9.3.3.4 Antibody Tests
	9.4 Vaccination Campaigns
		9.4.1 General
		9.4.2 Vaccination in the United States
			9.4.2.1 December 2020: Successful Start of the American Vaccination Campaign (Notwithstanding a Vaccination Mistrust of a Subs...
			9.4.2.2 Progress of the Covid-19 Vaccination Campaign in February and March 2021
			9.4.2.3 March 2021: President Joe Biden´s Further Vaccination Efforts
			9.4.2.4 25 March 2021: New Vaccination Targets
			9.4.2.5 Biden´s Approval Rating in Mid-April 2021
			9.4.2.6 Vaccination of the US Health Sector
			9.4.2.7 Prognosis on Herd Immunity
		9.4.3 The EU´s (initially) Failed Vaccination Strategy
			9.4.3.1 A Wrong Sense of Solidarity as the Starting Point of the EU´s Failed Vaccination Strategy
			9.4.3.2 March-May 2020: Choosing Prestige Over Common Sense and Efficiency
			9.4.3.3 June 2020: The EU´s New Vaccine Strategy-Choosing Stinginess Over Human Lives and Economic Sense
			9.4.3.4 Being the Last in Entering Into Contracts with the mRNA-Vaccine Producers, But Still Being Proud of It
			9.4.3.5 Lack of Awareness That, Ultimately, the European Population Would Have to Pay the Price for the EU´s Many Mistakes in ...
			9.4.3.6 Further Comparison with the Approach of the United Kingdom and the United States
			9.4.3.7 Late Start of the Vaccination Campaign in the EU and Problems with Supply Shortages
			9.4.3.8 Criticism on the EU´s Stinginess
			9.4.3.9 In Between-Conclusions Regarding the EU´s Failed Covid-19 Vaccines Procurement Policy
			9.4.3.10 Aftermath
				9.4.3.10.1 March 2021: Searching for a Scapegoat
				9.4.3.10.2 Situation on 1 April 2021: Hardly an April Fools-Joke
				9.4.3.10.3 Further Covid-19 Vaccine Problems and the Search for Solutions
			9.4.3.11 Some Final Data from April-May 2021
		9.4.4 The UK Vaccination Campaign
			9.4.4.1 The Successful Procurement Approach of ``Kate The Great´´
			9.4.4.2 The Result: An Accelerated Vaccination Campaign
	9.5 Face Mask Wearing
	9.6 Conclusions
		9.6.1 The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
		9.6.2 Vaccine Nationalism
		9.6.3 Calls for an Alternative Approach
		9.6.4 A Surprising Response from US President Joe Biden
		9.6.5 And Furthermore
	References
Chapter 10: Covid-19 and Inequality
	10.1 Introduction: Historical Precedents
	10.2 Covid-19 and Socio-Economic Inequalities in General
	10.3 Covid-19 and Health(Care) Inequalities
		10.3.1 Postulates by Bambra, Riordan, Ford, and Matthews
			10.3.1.1 General
			10.3.1.2 Covid-19 as a ``Syndemic´´
			10.3.1.3 Impact of Some Socio-Economic Determinants of Health
				10.3.1.3.1 Housing and Working Conditions
				10.3.1.3.2 Mental Conditions
			10.3.1.4 Other Health Consequences of Covid-19
		10.3.2 Differences Between Countries
			10.3.2.1 Inequalities Between Countries in the Treatment of Covid-19
			10.3.2.2 Covid-19 and Inequality in the United Kingdom: Summary of the Findings of the 2020 Covid-19 Marmot Review
			10.3.2.3 Covid-19 and Inequality in the United States
	10.4 Global Inequality Regarding Access to the Covid-19 Vaccines
	10.5 Conclusions
		10.5.1 General Assessment
		10.5.2 Re-addressing the Plea for a New Care State Model
	References
Chapter 11: Final Conclusions
	11.1 Impact of Two Crises on the Monetary and Fiscal Policy Levels
		11.1.1 General
		11.1.2 Quantitative Easing, and Some of Its Consequences
		11.1.3 Similar Consequences of Neoliberal, Fiscal Policy
		11.1.4 Increasing Debt Levels
	11.2 What Will Be Further at Stake in the World Post Covid-19
	11.3 Revisiting the Outlook of a New International Monetary Order
	11.4 Addressing the Monetary Financing Prohibition Argument
	11.5 Re-establishing a Clear Public Good or General Interest Domain vs a Free Market Domain
	11.6 The Covid-19 Crisis Fortifying the Case for a New International Monetary Order Even More
	References