UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Contents......Page 7
Tables and Appendices......Page 8
Acronyms......Page 9
Acknowledgments......Page 13
Basic questions and the argument in brief......Page 17
Why another study of peacekeeping is necessary......Page 18
Case selection......Page 20
Measuring success and failure......Page 22
The situational difficulty......Page 24
Security Council interests......Page 27
The “rules” of peacekeeping......Page 29
Organizational learning......Page 30
Organization of the book......Page 36
Somalia......Page 37
Rwanda......Page 44
Angola......Page 51
Bosnia-Herzegovina......Page 58
Conclusion......Page 66
Situational factors......Page 68
Security Council interests......Page 72
Mandate......Page 73
Linkage......Page 74
Consensus......Page 76
Intensity......Page 77
Organizational change and mandate implementation......Page 78
Establishment of the UNTAG offices amidst renewed fighting......Page 79
The military component......Page 87
CIVPOL......Page 89
Refugees......Page 93
Elections......Page 96
Namibia since UNTAG......Page 100
Conclusion......Page 102
Situational factors......Page 104
Security Council interests......Page 109
Consensus......Page 112
Intensity......Page 113
Organizational change and mandate implementation......Page 114
Mandate creation......Page 117
Mandate interpretation......Page 118
Human rights......Page 119
ONUSAL and human rights monitoring......Page 120
The Ad Hoc and Truth Commissions......Page 123
Broader judicial reforms......Page 126
Civilian police......Page 127
Salvadoran Armed Forces reform and FMLN reintegration......Page 130
Land and economic reform......Page 134
Elections......Page 137
El Salvador since ONUSAL......Page 142
Conclusion......Page 144
Situational factors......Page 147
Mandate......Page 154
Security Council interests......Page 155
Consensus......Page 158
Organizational change and implementation......Page 159
UNAMIC and organizational dysfunction......Page 160
UNTAC’s delayed deployment......Page 163
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General......Page 164
Civil administration......Page 165
Military division......Page 167
Civilian police......Page 171
Human rights......Page 173
Information and education......Page 176
Repatriation......Page 178
Rehabilitation......Page 180
Elections......Page 183
Cambodia since UNTAC......Page 189
Conclusion......Page 192
Introduction......Page 195
Situational factors......Page 196
Five years of stalemate......Page 200
Negotiations......Page 201
Mandate......Page 202
Security Council interests......Page 204
Intensity......Page 208
Organizational change and mandate implementation......Page 209
Establishing ONUMOZ and confronting crises......Page 210
Political component......Page 213
Military component......Page 214
Police component......Page 222
Humanitarian assistance......Page 224
Elections, crisis and recovery......Page 228
Mozambique since ONUMOZ......Page 234
Conclusion......Page 238
Introduction......Page 241
Situational factors......Page 242
Negotiations......Page 245
Mandate......Page 247
Security Council interests......Page 250
Organizational change and mandate implementation......Page 251
Military......Page 253
Civilian administration......Page 258
Police......Page 261
Human rights......Page 263
Refugees......Page 265
Public affairs......Page 267
Elections......Page 269
Croatia since UNTAES......Page 272
Conclusion......Page 274
Introduction......Page 276
Situational factors......Page 278
UNAMET......Page 281
INTERFET......Page 282
Security Council interests......Page 284
Consensus......Page 287
Organizational change and mandate implementation......Page 288
Mandate......Page 291
Pillar 1: Governance and public administration / East Timorese
Transitional Administration......Page 293
Civilian police......Page 297
Judicial affairs......Page 299
Pillar 2: UN peacekeeping force......Page 300
Pillar 3: Humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation......Page 303
Economic and social development......Page 304
Elections......Page 305
Exit strategy, UNMISET, and Timor-Leste after UNTAET......Page 306
Law enforcement......Page 308
Security and stability......Page 309
Economy......Page 310
Elections......Page 311
Conclusion......Page 312
Introduction......Page 315
The 1999 wave: Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Congo......Page 316
Kosovo......Page 317
Sierra Leone......Page 319
Congo......Page 322
The 2003–2004 wave and a ripple: Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Haiti…and Sudan......Page 326
Liberia......Page 328
Cote d’Ivoire......Page 330
Burundi......Page 332
Haiti......Page 335
Sudan......Page 338
Conclusion......Page 340
10
Conclusion: two levels of organizational learning......Page 343
Preconditions for first-level learning......Page 344
Dysfunction......Page 346
Incremental adaptation......Page 350
Second-level learning......Page 353
The Secretariat as actor and the spread of western institutions......Page 355
Implications of the findings of this book for the operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan......Page 358
Outlook and prospects......Page 362
Appendix I
Multidimensionality of mandates of all post-Cold War
UN peacekeeping operations in civil wars......Page 363
Notes on Appendix I......Page 368
Appendix II
Questions for structured-focused comparisons......Page 369
Appendix III
Situational difficulty before the start of the UN
peacekeeping operation......Page 371
Bibliography......Page 374
Index......Page 408