Biological Essentialism

Cover
Biological Essentialism
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Preface
1. Resurrecting Biological Essentialism
	1.1 Introduction
	1.2 Evidence of the Consensus
	1.3 An Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism
	1.4 Relational Species Concepts
	1.5 A Crucial Distinction
	1.6 Species Concepts and the Category Problem (2)
	1.7 BSC, ENC, and the Taxon Problem (1)
	1.8 The Conspecificity Route to Error about the Taxon Problem (1)
	1.9 P-CC and the Taxon Problem (1)
	1.10 Variation and Change
		Variation
		Gradual Change
		Indeterminacy
		Arbitrariness
		\"Worldmaking”
		Monsters
		Essentialism?
	1.11 Conclusion
2. Defending Partly Intrinsic Taxon Essentialism
	2.1 Introduction
	2.2 Clarifications
	2.3 Three Important Distinctions
	2.4 Variation
		2.4.1 The Common Cause Hypothesis
		2.4.2 Genetic Variations
		2.4.3 Phenotypic Variations
		2.4.4 Causes of Phenotypic Properties
		2.4.5 Complicated Developmental Pathways
		2.4.6 Disjunctive Developmental Pathways
		2.4.7 Evolving not Timeless
	2.5 “The Added Metaphysical Claim”
	2.6 The Irrelevance of the Species Concepts
	2.7 The Conspecificity Diagnosis
	2.8 The Relational View of Conspecificity (R-CON)
	2.9 The Essence of Implements (“Artifacts”)
	2.10 Godman and Papineau against Partly Intrinsic Taxon Essentialism
	2.11 The Historical Species Essentialism of Godman, Mallozzi, and Papineau
		2.11.1 The “More Fundamental Objection”
		2.11.2 The Positive View
	2.12 Conclusion
3. Historical Biological Essentialism
	3.1 Introduction
	3.2 An Argument for Partly Historical Taxon Essentialism
	3.3 Hypothesis (1): Descended from Certain Particular Actual Organisms
	3.4 Hypothesis (2): Descended from a Certain Kind of Organism (Which Itself has a Wholly Relational Essence)
	3.5 Hypothesis (3): Descended from a Certain Kind of Organism with a Partly Intrinsic Essence
	3.6 Objections: Twin Earth and the Like
	3.7 Conclusion
4. Individual Essentialism in Biology
	4.1 Introduction
	4.2 Individual Essentialism: A Kripkean View
	4.3 An Argument for Partly Intrinsic Individual Essentialism
	4.4 An Argument for Partly Historical Individual Essentialism
	4.5 Haecceitism
	4.6 Essential Membership
	4.7 Objection 1: The Interbreeding and Ecological Approaches to Species
	4.8 Objection 2: The Cladistic Approach to Species
	4.9 Objection 3: Kitcher’s “Dumbbell Allopatry”
	4.10 Objection 4: Higher Taxa
	4.11 Conclusion
5. Type Specimens and Reference
	5.1 Introduction
	5.2 The Causal Theory of Reference and Levine’s Thesis
	5.3 The Falsity of Levine’s Thesis; The Case for C1
	5.4 “But What about the Theory of Reference?”; The Case for C2
	5.5 The Causal Theory of Multiple Grounding; The Case for C3
	5.6 Philosophical Evaluations of Levine’s Thesis
		5.6.1 Haber; The Case for C4
		5.6.2 Witteveen
		5.6.3 Brzozowski
	5.7 Objections
		5.7.1 Reviewer R1 and Codes of Nomenclature
		5.7.2 Reviewer R2 and the Linguistic Turn
	5.8 Conclusion
6. Racial Realism and Essentialism
	6.1 Introduction
	6.2 A Presentation of the Racial Realism Issue
	6.3 The Reality/Existence Issues about Race
	6.4 Racial Taxon Realism
	6.5 Racial Taxon Realism (Humans)
		6.5.1 The Case for Racial Taxon Realism (Humans)
		6.5.2 Objections to Racial Taxon Realism (Humans)
		6.5.3 Rosenberg et al. and the Essences of Alleged Races
	6.6 Racial Category Realism (Humans): The “Worthy of the Name” Issue
	6.7 Racial Category Realism (Humans): The Explanatory Issue
		6.7.1 The Explanatory Issue with Other Categories
		6.7.2 The Explanatory Issue with the Category Race
		6.7.3 Minimal Concepts of the Higher Categories
		6.7.4 A Minimal Concept of the Category Race
	6.8 Too Weak to be Interesting?
	6.9 Conclusion
Glossary of Named Doctrines
	Taxon Essentialism
	Individual Essentialism
	Type Specimens
	Race
References
Index
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