A Companion to the Philosophy of Language

Cover......Page 1
Title Page......Page 3
Contents......Page 5
Preface......Page 8
Notes on Contributors......Page 10
Part I: Meaning and Theories of Meaning......Page 15
1 Meaning and truth conditions: from Frege\'s grand design to Davidson\'s......Page 17
Notes......Page 36
References......Page 39
Suggestions for further reading......Page 41
1.1 Introductory......Page 43
1.2 Meaning and use in Wittgenstein......Page 44
1.3 The priority thesis and the epistemic conception of meaning......Page 45
1.4 The truth-conditional conception of meaning......Page 49
1.5 ‘Full-bloodedness’......Page 51
2.1 Verificationism: meaning and truth......Page 54
2.2 The meaning of the logical operators......Page 59
2.3 Beyond verificationism......Page 61
3.1 Concepts as cognitive roles......Page 62
3.2 Aprioricity and normativity......Page 65
Notes......Page 69
References......Page 71
1 Intention and convention in language......Page 74
2 Use theories vs. formal theories......Page 75
3 Austin and the use of language......Page 78
4 The analysis of meaning......Page 82
5 Grice\'s account of non-natural meaning......Page 84
6 The sufficiency of the analysis......Page 85
7 The necessity of the analysis......Page 90
8 Structure......Page 92
9 Linguistic meaning......Page 93
10 Convention......Page 94
References......Page 99
4 Pragmatics......Page 101
1 Semantic properties......Page 102
2 The pragmatic view......Page 103
3 Domestications......Page 105
4 Implicature......Page 108
5 Metaphysics......Page 112
6 Perspective......Page 114
7 Thoughts......Page 116
8 Concluding remarks......Page 119
Bibliography......Page 120
5 A guide to naturalizing semantics......Page 122
The crude causal theory......Page 126
Dretske\'s information-theoretic account......Page 127
Optimal conditions accounts......Page 128
Teleological theories......Page 129
Fodor\'s asymmetric dependence theory......Page 131
Causal-role semantics......Page 134
Conclusion......Page 135
Notes......Page 136
References and further reading......Page 139
1 Introduction: the two questions and their consequences......Page 141
2 Private states and public language: the possibility......Page 143
3 Private states and public language: the effects......Page 150
4 The possibility of a private language......Page 152
Notes......Page 158
Bibliography......Page 159
1 Introduction......Page 160
2 Tacit knowledge and propositional attitudes......Page 161
3 Tacit knowledge and dispositional states......Page 167
4 Wright\'s attack on Evans......Page 169
5 The mirror constraint and understanding novel utterances......Page 181
6 Wright\'s proposal......Page 182
7 Tacit knowledge and rule-following......Page 184
Notes......Page 186
References and further reading......Page 187
1 A bird\'s-eye view of some options......Page 189
2 From ‘truth and meaning’ to ‘radical interpretation’......Page 193
3 The basis for radical interpretation......Page 197
4 Interpretation, charity, holism and norms......Page 200
5 Indeterminacy of meaning, holism and molecularity......Page 206
References......Page 209
Propositional attitudes and philosophy of language......Page 211
Propositions and structure......Page 214
Direct reference......Page 215
Fregeanism......Page 216
Attitudes, utterances, and sentences......Page 219
Attitudes and context......Page 223
Appendix: de dicto, de re, and de se......Page 227
Notes......Page 231
References and further reading......Page 235
1 What is meaning holism?......Page 241
2 Does the Duhem-Quine Thesis provide a ground for meaning holism?......Page 244
3 Does revisability support meaning holism?......Page 247
4 Do interpretational and compositional considerations support meaning holism?......Page 249
5 Global holism, justification and semantic value......Page 254
6 Local holisms and their source......Page 257
Notes......Page 259
References......Page 260
11 Metaphor......Page 262
1 Figurative and non-figurative: metaphor, idiom and ambiguity......Page 263
2 Metaphorical meaning......Page 265
3 Davidson and the case against metaphorical meaning......Page 268
4 Paraphrase and propositional status......Page 270
5 Metaphor and communication......Page 273
6 Pragmatics and speaker\'s meaning......Page 275
7 Metaphor, rhetoric and relevance......Page 279
References......Page 281
Part II: Language, Truth and Reality......Page 283
12 Realism and its oppositions......Page 285
§ 1 Dummett\'s general account of R/AR disputes......Page 286
§ 2 Arguments against semantic realism......Page 289
Truth-value links......Page 290
Partial accessibility......Page 291
Enhanced recognitional capacities......Page 292
Compositionality......Page 293
Inferential practice......Page 294
Manifestation and manifestees......Page 295
§ 3 The adequacy of Dummett\'s characterization of R/AR disputes......Page 297
§ 4 Error theories, projectivism and quasi-realism......Page 302
§ 5 Realism and objective truth......Page 305
Minimalism......Page 306
Cruces......Page 308
Notes......Page 313
References and further reading......Page 318
1 Introduction: problems with correspondence......Page 323
2 The coherence theory and the pragmatic theory......Page 324
3 Coherence and correspondence......Page 325
4 Why pragmatic and coherence theories are attractive......Page 328
5 Why the coherence theory fails......Page 330
6 Frege on defining truth......Page 331
7 The correspondence theory......Page 334
8 The redundancy theory......Page 336
9 The semantic theory......Page 340
Books......Page 342
Articles......Page 343
Articles......Page 344
I......Page 345
Belief, apriority and indeterminacy......Page 346
Analyticity: metaphysical or epistemological?......Page 348
The metaphysical concept......Page 349
The epistemological concept......Page 351
‘Two Dogmas’ and the rejection of Frege-analyticity......Page 353
Skeptical theses about analyticity......Page 354
