A Philosophy of Person and Identity: Where was I when I wasn’t there?

Acknowledgments
Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
	1.1 Where Was I? What Am I?
	References
Chapter 2: Life and Death, Soul and Body
	2.1 Is There Life After Death?
	2.2 Out-of-Body Experiences and the Weight of the Soul
	2.3 Dualism in Antiquity
	2.4 Descartes: From Soul to Mind and from Living Body to Lifeless Mechanism
	2.5 Conclusion: The Legacy of Descartes
	References
Chapter 3: Consciousness, Person and Self
	3.1 New Concepts in Descartes
	3.2 Locke on Human Being and Person
	3.3 Contemporary Meanings of Consciousness
	3.4 New Meanings of the Self
	3.5 Damasio: Several Forms of Consciousness and Several Selves
	3.6 Conclusion: Where Was My Self?
	References
Chapter 4: Cartesian People 1: The Body a Machine
	4.1 The Helm and the Pineal Gland
	4.2 The Mind, Self-Consciousness, and Certainty
	4.3 Existing Cartesian People? The Case of Ian Waterman
	4.4 What is Ian Waterman Missing? Proprioception
	4.5 Proprioception as an Argument Against Descartes
	4.6 Has Ian Waterman Lost his Body?
	4.7 Visual Perception, Movement, and the Body
	4.8 Conclusion: Not Just Bodiless Thinkers, Nor Just Passive Feelers, but Active Embodied Creatures
	References
Chapter 5: Cartesian People 2: The Body an Illusion
	5.1 Cartesian Mind and Material Brain
	5.2 Brains Without Bodies: The Brain in a Vat
	5.3 Evil Demons and Evil Scientists: The Role of Empirical Data in Thought Experiments
	5.4 Empirical Data About Brains Without Bodies: Descartes and Phantoms
	5.5 Phantom Phenomena as an Argument for the Possibility of a Brain in a Vat
	5.6 Types of Phantom Phenomena
	5.7 Moving a Phantom
	5.8 Acquired and Congenital Phantoms
	5.9 Moving Existing Limbs: Forward Models in the Brain
	5.10 Moving Existing Limbs: Ownership and Agency
	5.11 Moving Existing Limbs: Intentions to Move
	5.12 Possible Explanations for Phantom Movements 1: The Bell Cord
	5.13 Possible Explanations for Phantom Movements 2: Innate Motor Schemas
	5.14 Possible Explanations of Phantom Movements 3: Mirror Neurons
	5.15 Moving Limbs and Brains in a Vat
	5.16 Conclusion: The Body Is Not an Illusion
	References
Chapter 6: Lockean Persons 1: Living Without Memory
	6.1 Locke’s Criterion for Personal Identity
	6.2 The Memory Criterion as Constitutive for Personal Identity
	6.3 The Memory Criterion as Subjective: The Case of John Demjanjuk
	6.4 The Memory Criterion for Personal Identity and the Autobiographical Self
	6.5 Living Without Autobiographical Memory: The Case of Clive Wearing
	6.6 The Cliveness of Clive
	6.7 Conclusion: Amnesic Selves
	References
Chapter 7: Lockean Persons 2: Persons and Organisms
	7.1 Persons and Living Organisms
	7.2 Persons Constituted by Organisms: Lynne Baker
	7.3 The Anti-Constitution Argument
	7.4 The Self-Reference Argument
	7.5 The Development Argument
	7.6 Conclusion: Persons Cannot Be Non-identical with Organisms
	References
Chapter 8: The Gradual Origin of Self-Consciousness
	8.1 The Paradox of Self-Consciousness
	8.2 Consciousness and Self-Consciousness in Animals
	8.3 The Gradualist Account: Perception, Movement, and Self-Consciousness
	8.4 Forms of Self-Consciousness
	8.5 Conclusion: Full-Blown Self-Consciousness Does Not Emerge All at Once
	References
Chapter 9: “Here I Am”
	9.1 Self-Consciousness and the First-Person Pronoun
	9.2 The First-Person Perspective as Criterion of Identity
	9.3 Psychological Identity Criterion or Body Criterion?
	9.4 What We Are
	9.5 Human Organisms and Others
	9.6 How We Become Persons
	9.7 The Importance of Personhood
	9.8 Conclusion: Our Identity and Our Personhood
	References
Name Index
Subject Index