Accuracy and the laws of credence

Content: Cover
 Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
 Copyright
 Contents
 Acknowledgements
 Introduction
 PART I: The accuracy argument for Probabilism
 1: From No Drop to Probabilism
 2: Formulating the dominance principle
 2.1 From Dominance to Undominated Dominance
 2.2 From Undominated Dominance to Immodest Dominance
 2.3 From Immodest Dominance to Deontological Immodest Dominance
 3: Measuring accuracy: existing accounts
 3.1 Joyce on convexity
 3.2 Leitgeb and Pettigrew on agreement and epistemicdilemmas
 3.3 Joyce on coherent admissibility
 4 Measuring accuracy: a new account 4.1 Additive divergences4.2 Continuity and the absence of jumps
 4.3 Calibration and accuracy
 4.4 Symmetry
 5: The Bronfman objection
 5.1 Epistemicism
 5.2 Supervaluationism
 5.3 Subjectivism
 6: Howson\'s robustness objection
 7: The accuracy argument for Probabilism
 Appendix I: The mathematical results
 I.A Characterizing the probabilistic credence functions
 I.B Characterizing legitimate inaccuracy measures (without Symmetry)
 I.C Characterizing legitimate inaccuracy measures (with Symmetry)
 I.D Two theorems concerning additive Bregman divergences
 PART II: Chance-credence principles 8: The Principal Principle9: Vindication and chance
 9.1 Objections to Ur-Chance Initial Vindication
 9.2 Introducing the Temporal Principal Principle
 9.3 Beyond the initial credence function
 9.4 An objection to Current Chance Evidential Vindication
 10: Dominance and chance
 10.1 Adapting the argument
 10.2 The circularity objection
 11: Self-undermining chances
 11.1 Self-undermining chance functions
 11.2 An accuracy-based argument for Ismael\'sGeneral Recipe
 11.3 An accuracy-based argument for the New Principle
 Appendix II: A summaryof chance-credence principles Appendix III: The mathematical resultsIII.A Proof of Theorem III.A.2
 III.B Proof of Theorem 11.1.1
 III.C Proof of Theorem 11.2.1
 III.D Proof of Theorem 11.2.2
 PART III: The Principle of Indifference
 12: Maximin and the Principleof Indifference
 12.1 The Argument from Evidential Support
 12.2 The Argument from Minimal Information
 12.3 The Argument from Accuracy
 12.4 Generalizing the argument
 12.5 Epistemic risk aversion
 12.6 Language dependence
 13: Hurwicz, regret, and C-maximin
 13.1 The Hurwicz criterion
 13.2 Risking regret
 13.3 Risk and chances Appendix IV:The mathematical resultsIV.A Proof of Theorem 13.1.1
 IV.A.1 Proof ofTheorem 13.1.1(I)
 IV.A.2 Proof ofTheorem 13.1.1(II)
 IV.B Proof ofTheorem 13.3.1
 PART IV: Accuracy and updating
 14: Plan Conditionalization
 14.1 Forward-facing argument
 14.2 Backwards-facing argument
 14.3 Neither-facing argument
 15: Diachronic Conditionalization
 15.1 The argument from the prior standpoint
 15.2 The argument from diachronic continence
 Appendix V: The mathematical results
 V.A Proof ofTheorem 14.1.1
 V.C Proof ofTheorem 14.3.1
 V.D Proof ofTheorem 15.1.1
 V.F Proof ofTheorem 15.1.5