Conflicts, Crimes and Regulations in Cyberspace

Cover
	Half-Title Page
	Title Page
	Copyright Page
	Contents
	Introduction
1 The United States, States and the False Claims of the End of the Global Internet
	1.1. Introduction
	1.2. The creation of the internet and the development of cyberspace by the United States
		1.2.1. The first international telecommunications systems developed by all states
		1.2.2. The creation and development of the internet by the United States
		1.2.3. International management controlled by the United States
		1.2.4. A sociotechnical system bearing a composite American ideology
		1.2.5. The false recomposition of the global sociotechnical system: the global summits on the information society
	1.3. Cyberspace transformed by the arrival in force of states
		1.3.1. State intentions in “national strategies”: a global approach
		1.3.2. Russian–American structural disagreements on information security and cybersecurity
		1.3.3. Discussions on cybersecurity: the symbolic international restoration of the coercive state
	1.4. Praxis of state coercion in cyberspace
		1.4.1. Intelligence and surveillance activities in the digital environment
		1.4.2. Non-military cyber operations
		1.4.3. Interstate digital conflicts, secrecy and coercive diplomacy
	1.5. The fragmentation of the global internet and the digital sovereignty of states
		1.5.1. Linguistic balkanization: Digital Babel
		1.5.2. Political fragmentation: alternative internets
	1.6. The strong constraint of interstate cooperation for all states
		1.6.1. Interstate agreements on an embryo of international law
		1.6.2. State dependence on international cooperation for cybersecurity
	1.7. Conclusion
	1.8. References
2 Cybersecurity in America: The US National Security Apparatus and Cyber Conflict Management
	2.1. Introduction
	2.2. Societal and institutional dynamics
	2.3. Organizational and bureaucratic dynamics
	2.4. Individual dynamics
	2.5. Conclusion
	2.6. References
3 Separation of Offensive and Defensive Functions: The Originality of the French Cyberdefense Model Called into Question?
	3.1. Introduction1
	3.2. A model designed and developed in response to the threats and challenges of the early 2010s
		3.2.1. An organizational model apparently based on two main actors
		3.2.2. The commitment to a strict offensive/defensive separation
	3.3. A strict separation of offensive and defensive functions and missions: an obstacle to better defense?
		3.3.1. A rapidly changing context: an increasingly significant threat from the most advanced states
		3.3.2. Limits that have become obstacles to accomplishing cyberdefense missions
		3.3.3. An institutionalized rapprochement of the actors of defensive and offensive parts in the name of cyberdefense missions: from mitigation to obliteration?
	3.4. Conclusion
	3.5. References
4 The Boundary Between Cybercrime and Cyberwar: An Uncertain No-Man’s Land
	4.1. Introduction
	4.2. The field of cybercrime up to the limits of the glass ceiling
		4.2.1. The field of cybercrime: an attempt at delimitation
		4.2.2. Cybercrime, the “21st century crime”
		4.2.3. Cyber conflict at the edge of the glass ceiling
	4.3. War in cyberspace, cyber in war
		4.3.1. Cyber in war, a daily reality
		4.3.2. Autonomous warfare in the cyber world: the test of the law of armed conflict
		4.3.3. Digital cyber persuasion
	4.5. References
5 Cyberdefense, the Digital Dimension of National Security
	5.1. Introduction
	5.2. Cyberdefense in the political and legal framework of digital security
		5.2.1. A definition of cyberdefense
		5.2.2. Linking cyberdefense to national security strategy
	5.3. The emergence of a coherent legal regime for cyberdefense
		5.3.1. The legal basis of the permanent cyberdefense posture
		5.3.2. Exceptional instruments for responding to a crisis
	5.4. Conclusion
	5.5. References
6 Omnipresence Without Omnipotence: The US Campaign Against Huawei in the 5G Era
	6.1. Introduction
	6.2. The unilateral American offensive against Huawei: a disruptive campaign causing significant collateral damage
	6.2.1. Huawei: an “unusual and extraordinary” threat to the United States’ position in the international order
	6.2.2. A political, legal and economic offensive against Huawei, causing significant collateral damage
	6.3. The American diplomatic offensive: the limits of American rhetorical coercion of their partners and allies
	6.3.1. Educating rather than persuading: an attempt to rhetorically coerce partners and allies
	6.3.2. Successful agenda setting but limited rhetorical coercion
	6.3.3. American rhetorical coercion in the special relationship
	6.4. The anti-Huawei offensive: a barometer of American power?
	6.5. References
7 The Issue of Personal and Sovereign Data in the Light of an Emerging “International Law of Intelligence”
	7.1. Introduction
	7.2. The legal rules invoked in the collection of personal and sovereign data
		7.2.1. Right to privacy versus general communications surveillance
		7.2.2. Violation of territorial sovereignty versus cyberespionage
	7.3. Data localization in the light of international intelligence law
		7.3.1. Data fluidity versus data storage
		7.3.2. Datasphere versus international intelligence law
	7.4. Conclusion
	7.5. Appendix: the quadrants of intelligence law
	7.6. Sources and references
		7.6.1. Sources
		7.6.2. References
8 International Cybersecurity Cooperation
	8.1. Current attack trends
	8.2. The multiple paths of international cooperation
	8.3. The issue of attack attribution
9 Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity Regulations in the United States: From the Failure of the “Comprehensive Policy” to the Success of the Sectoral Approach
	9.1. Introduction
	9.2. The identification of a new threat and the impact of cyber on how US security and defense policies are designed
	9.3. From the impact of cyber on policy to the impact of politics on cyber
	9.4. From a comprehensive cyber policy to a sectoral approach: the success of an undeclared regulatory policy
	9.5. Conclusion
	9.6. References
List of Authors
Index
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