China's Gambit: The Calculus of Coercion

Cover
Half-title page
Title page
Copyright page
Dedication
Contents
List of Figures
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
1 Introduction
	1.1 Coercion and Chinese Foreign Policy
		1.1.1 Coercion in an Era of Global Economic Interdependence
		1.1.2 Tools of Coercion
		1.1.3 Theories of Rising Powers and Chinese Foreign Policy
	1.2 The Argument
	1.3 Overview of the Book
2 The Cost-Balancing Theory
	2.1 Coercion on a Spectrum
	2.2 The Cost-Balancing Theory
		2.2.1 Issue Importance
		2.2.2 The Need to Establish a Reputation for Resolve
		2.2.3 Economic Cost
			2.2.3.1 Foreign Trade
			2.2.3.2 Domestic Production and Global Supply Chains
			2.2.3.3 International Finance
		2.2.4 Geopolitical Backlash Cost
		2.2.5 Synthesis – A Cost-Balancing Theory
		2.2.6 Weighing the Costs and Benefits
		2.2.7 Measurement
			2.2.7.1 Magnitude of Coercive Measures
			2.2.7.2 Measuring Issue Importance
			2.2.7.3 Measuring the Need to Establish Resolve
			2.2.7.4 Measuring Economic Cost
			2.2.7.5 Measuring Geopolitical Backlash Cost
	2.3 Alternative Hypotheses
		2.3.1 When States Use Coercion
		2.3.2 Tools of Coercion
	2.4 Research Methods
		2.4.1 Case Selection
		2.4.2 Evidence and Sources
3 Coercion in the South China Sea
	3.1 General Trends, Specific Cases, and Theoretical Expectations of the Cost-Balancing Theory
	3.2 Explaining the Temporal Trend of China’s Coercion in the South China Sea
		3.2.1 The Need to Establish a Reputation for Resolve
		3.2.2 Economic Cost
		3.2.3 Geopolitical Backlash Cost
		3.2.4 Result: Temporal Variation in Chinese Coercion and Choices of Coercive Tools
	3.3 Selective Targeting: A Cross-national Case Study of Coercion Toward the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia
		3.3.1 Why China Coerced Some Claimants More Than Others
	3.4 The Sino-Philippine Mischief Incident of 1994–1995
		3.4.1 Why China Used Coercion
	3.5 Divergent Reactions: The Sino-Philippine Scarborough Incidents of 2001 and 2012
		3.5.1 Why China Used Coercion in 2012 but Not in 2001
	3.6 Alternative Explanations
		3.6.1 Individual Leaders
		3.6.2 Bureaucracies and Interest Groups
		3.6.3 Nationalism
		3.6.4 Structural Realism and the Power Variable
		3.6.5 The Utility of Military Coercion
	3.7 Conclusion
4 Sino-Japanese Disputes in the East China Sea
	4.1 General Trends, Specific Cases, and Theoretical Expectations of the Cost-Balancing Theory
	4.2 Explaining the Temporal Trends: Why China Refrained from Coercion Before 2005
		4.2.1 The Need to Establish a Reputation for Resolve
		4.2.2 Economic Cost
		4.2.3 Geopolitical Backlash Cost
		4.2.4 Result: Temporal Variation of Chinese Coercion and Choices of Coercive Tools
	4.3 The 2010 Boat Clash Incident
	4.4 Japan’s Nationalization of the Senkaku Islands in 2012
	4.5 Alternative Explanations
		4.5.1 Individual Leaders
		4.5.2 Bureaucracies and Interest Groups
		4.5.3 Nationalism
		4.5.4 Structural Realism and the Power Variable
		4.5.5 The Utility of Military Coercion
	4.6 Conclusion
5 Coercion in Cross-Strait Relations
	5.1 General Trends, Specific Cases, and Theoretical Expectations of the Cost-Balancing Theory
	5.2 US Arms Sales to Taiwan in 1992
		5.2.1 The Need to Establish Resolve
		5.2.2 Economic Cost
	5.3 The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis
		5.3.1 Explaining the Case
	5.4 Coercion in the Post-2008 Period
		5.4.1 The Need to Establish Resolve
		5.4.2 Economic Cost
		5.4.3 Issue Importance
	5.5 Alternative Explanations
		5.5.1 Individual Leaders
		5.5.2 Bureaucracies and Interest Groups
		5.5.3 Nationalism
		5.5.4 Structural Realism and the Power Variable
		5.5.5 The Utility of Military Coercion
	5.6 Conclusion
6 Tibet and the Dalai Lama Visits
	6.1 General Trends, Specific Cases, and Theoretical Expectations of the Cost-Balancing Theory
	6.2 Explaining the General Trend in Receptions of the Dalai Lama
		6.2.1 The Need to Establish a Reputation for Resolve
		6.2.2 Economic Cost
		6.2.3 Geopolitical Backlash Cost
	6.3 Why Pick on the Europeans but Not Australia?
		6.3.1 Chinese Coercion Toward France and Germany
		6.3.2 Why China Coerced France and Germany
		6.3.3 Why China Did Not Coerce Australia
	6.4 Alternative Explanations
		6.4.1 Individual Leaders
		6.4.2 Bureaucracies and Interest Groups
		6.4.3 Nationalism
		6.4.4 Structural Realism and the Power Variable
		6.4.5 The Utility of Military Coercion
	6.5 Conclusion
7 Conclusion
	7.1 Review of the Argument and Alternative Explanations
	7.2 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Coercion
	7.3 Implications for Research on Chinese Foreign Policy
		7.3.1 Generalizing to Other Issue Areas
		7.3.2 China’s Foreign Policy and Future Trajectory
	7.4 Implications for International Relations Theory
		7.4.1 Generalizing Beyond China
References
Index