Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Bradford Books)

Contents......Page 8
Acknowledgments......Page 12
1.1 Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective......Page 16
1.2 Questions......Page 21
1.3 Overview: The architecture of the book......Page 24
2.1 Overview: Mental representation and phenomenal states......Page 28
2.2 From mental to phenomenal representation: Information processing, intentional content, and conscious experience......Page 30
2.2.1 Introspectability as attentional availability......Page 47
2.2.2 Availability for cognitive processing......Page 53
2.2.3 Availability for the control of action......Page 54
2.3 From mental to phenomenal simulation: The generation of virtual experiential worlds through dreaming, imagination, and planning......Page 58
2.4 From mental to phenomenal presentation: Qualia......Page 77
2.4.1 What is a quale?......Page 81
2.4.2 Why qualia don\'t exist......Page 84
2.4.3 An argument for the elimination of the canonical concept of a quale......Page 98
2.4.4 Presentational content......Page 101
2.5 Phenomenal presentation......Page 109
2.5.1 The principle of presentationality......Page 111
2.5.2 The principle of reality generation......Page 113
2.5.3 The principle of nonintrinsicality and context sensitivity......Page 115
2.5.4 The principle of object formation......Page 119
3.1 What is the conceptual prototype of a phenomenal representatum?......Page 122
3.2 Multilevel constraints: What makes a neural representation a phenomenal representation?......Page 131
3.2.1 Global availability......Page 132
3.2.2 Activation within a window of presence......Page 141
3.2.3 Integration into a coherent global state......Page 146
3.2.4 Convolved holism......Page 158
3.2.5 Dynamicity......Page 166
3.2.6 Perspectivalness......Page 171
3.2.7 Transparency......Page 178
3.2.8 Offline activation......Page 194
3.2.9 Representation of intensities......Page 199
3.2.10 \"Ultrasmoothness\": The homogeneity of simple content......Page 204
3.2.11 Adaptivity......Page 213
3.3 Phenomenal mental models......Page 223
4.1 Reality testing: The concept of a phenomenal model of reality......Page 228
4.2.1 Agnosia......Page 230
4.2.2 Neglect......Page 237
4.2.3 Blindsight......Page 243
4.2.4 Hallucinations......Page 252
4.2.5 Dreams......Page 266
4.3 The concept of a centered phenomenal model of reality......Page 279
5.2 From mental to phenomenal self-representation: Mereological intentionality......Page 280
5.3 From mental to phenomenal self-simulation: Self-similarity, autobiographical memory, and the design of future selves......Page 294
5.4 From mental to phenomenal self-presentation: Embodiment and immediacy......Page 300
6.1 What is a phenomenal self-model?......Page 314
6.2.1 Global availability of system-related information......Page 320
6.2.2 Situatedness and virtual self-presence......Page 325
6.2.3 Being-in-a-world: Full immersion......Page 328
6.2.4 Convolved holism of the phenomenal self......Page 335
6.2.5 Dynamics of the phenomenal self......Page 339
6.2.6 Transparency: From system-model to phenomenal self......Page 345
6.2.7 Virtual phenomenal selves......Page 355
6.2.8 Adaptivity: The self-model as a tool and as a weapon......Page 359
6.3.1 Neural correlates......Page 368
6.3.2 Cognitive correlates......Page 376
6.3.3 Social correlates......Page 377
6.4 Levels of content within the human self-model......Page 394
6.4.1 Spatial and nonspatial content......Page 395
6.4.2 Transparent and opaque content......Page 401
6.4.3 The attentional subject......Page 405
6.4.4 The cognitive subject......Page 410
6.4.5 Agency......Page 420
6.5 Perspectivalness: The phenomenal model of the intentionality relation......Page 426
6.5.1 Global availability of transient subject-object relations......Page 435
6.5.2 Phenomenal presence of a knowing self......Page 436
6.5.3 Phenomenal presence of an agent......Page 437
6.6 The self-model theory of subjectivity......Page 442
7.2.1 Anosognosia......Page 444
7.2.2 Ich-Störungen: Identity disorders and disintegrating self-models......Page 452
7.2.3 Hallucinated selves: Phantom limbs, out-of-body-experiences, and hallucinated agency......Page 476
7.2.4 Multiple selves: Dissociative identity disorder......Page 537
7.2.5 Lucid dreams......Page 544
7.3 The concept of a phenomenal first-person perspective......Page 560
8.1 The neurophenomenological caveman, the little red arrow, and the total flight simulator: From full immersion to emptiness......Page 562
8.2 Preliminary answers......Page 573
8.3 Being no one......Page 640
References......Page 650
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