Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 13
A. Monopoly......Page 19
B. Market Price......Page 20
C. Market ’s Contribution to Wealth......Page 21
D. Defining Perfect Competition......Page 22
A. Perfect Competition......Page 27
B. Monopoly......Page 30
A. Conscious Parallelism......Page 39
B. Transaction Cost Economics......Page 40
C. Information Economics......Page 42
2 Law and Policy......Page 45
A. Conspiracy, Section 1, and Section 2......Page 46
B. Jurisdiction......Page 47
II. ENACTING THE ANTITRUST LAWS......Page 48
A. Common Law Background......Page 49
C. What Led to the Sherman Act 1890?......Page 55
D. What Led to the 1914 Legislation?......Page 57
III. WHAT SHOULD ANTITRUST LAW AIM TO DO?......Page 58
I. OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT THEROY......Page 61
A. Who Enforces?......Page 65
B. Are Penalties Optimal?......Page 67
C. Fairness......Page 70
D. Equity Proceedings......Page 73
E. Private Antitrust Suits......Page 75
B. Optimality of Treble Damages......Page 82
A. Basic Theory......Page 86
B. Stigler on Monitoring......Page 89
A. Introduction to the Problem......Page 91
B. Strain on the Conspiracy Doctrine......Page 93
C. A Digression on the Theory of Interdependence......Page 94
D. Should a Conspiracy Statute be used to Regulate Consciously Parallel Behavior?......Page 95
E. Remarks on Intraenterprise Conspiracy......Page 96
F. Turner on Conscious Parallelism......Page 98
G. Reexamining Rahl and Turner under the Cournot and Bertrand Models......Page 101
H. Posner on Conscious Parallelism......Page 104
I. Rahl/Turner v. Posner......Page 105
III. CONCLUSION......Page 107
I. THE SHERMAN ACT VERSUS THE COMMON LAW......Page 108
A. Aside on Ruinous Competition......Page 112
B. Validity Crisis and Resolution......Page 116
C. The Case Against The Common Law Standard......Page 119
II. RULE OF REASON AND PER-SE RULE......Page 122
III. CONCLUSION......Page 130
I. THE CASE FOR PRICE FIXING......Page 131
II. PER-SE AND RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS: FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS......Page 134
A. The Per-Se Rule and its Utilitarian Justification......Page 135
B. Pressure on Rule of Reason Boundary......Page 143
III. PER-SE VERSUS RULE OF REASON TESTS: UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT'S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PER-SE RULE......Page 147
7 Agreement......Page 150
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFERENCE DOCTRINE......Page 151
A. Interstate Circuit......Page 152
B. Unilateral Contract Theory......Page 156
II. REJECTION OF UNILATERAL CONTRACT THEORY......Page 158
8 Facilitating Mechanisms......Page 162
I. DATA DISSEMINATION CASES......Page 163
II. BASING POINT PRICING AND RELATED PRACTICES......Page 172
A. Basing Point Pricing Cases......Page 173
B. A Note on the “Most Favored Customer ”Clause......Page 177
III. BASING POINT PRICING: ECONOMICS......Page 178
I. PRE-SOCONY......Page 184
II. POST SOCONY......Page 188
A. No Effect on Competition......Page 190
B. The Klor’s Paradox and Boycott Doctrine......Page 192
C. Associated Press......Page 195
III. POST BMI/SYLVANIA......Page 199
IV. CONCLUSION......Page 202
I. DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 2 DOCTRINE......Page 204
A. Alcoa......Page 207
B. Post-Alcoa......Page 212
A. Leveraging and Essential Facility Cases......Page 220
B. The Essential Facility Doctrine......Page 225
C. The Leverage Debate......Page 229
III. PREDATORY PRICING......Page 230
A. Predation Cases......Page 231
B. Predation Theory......Page 237
IV. CONCLUSION......Page 246
I. MEASURING MARKET POWER......Page 248
II. DETERMINANTS OF MARKET POWER......Page 253
III. SUBSTITUTABILITY AND THE RELEVANT MARKET: CELLOPHANE......Page 255
IV. MULTIMARKET MONOPOLY AND THE RELEVANT MARKET: ALCOA......Page 257
V. MEASURING POWER: GUIDELINES......Page 261
I. THE SWIFT FORMULA AND MODERN DOCTRINE......Page 262
II. DANGEROUS PROBABILITY REQUIREMENT......Page 266
A. Law and Justifications......Page 270
B. Scope......Page 279
A. Exclusivity Agreements......Page 280
B. Territorial Restrictions......Page 282
III. MANUFACTURER RETAINS TITLE......Page 285
A. Colgate Doctrine......Page 288
B. Dr. Miles/Colgate Boundary......Page 290
A. Anticompetitive Theory of Tying and Chicago School Critique......Page 297
B. Anticompetitive Theory after the Chicago School......Page 299
C. Efficiency and Other Considerations......Page 301
II. EARLY CASES......Page 302
A. International Salt and the Per-Se Rule......Page 304
B. Articulation of the Per-Se Standard......Page 308
C. Jerrold and the Goodwill Defense......Page 310
IV. TENSION BETWEEN RULE OF REASON ARGUMENTS AND PER-SE RULE......Page 313
V. TECHNOLOGICAL TYING......Page 319
B. Law......Page 321
APPENDIX......Page 325
I. REASONS FOR MERGING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW......Page 329
II. HORIZONTAL MERGER LAW......Page 335
A. Rule of Reason and Incipiency Doctrine......Page 336
B. Toward an Incipiency Doctrine: Mergers in Concentrated Markets......Page 339
C. High Point of Incipiency Doctrine......Page 343
D. Rejection of Incipiency Doctrine......Page 344
E. Merger Guidelines......Page 346
Mergers: The Welfare Tradeoffs......Page 348
A. Procompetitive Theories......Page 351
C. Development of Doctrine......Page 353
D. Some Rule of Reason Considerations......Page 358
E. Vertical Mergers and Transaction Costs......Page 359
A. Potential Competition Theory......Page 362
B. Subsequent Potential Competition Decisions......Page 366
C. Summary of Critique......Page 367
D. Enforcement Guidelines......Page 368
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS......Page 369
17 Antitrust and the State......Page 370
I. NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE......Page 372
A. The Scope of Noerr Immunity in Legislative and Judicial Processes......Page 377
B. Sham Lawsuits......Page 387
II. PARKER DOCTRINE......Page 389
III. SOME FINAL COMMENTS: ERROR COSTS AND IMMUNITY DOCTRINES......Page 393
Index......Page 397