Balancing Power without Weapons : State Intervention into Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions.

Cover
Half title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Figures
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
	International Finance and International Security
	Puzzling Behavior
	Intervention in Empirical Context
	Placing the Theory behind Intervention in Context
	The Significance
1 A Theory of Non-Military Internal Balancing
	Introduction
	National Security and Foreign Takeovers
	Economic Interdependence and Power
	The Theory
	Methodology
	Conclusion
2 The Numbers: Assessing the Motivations Behind State Intervention into Foreign Takeovers
	Introduction
	The Variables
	Independent Variables
	Specification of the Models and Expected Results
	Results
	Conclusion
3 Unbounded Intervention: The State and the Blocked Deal
	Introduction
	Defining Unbounded Intervention
	Case Selection
	Case 1: PepsiCo/Danone
	Case 2: CNOOC/Unocal
	Case 3: Check Point/Sourcefire
	Case 4: Macquarie/PCCW
	Conclusion
4 Unbounded or Overbalancing? An Outlier Case
	Introduction
	Case 5: DPW/P&O
	Conclusion
5 Bounded Intervention: Mitigating Threats to National Security
	Introduction
	Defining Bounded Intervention
	Case 6: Alcatel/Lucent
	Case 7: Lenovo/IBM
	Conclusion
6 Non-Intervention and the “Internal” Intervention Alternative
	Introduction
	Part I: Non-Intervention
		Case 8: CGG/Veritas
		Case 9: JP Morgan/Troika Dialog
	Part II: Internal Intervention
		Case 10: GdF/Suez
	Conclusion
Conclusion
	The Theoretical Context
	Non-Military Internal Balancing
	Significance
	Concluding Thoughts
Appendix A Alternative Independent Variables Considered
Appendix B Descriptive Statistics of Variables in MNLMs I-IV
Appendix C MNLM III and Resource Dependency
Appendix D Descriptive Statistics of Dataset Variables: Frequencies
Appendix E Bivariate Correlations of Dataset Variables
Appendix F Negative Case Selection
References
Index