WTO Law and Developing Countries

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Contributors......Page 9
Developing Countries in the WTO System......Page 11
I. Introduction......Page 22
1. Background......Page 25
2. The Origins of Special and Differential Treatment......Page 26
III. Legal Status of S & D Provisions under the WTO Agreements......Page 29
1. S & D Provisions in the Uruguay Round Agreements......Page 30
2. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties......Page 32
3.1. Provisions Aimed at Increasing Trade Opportunities......Page 33
3.2. Provisions That Require WTO Members to Safeguard the Interests of Developing Countries......Page 37
3.3. Provisions Permitting Developing Countries to Assume Lesser Obligations......Page 40
3.4. Provisions Relating to Transitional Time Periods......Page 42
3.5. Provisions Relating to Technical Assistance......Page 43
IV. Conclusion......Page 44
Introduction......Page 46
I. Preferences as a Stumbling Block to MTL......Page 49
II. Welfare Estimates of Preferences as a Stumbling Block to MTL......Page 51
Methodology......Page 52
Empirical Results......Page 53
III. Implementation, Scope, and Refinement of the Subsidy Scheme......Page 58
IV. Conclusion......Page 60
Preferences to Small Countries as a Stumbling Block to MTL......Page 61
Side Conditions in Preferential Agreements......Page 63
Acknowledgments......Page 66
References......Page 67
I. Introduction......Page 69
A Commitments on Accession......Page 71
B Commitments on Intellectual Property......Page 73
A. Legal Rules......Page 78
B. Application of the Legal Rules......Page 79
C. Remedies......Page 83
A. China's Economic Interests......Page 84
B. The Timeline of WTO Dispute Settlement......Page 85
1. Constraints on Unilateral Measures......Page 86
3. The WTO TRIPS Council and Dispute Settlement Mechanism......Page 87
3. Aggressive Unilateralism......Page 88
Conclusion......Page 91
Introduction......Page 92
1. Services, Development, and the Cost of Protection......Page 94
2. Developing Countries in Previous Multilateral Services Negotiations......Page 99
3. Developing Countries in the Current Round of Services Negotiations......Page 108
4.1. To Commit or Not to Commit? That Is the Question......Page 112
4.2. Seeking Enhanced Access in Foreign Markets: Where and How......Page 117
4.3. The Mode 4 Agenda......Page 120
4.4. Reaping the Benefits of Outsourcing......Page 125
4.5. Domestic Regulation: Taking Care of Special Circumstances......Page 126
5. Concluding Remarks......Page 129
References......Page 131
Comment on Juan Marchetti’s “Developing Countries in the WTO Services Negotiation: Doing Enough?”......Page 135
Introduction......Page 139
Why Did Developing Countries Accept the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round?......Page 140
Pre-TRIPS National IP Laws in Developing Countries......Page 141
Forum for Lodging an Intellectual Property Agreement......Page 142
Clarifications and Further Flexibility Provided by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health......Page 143
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Declaration......Page 146
Biodiversity and Traditional Knowledge......Page 149
ANNEX: Existing flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement: some examples......Page 152
1. Introduction......Page 156
2. The World Trade Organization......Page 157
2.1. Organization......Page 160
2.2. Decision Making......Page 161
3. Participation......Page 162
3.1. The Action in 2003......Page 163
3.2. Representation in Geneva......Page 164
3.3. Written Submissions......Page 167
4. Analysis......Page 172
4.1. The Regression Model......Page 173
4.2. Size and Income Matter......Page 175
4.3. Trade Stakes......Page 177
4.4. Regional and Preferential Trade Agreements......Page 179
4.5. Market Access Conditions......Page 182
5. Participation in the DDA Negotiations......Page 184
6. Participation Across Areas and Subjects......Page 189
7. Conclusion......Page 194
References......Page 195
Comment on Nordstrom's "Developing Countries and the WTO: What’s Wrong with Inactivity?”......Page 196
I. The Trouble with Numbers......Page 197
II. Should Developing States Participate in WTO Activities?......Page 201
III. What's So Great about Participation Anyway?......Page 203
Conclusion......Page 204
I. Introduction......Page 205
II. Argument......Page 207
