A Minimal Libertarianism : Free Will and the Promise of Reduction

Cover
Half title
A Minimal Libertarianism
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I Toward a Minimal Libertarianism
	Chapter 1 Minimal Event-​Causal Libertarianism
		1.1 Causal Theory of Action
		1.2 Agency Reductionism
		1.3 Libertarianism
		1.4 Varieties of Libertarianism
		1.5 Event-​Causal Libertarianism
		1.6 Minimal Event-​Causal Libertarianism
		1.7 Conclusion
	Chapter 2 A Theory of Moral Accountability
		2.1 Building the Framework
		2.2 Reactive Attitudes and Moral Accountability
		2.3 Three Kinds of Pleas
		2.4 A Theory of Morally Accountable Agency
		2.5 Addiction and Extreme Stress
		2.6 Conclusion
	Chapter 3 Abilities, Opportunities, and Determinism
		3.1 Parting Ways
		3.2 Free Will, Abilities, and Opportunities
		3.3 Abilities
		3.4 Opportunities
		3.5 The No Opportunity Argument
		3.6 The New Dispositionalism
		3.7 Vihvelin on Narrow and Wide Abilities
		3.8 Conclusion
	Chapter 4 The Role and Location of Indeterminism
		4.1 Two Questions
		4.2 Non-​Action-​Centered Libertarianism
		4.3 Kane’s Nonbasic Action-​Centered Libertarianism
		4.4 Four Problems with Kane’s Account
		4.5 Basic Action-​Centered Libertarianism
		4.6 Conclusion
Part II The Promise of Reduction
	Chapter 5 The Problem of Luck
		5.1 Interlude
		5.2 The Luck Argument
		5.3 No Causation Formulation
		5.4 Ensurance Formulation
		5.5 Rollback Formulation
		5.6 Explanatory Formulation
		5.7 Conclusion
	Chapter 6 The Problem of Enhanced Control
		6.1 Enhancing Control
		6.2 Generalizing the Problem
		6.3 Opportunities Enhance Control
		6.4 Conclusion
	Chapter 7 The Limits of Event-​Causal Libertarianism
		7.1 Taking Stock
		7.2 The Disappearing Agent Objection
		7.3 A Dilemma for the Disappearing Agent Objection
		7.4 The It Ain’t Me Argument
		7.5 Exclusion Arguments
		7.6 Agency Reductionist Options
		7.7 Conclusion
	Conclusion
Appendix: Against Frankfurt-​Style Cases
Bibliography
Index