Non-factualism about Frege-analyticity......Page 356
The error thesis about Frege-analyticity......Page 357
The analyticity of logic......Page 359
The classical view and implicit definition......Page 360
Implicit definition and conventionalism......Page 364
Quine against implicit definition: regress......Page 366
Quine against implicit definition: constitutive truth......Page 367
Implicit definition, justification and entitlement......Page 370
Appendix: a priori knowledge of the second premise......Page 372
A solution......Page 374
Notes......Page 376
Select bibliography......Page 381
1 Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding and rules......Page 383
2 Kripke on rules......Page 384
3 Is semantic irrealism incoherent?......Page 388
4.1 The contractual model of meaning and investigation-independence......Page 394
4.2 The 1980/1 argument......Page 395
4.3 Horrified reactions......Page 398
4.4 Wright\'s strengthened argument......Page 400
4.5 Investigation-independence and objectivity of judgement......Page 402
5 Concluding remarks......Page 405
Notes......Page 406
References and suggested reading......Page 408
16 The indeterminacy of translation......Page 411
1 What does the indeterminacy of translation involve?......Page 412
2 Could one live with the indeterminacy of translation?......Page 414
3 Quine\'s arguments for the indeterminacy thesis......Page 415
4 Evans\'s appraisal of the argument from below......Page 418
5 Are Evans\'s objections compelling?......Page 422
6 The Argument from Above: preliminary clarifications......Page 427
7 The Argument from Above: appraisal......Page 432
Notes......Page 436
Works by Quine......Page 439
Works by other authors......Page 440
17 Putnam\'s model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism......Page 441
I......Page 442
II......Page 443
III......Page 444
IV......Page 452
V......Page 453
VI......Page 455
VII......Page 458
VIII......Page 460
Weak permutation......Page 462
Strong permutation......Page 463
Languages with modal operators......Page 465
Notes......Page 466
Works by Hilary Putnam......Page 470
Works by other authors......Page 471
1 The early history......Page 472
2 Recent approaches......Page 480
2.1 Three forms of paradoxical arguments......Page 481
2.2.1 Observational predicates......Page 482
2.2.2 The nature of vagueness......Page 484
2.3.1 Supervaluations......Page 485
2.3.2 Degrees of truth......Page 489
2.3.3 A non-bivalent metalanguage......Page 492
2.4 The epistemic view......Page 493
Notes......Page 495
References......Page 497
Part III: Reference, Identity and Necessity......Page 499
1.2 Relative and absolute modalities......Page 501
1.3 Comparability and strength of absolute modalities......Page 503
1.4 The philosophical problem of necessity......Page 504
2.2 Quine\'s scepticism finessed?......Page 505
2.3 More direct defences against Quine\'s challenge......Page 506
3.1 Possible-world semantics......Page 507
The Paraphrase Argument......Page 508
Arguments from explanatory virtue......Page 509
3.3 Alternatives to and arguments against realism about worlds......Page 510
3.4 Objections to Lewisian realism......Page 514
4 Modal realism 2: the non-cognitivist challenge......Page 518
Notes......Page 523
References and further reading......Page 527
1 Concepts......Page 529
2 Essentialist theses and arguments for them......Page 531
3 Slippery slopes and primitive thisnesses......Page 536
4 The grounds of metaphysical necessity......Page 543
Further reading......Page 546
21 Reference and necessity......Page 548
1 Questions and theses......Page 549
2 The possible-worlds framework......Page 551
3 What are the semantic values of names?......Page 554
4 How do names get their semantic values?......Page 556
5 Names and essences......Page 562
References......Page 567
1 Rigidity......Page 569
2 Rigid designation and quantified modal logic......Page 572
3 The descriptive picture......Page 577
4 Kripke\'s argument and the rigidity thesis......Page 579
5 The ‘actualized’ description theory......Page 583
6 Names and wide-scope......Page 585
7 Assertoric content and ingredient sense......Page 588
Notes......Page 592
Bibliography......Page 598
1 Introduction......Page 600
2 Meaning, content and propositions......Page 601
3.1 Burks\'s framework......Page 604
3.2 Signs, tokens and utterances......Page 606
3.3 Context......Page 607
3.3.3 Automatic versus intentional indexicals......Page 609
3.4 Meaning......Page 610
3.5.1 Varieties of truth-conditions......Page 613
3.5.2 Content_M as cognitively relevant content......Page 615
3.6.1 Content_C as official content......Page 617
3.6.2 Referentialism......Page 618
4 Conclusion......Page 621
Notes......Page 623
References......Page 625
1 Introduction......Page 627
2 Sortals and counting......Page 629
3 What is an object?......Page 630
4 Frege on concepts and objects......Page 632
5 Two forms of identity criterion......Page 633
6 The logical status and role of identity criteria......Page 636
7 One-level versus two-level identity criteria......Page 637
8 On the identity of cardinal numbers......Page 638
9 Cardinal numbers and counting......Page 639
10 Abstract and concrete objects......Page 641
11 The paradoxes of identity over time......Page 643
Appendix: informal proof of (N2)......Page 645
Bibliography......Page 646
Introduction......Page 648
The non-existence of absolute identity......Page 649
The derelativization thesis......Page 651
The counting thesis......Page 653
The irreducibility of restricted quantification......Page 654
The ‘name for an A’/‘name of an A’ distinction......Page 655
Geach versus Quine: a baroque meinongian ontology......Page 656
Cats, rivers and heralds......Page 659
Substantival terms and the derelativization thesis......Page 662
References......Page 665
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Back Cover......Page 736