III. Empirical Tests......Page 209
IV. Implications......Page 219
1. Introduction......Page 223
2. The Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries......Page 224
3. Dispute Settlement Proceedings......Page 226
(a) To Litigate or to Negotiate......Page 227
(b) The Costs of Dispute Settlement Proceedings......Page 228
(c) The Costs of Failure to Prevail in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings......Page 230
(e) The Benefits of the Available Remedies......Page 231
(f) Concluding Thoughts......Page 235
II. The Role of Economics in Providing Assistance to Developing Countries in WTO Litigation......Page 237
A The Use of Economics in the Pre-Litigation Phase......Page 238
B The Use of Economics During the WTO Litigation Phase......Page 240
III. Alternatives to the ACWL Model and Implications......Page 241
9 Compensation and Retaliation: A Developing Country's Perspective......Page 243
I. Introduction......Page 244
II. Brief Overview of the Mexican Proposal......Page 245
A Early Determination and Application of Nullification or Impairment......Page 246
B Retroactive Determination of Nullification or Impairment......Page 248
C Preventive Measures......Page 250
D Negotiable Remedies......Page 251
A It Is in the Developing Countries' Own Interest to Enhance the Remedies Part of the DSU......Page 252
B Three Main Areas in Which the Mexican Proposal Will Serve to Enhance the Remedies Part of the DSU......Page 253
(b) Whether Retaliation Is Trade Disruptive and Whether It Hurts the Complaining Party......Page 254
(c) Whether Retaliation Rebalances the Level of Rights and Obligations between Members......Page 255
V. Conclusion......Page 256
 Getting Compliance Just Right: Comment on Mateo Diego-Fernández’s “Compensation and Retaliation: A Developing Country’s......Page 258
1. Introduction......Page 265
2. Legal Background......Page 266
2.1.1. GSP in the United States......Page 267
2.1.2. GSP in the European Communities......Page 269
2.2 India's Complaint and Its Legal Basis......Page 270
2.3 The European Response and the Panel Decision......Page 272
2.4 The Appellate Body Decision......Page 274
3.1. An Assessment of the WTO Outcome......Page 276
3.2. Implications of the Appellate Body Decision for Other Aspects of Existing GSP Schemes......Page 279
4.1. Economic Effects of Tariff Preferences......Page 281
4.2. Does GSP Promote Development?......Page 284
4.3. Differential Treatment and Conditionality in Tariff Preference Schemes......Page 287
References......Page 290
When – and Why – Do Hard Cases Make Bad Law? The GSP Dispute: Comment on Grossman and Sykes’ “A Preference for Development......Page 293
I. Relationship between the Enabling Clause and Article XX......Page 294
II. Role of the Appellate Body (AB) in Hard Cases like the GSP Dispute......Page 297
III. Purpose of the GSP Programs......Page 298
IV. Conclusion......Page 301
1. Introduction......Page 302
2. EC Development Policy and Trade Preferences – A Neat Fit?......Page 303
3. The GSP+– Meeting Legitimate Development Needs?......Page 308
1. Background to the Dispute......Page 316
2. Reflection: The GSP Fallacy......Page 318
1. Legal Grounds......Page 321
2. Economic Grounds......Page 325
3. Political/Systemic Grounds......Page 328
C. Conclusion......Page 332
I. Introduction......Page 334
Terms of Trade and International Cooperation......Page 335
The “Commitment” Value of International Cooperation......Page 336
Developing Countries and International Cooperation......Page 337
III. Costs and Benefits from the WTO for Developing Countries......Page 338
The Growth of New Rules-Related Obligations......Page 339
The Implementation Debate and Special and Differential Treatment......Page 340
The Impact of Rules Depends in Part on HowMembers Behave......Page 345
Setting the Agenda in Rules-Related Negotiations......Page 348
Influencing the Agenda: Multilateral and Regional Arrangements......Page 351
Reliance on Preferences to Circumvent MFN......Page 352
Scope for Gains from Further Liberalization in ForeignMarkets......Page 353
Market Access Issues in Developing Country Markets......Page 355
Lessening Information Asymmetries in the Trading System......Page 363
I. Summary and Conclusions......Page 365
References......Page 367
Comment on Patrick Low’s “Is the WTO Doing Enough for Developing Countries?”......Page 369
Index......Page 373