Behavioural Public Finance: Individuals, Society, and the State

Cover
Endorsement
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of contents
Figures
Tables
Contributors
Foreword
Book overview
Part I Theoretical considerations on behavioural public finance
	1 Behavioral public finance in a populist world
		Introduction
		Do individuals act rationally?
		A tutorial role for governments?
		Use of nudges in authoritarian governments
		Concluding comment
		References
	2 Smart decision-makers, institutional design and x-efficient (real-world optimal) public finance
		Introduction
		Different modelling perspectives
		Tax compliance
		The Lucas Critique
		Behavioural public finance and the theory of the firm
		Behavioural labour and public policy
		Conclusions
		References
	3 Behavioral economics and public policy
		Introduction
		Behavioral economics and public policy perspectives
		Behavioral economics and public health policy
		Behavioral economics and education
		Conclusions
		References
Part II Behavioural responses to regulations
	4 Financial decisions and financial regulation: Three concepts of performance-based regulation
		Economics and behavioural economics and the performance of financial services and products
			Introduction
				Behavioural economics: theory and data
				Dominated choices – measuring confusion
				Behavioural economics
				Empirical methods
				Three sources of data – three concepts
				Alternative conventional measures
		Three concepts of performance-based regulation
			Concept 1: Using existing data – what have customers chosen in the past?
				Description of the concept
				Natural experiments: how would “confusion audits” work?
				What would a “confusion auditor” look like?
				Observations on limitations, risks, and challenges
			Concept 2: Laboratory experiments – simulated choices using real-world communication and online services
				Description of the concept
				Extension: surveying participants’ understanding of products
				What would a “confusion auditor” look like?
				Observations on limitations, risks, and challenges
			Concept 3: Randomized controlled trials or field experiments – mystery shoppers
				Description of the concept
				Field experiments: how would “confusion audits” work?
				What would a “confusion auditor” look like?
				Observations on limitations, risks, and challenges
		Illustration and discussion: credit cards, savings, and insurance products
			Credit cards
			Savings products
			Detailed case study: savings products
			Insurance products
			Discussion
			What works for which market?
			Naming confusion audits
			Regulation and confusion audits
		Conclusions
		References
	5 Behavioral biases and political actors: Three examples from US international taxation
		Introduction
		The Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) (1980)
			Cognitive heuristic
			Politicians’ own biases
		The exit tax on US citizens who expatriate (2008)
			Cognitive heuristic
			Politicians’ own biases
		The enforcement of withholding tax on dividend equivalents (2010)
			Cognitive heuristic
			Politicians’ own biases
		Conclusion
		References
	6 Varieties of general anti-avoidance legislation
		I. Introduction
		II. Categories of tax minimisation
			A. Mitigation
				1. Measures to promote favoured industries
				2. Measures to stimulate the economy as a whole
				3. Measures to promote social welfare
			B. Avoidance
			C. Evasion
		III. Example of tax avoidance: Bowater Property Developments
		IV. Problems with the analytical framework
		V. Second example of tax avoidance
		VI. Specific anti-avoidance rules
		VII. General anti-avoidance rules (GAARs)
		VIII. Fictional transactions
		IX. Abuse of law
		X. Operation and history of GAARs
		XI. Questionable qualities of GAARs
		XII. The “Investor” example of tax avoidance
		XIII. International tax planning
		XIV. Fictions in the Investor (plus Parent Company and Subsidiary) example
		XV. Specific anti-avoidance regimes revisited
		XVI. GAARs and economics
		XVII. An example from the common law: Australia and New Zealand
		XVIII. Other examples of similarities and dissimilarities between GAARs
			A. Length and complexity contrasted with conciseness
			B. Contrasts between GAARs of common law jurisdictions
			C. Significance of the criterion of economic substance
		XIX. Conclusion: lessons from differences between GAARs
		XX. References
Part III Tax compliance behaviour
	7 Political economy of tax compliance behavior: An analysis of three cities in Turkey
		Introduction
		The political economy of tax compliance behavior
			Common needs, collective goods, and reciprocity
			Fairness perception of tax burden, social norms, and attitudes
			Trust in governing institutions and the level of corruption perceptions
			Effective use of tax revenues and satisfaction from public services
		An empirical examination of tax compliance behavior in Turkey
			Survey design
			Results
				Taxpayers’ feelings of social responsibility and their quest for reciprocity
				Perceptions of respondents regarding the fairness of the Turkish tax system, their burden, and their emotions
				Trust in government and perceived levels of corruption
				Perceptions of public service quality and decent use of tax revenues
				Political interactions and attitudes towards taxes: how are cities different?
		Concluding remarks
		Acknowledgments
		References
	8 Incidental emotions, integral emotions, and decisions to pay taxes
		Introduction
		What are emotions?
		How do emotions influence decisions?
		Empirical study (1): incidental emotions and tax compliance
			Method
			Results
			Discussion
		Empirical study (2): the role of integral emotions on tax compliance decisions
			Empirical investigation
			Part one: qualitative focus group study
			Part two: quantitative survey study
			Discussion
		General discussion
		Conclusions
		Acknowledgment
		References
	9 Moral concerns and personal beliefs regarding tax evasion: Empirical results from Germany, Romania, Turkey, ...
		Introduction
		Brief account on tax evasion-related acts
		Method
			Participants
			Materials
			Procedure
		Results
			Moral concerns regarding tax evasion
			Personal beliefs regarding tax evasion
		Discussion and concluding remarks
		References
	10 Paying is caring?: Prosociality and gender in fiscal compliance
		Introduction
		Literature review
			Social Value Orientation and tax compliance
			Gender
		Hypotheses
		Experimental design
		Results
			Individual level models
			Mediation analysis
		Concluding remarks
		Acknowledgments
		References
	11 Tax compliance theories and fiduciary taxes: Do the shoes fit?
		Introduction
		Tax compliance theories
		Fiduciary taxes
		Tax compliance theories and organisations
		Conclusions
		References
	12 How to tax the powerful and the sophisticated?
		Introduction
		A very brief history of taxation
			Recurrent taxation
			Incidental taxation
			Seigniorage tax
			Tribute tax
			Accounting-based taxes
		How were plutocrats taxed in the past?
		A reflection on today’s plutocrats
		How does modern tax avoidance work?
		Back to tributes?
		Conclusions
		References
	13 Starbucks and media allegations of tax avoidance: An examination of reputational loss
		Introduction
		Review of prior literature and development of our hypothesis
			Starbucks – the background
			Reputational loss
			The relationship between reputational loss and tax avoidance
			Stakeholder theory
		Research method and data collection
			Choice of methods
			Share return analysis
			Thematic analysis
		Empirical results
			Starbucks’ share returns
			Thematic analysis
			Starbucks’ response to the crisis
			Summary
		Conclusion
		References
	14 The effect of media on tax compliance: Hypothetical scenarios study
		Introduction
		Tax Compliance Models
		Methodology
			Scenario 1
			Scenario 2
			Scenario 3
			Scenario 4
			Scenario 5
		Results
		Conclusion
		References
Names index
Subject index