We Have Always Been Cyborgs: Digital Data, Gene Technologies, and an Ethics of Transhumanism

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Testimonials page
We Have Always Been Cyborgs: Digital Data, Gene Technologies, and an Ethics of Transhumanism
Copyright information
Table of contents
List of abbreviations
Acknowledgments
1 Transhumanism: In a Nutshell
	1.1 Philosophical issues
	1.2 Transhumanism as nihilistic, positive pessimism
		1.2.1 Pessimism
		1.2.2 Positivity
		1.2.3 Nihilism
	1.3 Conclusion
2 On a Silicon-based Transhumanism
	2.1 Transhumanism without mind uploading and immortality
		2.1.1 Elon Musk and the simulation argument
		2.1.2 Implicit assumptions of the simulation argument
		2.1.3 Immortality now
		2.1.4 Conclusion
	2.2 A democratic usage of our digital data as pragmatic must-have?
		2.2.1 We have always been cyborgs6
		2.2.2 Personal interests in data collection9
		2.2.3 Ageing as disease11
		2.2.4 Political interests in data collection
		2.2.5 Internet panopticon20
		2.2.6 A European social credit system as a pragmatic necessity
		2.2.7 An as-good-as-it-gets ethic of reducing violence
		2.2.8 Truthfulness, mindfulness, and impulse control as means to strengthen autonomy
		2.2.9 Conclusion
		2.2.10 Final thoughts related to the COVID-19 pandemic
		2.2.11 Glocalization and the war for digital data34
3 On a Carbon-based Transhumanism
	3.1 From Nietzsche’s overhuman to the posthuman of transhumanism
		3.1.1 Reflections on this challenge
		3.1.2 Implications for contemporary discourses
		3.1.3 Conclusion
	3.2 Moral (bio)enhancement
		3.2.1 Moral bioenhancement by means of citalopram
		3.2.2 Moral (bio)enhancement as legal obligation
		3.2.3 Moral (bio)enhancement as free choice
		3.2.4 Further moral bioenhancement options
		3.2.5 The relationship between cognitive and moral development
		3.2.6 Conclusion
	3.3 Gene modification
		3.3.1 On the relationship between educational and genetic enhancement24
		3.3.2 Irreversibility of genetic enhancement
		3.3.3 Reversibility of educational enhancement
		3.3.4 Autonomy
		3.3.5 Instrumentalization
		3.3.6 Equality
		3.3.7 Therapy and enhancement
		3.3.8 Educational enhancement is necessary but genetic enhancement is not
		3.3.9 Conclusion
	3.4 Gene selection
		3.4.1 Creating children and the principle of PB
		3.4.2 Counter-arguments against the principle of PB
			3.4.2.1 General concerns
			3.4.2.2 Inconsistencies
			3.4.2.3 PB as a violent and hence an immoral principle
		3.4.3 Conclusion
4 A Fictive Ethics
	4.1 Using gene technologies as a vice?
		4.1.1 Nietzsche’s communitarianism, virtue ethics, and the overhuman
		4.1.2 Sandel’s virtue-ethical rejection of genetic enhancement
		4.1.3 A Nietzschean critique of Sandel’s criticism of genetic enhancement
		4.1.4 Conclusion
	4.2 Three transhumanist types of human perfection
		4.2.1 The Renaissance ideal
		4.2.2 A common-sense account
		4.2.3 Radical pluralism
		4.2.4 Conclusion
	4.3 What does it mean to harm a person?
		4.3.1 Human dignity12
			4.3.1.1 Challenging Kant’s basic assumptions
			4.3.1.2 Moving beyond Kant’s basic assumptions
			4.3.1.3 Challenges related to these moves beyond Kant’s basic assumptions
		4.3.2 Twisting the person–thing distinction
		4.3.3 Reduce violence and avoid damage
		4.3.4 Conclusion
	4.4 Transhumanism and ‘The Land of Cockaygne’
		4.4.1 Immortality
		4.4.2 An anti-utopian transhumanism
			4.4.2.1 Dynamic politics of freedom, equality, and solidarity
			4.4.2.2 The importance of a radical plurality of goodness
			4.4.2.3 Affirmation of a culture of plurality, science, and relationality
				4.4.2.3.1 A decent work-life-balance with a lot of vacation time
				4.4.2.3.2 Non-violence as a social and a lived ideal
				4.4.2.3.3 An increased lifespan or even better: a longer-lasting health span
		4.4.3 Conclusion
	4.5 Transhumanism, immortality, and the meaning of life
		4.5.1 Cryonics
		4.5.2 Mind uploading
		4.5.3 Meaning of life
		4.5.4 The hermeneutic circle of naturalism and philosophical interpretations
		4.5.5 Conclusion
5 The End as a New Beginning
References
Notes
Index
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