Warrant and Proper Function

Contents......Page 12
1. Warrant: A First Approximation......Page 16
I. Proper Function......Page 17
II. The Design Plan......Page 24
III. Reliability......Page 30
I. The Design Plan......Page 34
II. Two Concluding Comments......Page 55
I. Knowledge of Myself......Page 61
II. Memory......Page 70
I. Other Persons......Page 78
II. Testimony......Page 90
I. Perceptual Belief as Knowledge......Page 102
II. Perceptual Experience......Page 104
III. Perceptual Beliefs as Basic......Page 106
IV. Perceptual Beliefs Formed on the Basis of Experience......Page 111
V. Nature, Nurture, and Perceptual Judgments......Page 112
6. A Priori Knowledge......Page 115
I. A Priori Knowledge Initially Characterized......Page 116
II. A Priori Knowledge Is Knowledge......Page 121
III. Fallibilistic A Priorism......Page 123
IV. A Priori Knowledge and the Causal Requirements......Page 126
V. Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete......Page 130
VI. Back to the Causal Requirement......Page 133
7. Induction......Page 135
I. The Old Riddle of Induction......Page 137
II. The New Riddle of Induction......Page 141
8. Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views......Page 150
I. Epistemic Probability and Statistical Probability......Page 152
II. Theories of Epistemic Probability......Page 155
I. The Two Faces of Epistemic Probability......Page 172
II. An Account of the Normative Component......Page 178
III. Replies and Comments......Page 181
10. Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence......Page 189
I. Coherence and Foundations......Page 190
II. Evidentialism......Page 198
11. Naturalism versus Proper Function?......Page 207
I. Naturalistic Analyses of Proper Function......Page 212
II. So What\'s a Poor Naturalist to Do?......Page 224
I. The Problem......Page 229
II. Darwin\'s Doubt......Page 232
III. A Preliminary Argument against Naturalism......Page 241
IV. The Main Argument Against Naturalism......Page 242
C......Page 252
F......Page 253
M......Page 254
R......Page 255
Z......Page 256