Advances in Collective Decision Making: Interdisciplinary Perspectives for the 21st Century

Preface
Contents
Contributors
Introduction
	References
Social Choice
Building Bridges Over the Great Divide
	1 Introduction
	2 The Main Pros and Cons of Binary and Positional Rules
	3 Some Attempts to Reconcile Binary and Positional Intuitions
		3.1 Black's Rule
		3.2 Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules
		3.3 Dodgson's Rule
		3.4 Rules Based on Supercovering Relation
	4 Concluding Remarks
	References
Social Unacceptability for Simple Voting Procedures
	1 Introduction
	2 Definitions
		2.1 Preferences and Social Unacceptability
		2.2 Voting Rules
		2.3 Probability Models and Simulation Methodology
	3 Results
		3.1 The Probability that a Fixed Number of Socially Unacceptable Candidates Exist
		3.2 The Probability that Some Voting Rules Select a Socially Unacceptable Candidate
	4 Concluding Remarks
	References
Probability of Majority Inversion with Three States and Interval Preferences
	1 Introduction
	2 May's Model and Its Alternatives
	3 Studies on Inversion Probability
	4 The General Interval Model
	5 Inversion Probability
	6 Numerical Simulations
		6.1 Inequality in Population Weights
		6.2 The Average Variance
		6.3 The Average Absolute Bias
	7 Summary
	References
Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy
	1 Introduction
	2 Related Work
	3 Preliminaries
		3.1 Players and Preferences
		3.2 Single-Peakedness
		3.3 Voting Rules
	4 Game-Theoretic Model
		4.1 Strategies and Outcomes
		4.2 Equilibrium Concepts
	5 Results
	6 Conclusion
	References
Meta-agreement and Rational Single-Peaked Preferences
	1 Introduction
	2 The Meta-agreement Hypothesis
	3 Single-Peakedness Through Rationality?
		3.1 The Case of Non-convex Preferences
		3.2 Meta-agreements as Constraints on Reason-Based Preferences
	4 Conclusion
	References
On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules
	1 Introduction
	2 q-Paretian Rules: Definitions
		2.1 Strong q-Paretian Simple Majority Rule
		2.2 Strong q-Paretian Plurality Rule
		2.3 Strongest q-Paretian Simple Majority Rule
		2.4 Condorcet Practical Rule
	3 Extended Preferences and Multi-valued Choice
	4 Manipulation Models and Manipulability Indices
	5 Results
	6 Conclusion
	References
Weighted Voting
Effectiveness, Decisiveness, and Success in Weighted Voting Systems: Collective Behavior and Voting Measures
	1 Introduction
		2 Some Basics
		3 Urn Models
	4 Permutation Invariant Voting Systems
	5 Penrose–Banzhaf Versus Shapley–Shubik
	6 Weighted Voting and the Common Belief Model
	7 The Council of the EU: A Case Study
	8 Conclusions and Outlook
	A Mathematical Appendix
		A.1 Hoeffding's Inequality
		A.2 Urn Models
	References
All Power Structures are Achievable in Basic Weighted Games
	1 Introduction
		1.1 Two Motivating Situations
		1.2 Background
	2 Binary Voting Systems
	3 Main Result
	4 Conclusion
	References
Bargaining in Legislatures:  A New Donation Paradox
	1 Introduction
	2 The Model
		2.1 Simple Games
		2.2 The Bargaining Procedure
		2.3 The Proposer Advantage
	3 A New Donation Paradox
	4 Generalizing the Example to a Class of Games
	5 Discussion
	6 Concluding Remarks
	References
Egalitarian Collective Decisions as `Good' Corporate Governance?
