Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons

Cover\r......Page 1
CONTRIBUTORS......Page 2
Title Page\r......Page 4
Copyright\r......Page 5
III. NUMBERS, SETS AND CLASSES......Page 6
Preface......Page 8
I. LOGIC......Page 10
The Liar Paradox......Page 12
\"Black Hole\" Sentences?......Page 14
Reconsideration of Parsons\' Solution......Page 15
A Hierarchy Beginning with a Kripkean Interpretation......Page 17
Paradox Revisited II: Sets A Case of All or None?......Page 25
Conceptual Relativity......Page 26
a Notion......Page 27
Applying the Attitudes I......Page 28
Set as \"Arbitrary\" Set......Page 31
I. Introduction......Page 36
II. Truthlike Operators......Page 37
III. Trivial Exclusions......Page 38
IV. The Logical Behavior of Truthlikeness......Page 39
Theorem 1.......Page 40
• Theorem 4.......Page 41
VII. Mathematical Practice......Page 42
VIII. Definitely Truthlike Operators......Page 43
Theorem 5.......Page 44
X. Weaker than Truthlike: (1) Semitruthlike Operators, Negative and Positive......Page 46
Theorem 9.......Page 47
Theorem 11.......Page 48
XI. Weaker than Truthlike: (2) Symmetries......Page 49
Theorem 13.......Page 50
XII. Definitely Truthlike Operators: Examples......Page 51
Theorem 13.......Page 57
• Theorem 14.......Page 59
\'Everything\'......Page 63
I. Introduction......Page 88
II. Elementary Linguistic Motivations......Page 89
III. Values of Variables......Page 92
IV. Plural Reference and Quantification......Page 96
V. Interpreting Plural Quantification......Page 100
VI. Classes as Many......Page 103
The Logical Roots of Indeterminacy......Page 109
II. Indeterminacy as Relativity to Background Language......Page 111
IV. Indeterminacy as Specificity of Information......Page 119
V. Does Logic Provide a General Framework for the Construction of Theories?......Page 121
VI. Full Determinacy as the Absence of Knowledge......Page 125
The Logic of Full Belief......Page 133
II. INTUITION......Page 162
Immediacy and the Birth of Reference in Kant: The Case for Space......Page 164
I. Leibniz......Page 166
II. Singularity in Kant......Page 170
III. The Birth of Modern Reference......Page 177
IV. Immediacy......Page 180
V. Space and Intuition......Page 183
Geometry, Construction, and Intuition in Kant and His Successors......Page 195
II. Quasi-concreta and Intuitions of Them......Page 228
III. Illusiveness of Intuitions of the Quasi-concrete......Page 231
IV. Explaining the Obviousness of the Obvious......Page 236
Godel and Quine on Meaning and Mathematics......Page 241
I. The Call for Meaning Clarification (1961)......Page 242
II. Meaning Clarification and Reductionism......Page 244
III. The Contrast with Quine......Page 246
IV. Analyticity......Page 248
V. Rational Intuition and Analyticity......Page 251
VI. Mathematical Content and Theoretical Hypotheses of Natural Science......Page 252
VII. Application of Ideas on Incompleteness, Consistency, and Solvability......Page 254
VIII. Mathematical Content and Quine\'s Conception of Set Theory......Page 256
IX. Mathematical Content and Unapplied Parts of Mathematics......Page 257
X. Mathematics and (Propositional) Attitude Adjustment......Page 260
III. NUMBERS, SETS, AND CLASSES......Page 264
Must We Believe in Set Theory?......Page 266
Achievements in Set Theory......Page 278
II. Summary of the Content of the......Page 281
and the Paradoxes of Set Theory......Page 289
Theorem.......Page 290
IV. What Numbers/Sets of Numbers Are There?......Page 291
Frege, the Natural Numbers, and Natural Kinds......Page 300
A Theory of Sets and Classes......Page 308
I. The Construction......Page 309
Theorem.......Page 313
II. Equality and Extensionality......Page 314
III. Axiomatics and Fixed Points......Page 315
Tait\'s Theorem.......Page 317
IV. Equinumerousity and Number......Page 320
I. Review......Page 326
Theorem.......Page 328
II. The Structuralist Standpoint and \"Constructing the Natural Numbers\"......Page 330
III. Parsons\' Challenge......Page 333
IV. The Challenge of George and Velleman......Page 337
Appendix: Realizing Dummett\'s Approach in EFSC......Page 345
Theorem.......Page 346
Name Index......Page 348