	1 Introduction and Overview
	2 Relativism and Applied Economic Science
	3 Friedman, Freeman as Brothers in Sin
		3.1 Friedman
		3.2 Freeman
	4 An Outline of a Procedure of Stakeholder Participation as Egalitarian Bidding
		4.1 An Axiomatic Characterization of Stakeholder Participation
		4.2 Properties of Participation as Egalitarian Bidding
	5 Critical Assessment of Incentives
		5.1 Underbidding Incentives
		5.2 Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsically Motivating Incentives
	6 Concluding Remarks
	References
Interpretation and Measurement of Power
Liability Situations with Successive Tortfeasors
	1 Introduction
	2 Obtaining the Compensation Payments
	3 Efficiency and Deterrence
	4 Settlements
	5 Conclusion
	References
Solidarity and Fair Taxation  in TU Games
	1 Introduction
	2 Basic Definitions and Notation
	3 Efficient, Linear, and Symmetric Values
	4 Solidarity and Fair Taxation
		4.1 Technical Preliminaries
		4.2 Relation Between Parameters
		4.3 Desirability
		4.4 Positivity for Null Players
		4.5 Desirability and Positivity
		4.6 Social Acceptability
		4.7 General Acceptability
	5 Concluding Remarks
	References
Analyzing the Zerkani Network  with the Owen Value
	1 Introduction
	2 The Owen Value and an Approximation Algorithm
	3 A New Game Theoretic Centrality Measure
	4 The Owen Value Approximation in the Zerkani Network
		4.1 The Zerkani Network Analysis
		4.2 On the Partition P Considered
		4.3 Numerical Results
		4.4 A Brief Comparison with the Ranking Based  on the Shapley Value
	5 Conclusions
	References
The Power of Closeness in a Network
	1 Introduction
	2 Algorithmic and Computational Aspects
	3 Power in Small Unweighted Networks
	4 Power in Weighted Networks
		4.1 The Linear Network Case
		4.2 The Circle Network Case
		4.3 The Star Network
	5 Discussion
	References
Political Power on a Line Graph
	1 Introduction
	2 Preliminaries
		2.1 Cooperative Games
		2.2 Line-Graph Games
	3 Political Power in Majority Voting Line-Graph Games
	4 Rewarding Intermediate Veto Players: Hierarchical Outcomes and the τ-Index
		4.1 Hierarchical Outcomes
		4.2 The τ-Index
		4.3 Illustration
	5 Concluding Remarks
	References
EU
Double Proportionality for the European Parliament: The Tandem System
	1 Introduction
	2 Double Proportionality in Swiss Cantons
	3 Double Proportionality for the EP
	4 The Tandem System
		4.1 Apportionment of Seats at Union Level
		4.2 Allotment of Seats by Member State and Europarty
		4.3 Assignment of Seats to Candidates
	5 Conclusion
	References
Explaining Contestation: Votes in the Council of the European Union
	1 Introduction
	2 Potential Determinants of Voting Behavior in the Council
	3 Variable Operationalization and Data
		3.1 Votes in the Council
		3.2 Government Composition
		3.3 Power
		3.4 Public Attitudes Towards the EU
		3.5 Net Contributions
		3.6 Presidency
	4 Explaining Voting Outcomes in the Council of the European Union
	5 Conclusion
	References
Codecision in Context Revisited:  The Implications of Brexit
	1 Introduction
	2 The Codecision Procedure
	3 The Model
		3.1 Intra-institutional Bargaining
		3.2 Inter-institutional Bargaining
		3.3 Assumptions on Preferences
	4 Results
	5 Concluding Remarks
	References
Field Experiments and Quasi-experiments
Proximity-Based Preferences  and Their Implications Based on Data from the Styrian Parliamentary  Elections in 2019
	1 Introduction
	2 Experimental Design and Data
	3 Left-Right Dimension
	4 Proximity-Based Preferences and Consistency
	5 Comparing (Hypothetical) Election Outcomes
		5.1 Plurality Rule
		5.2 Anti-plurality Rule
		5.3 Pairwise Majority Rule
		5.4 Borda Rule
		5.5 Approval Voting
	6 Conclusion
	References
Participation in Voting Over Budget Allocations: A Field Experiment
	1 Introduction
		1.1 Background and Overview of the Literature
	2 Theoretical Framework
		2.1 Aggregation Rules
		2.2 Preferences
		2.3 Impact of a Vote
	3 The Field Experiment
		3.1 General Set-up and Design
		3.2 Eliciting Impact Beliefs and Risk Preferences
		3.3 Hypotheses
	4 Results
		4.1 Real Impact Versus Assessed Impact
		4.2 Risk Preferences
		4.3 Voter Turnout
		4.4 Distribution of Votes
		4.5 Allocation Outcomes
		4.6 Non-truthful and Strategic Voting
	5 Conclusion
	References
The Office Makes the Politician
	1 Introduction
	2 Institutional Setting
		2.1 National Council and Council of States
		2.2 Referendum Decision
		2.3 Congruence with Geographical Constituency  and with the Nation
	3 Empirical Strategy
		3.1 Beyond Electoral Incentives
		3.2 Estimation Equation
		3.3 Identifying Assumptions
		3.4 Data
	4 Public Expectations and Behavior in Office
		4.1 Serving in Office as an Incentive in Itself
		4.2 No Changes Prior to Being Elected
	5 Conclusions
	References