Trust and Credit in Organizations and Institutions: As Viewed from the Evolution of Cooperation

Preface
	Abilities Unique to Humans
	Why Animals Live in Groups
	Groups of Human Beings
	Organizations and Institutions
	Trust in Organizations and Institutions
	Chapters
Acknowledgments
Contents
Part I: Introduction to the Evolution of Cooperation
	Chapter 1: What Is ``The Evolution of Cooperation``?
		1.1 Cooperation in Our Lives
		1.2 What Is Evolutionary Game Theory?
		1.3 Evolutionary Stable Strategy
		1.4 Games Between Two Players
			1.4.1 Prisoner´s Dilemma Game
			1.4.2 Chicken Game
			1.4.3 Snowdrift and Blizzard Game
			1.4.4 Which Is an ESS, Cooperation or Defection?
		1.5 Why We Can Analyze Our Society by Means of Evolutionary Game Theory
		1.6 How to Make a Mathematical Model or an Agent-Based Model of Our Society by Means of Evolutionary Game Theory
		1.7 The Mechanisms to Promote the Evolution of Cooperation Between Bilateral Players
			1.7.1 Kin Selection
			1.7.2 Group Selection
			1.7.3 Direct Reciprocity
			1.7.4 Indirect Reciprocity
			1.7.5 Social Network
			1.7.6 Punishment
		1.8 Games Among Three or More Players
		1.9 The Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Our Society
		References
	Chapter 2: The Evolution of Cooperation in a Lattice-Structured Population Under Two Different Updating Rules
		2.1 Introduction
		2.2 Completely Mixed Population
		2.3 One-Dimensional Lattice Under the Score-Dependent Viability Model
			2.3.1 Computer Simulations on a One-Dimensional Lattice Model
			2.3.2 The Dynamics of Density
				2.3.2.1 Mean-Field Approximation
				2.3.2.2 Pair Approximation
			2.3.3 Invasion Success Probability in the One-Dimensional Lattice Model
			2.3.4 The Pair-Edge Method
		2.4 Two-Dimensional Lattice Under the Viability Model
			2.4.1 Mean-Field Approximation in the Two-Dimensional Lattice
			2.4.2 Pair Approximation in the Two-Dimensional Lattice Model
			2.4.3 Computer Simulations
		2.5 Score-Dependent Fertility Model
			2.5.1 Computer Simulations on a One-Dimensional Lattice
			2.5.2 Mathematical Analyses in a One-Dimensional Lattice
				2.5.2.1 Mean-Field Dynamics
				2.5.2.2 Pair Approximation
				2.5.2.3 Invasion Success Probability
				2.5.2.4 The Pair-Edge Method
			2.5.3 Two-Dimensional Model
		2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
			2.6.1 The Lattice-Structured Population vs. Completely Mixing Population
			2.6.2 Comparison Between the Viability Model and the Fertility Model
			2.6.3 Coexistence of Cooperators and Defectors
		References
	Chapter 3: The Effect of Peer Punishment on the Evolution of Cooperation
		3.1 Introduction
		3.2 Two Updating Rules, Viability Model and Fertility Model
			3.2.1 Model
			3.2.2 The Completely Mixing Model
				3.2.2.1 Score-Dependent Viability Model
				3.2.2.2 Score-Dependent Fertility Model
			3.2.3 The Lattice Model
				3.2.3.1 Score-Dependent Viability Model
				3.2.3.2 Score-Dependent Fertility Model
			3.2.4 Summary
			3.2.5 Expansion of This Study: Do Empty Sites Influence the Evolution of Cooperation and Punishment?
				3.2.5.1 Model and Results
		3.3 If Anti-Social Punishers Exist in the Population
			3.3.1 Strategies and Payoffs
			3.3.2 Z-Mixed Population Model
			3.3.3 Lattice Model When Anti-Social Punishment Is Allowed
		3.4 Which Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation, Strict or Graduated Punishment?
			3.4.1 What Is Graduated or Strict Punishment?
			3.4.2 Models
			3.4.3 Results
				3.4.3.1 Agent-Based Simulations
				3.4.3.2 The Mathematical Model of the Random-Matching Condition
		3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
			3.5.1 Spiteful Behavior in Social Sciences and Evolutionary Evolution
			3.5.2 Graduated or Strict Punishment in Society
			3.5.3 Anti-Social Punishment in Society
			3.5.4 Other Types of Punishment Beside Peer Punishment
		References
Part II: Cooperation, Trust, and Credit in the Early-Stage Mutual-Aid Systems
	Chapter 4: Rotation Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) as Early-Stage Credit Systems
		4.1 Introduction
		4.2 Models and Results
			4.2.1 Model 1: Baseline Evolutionary Simulation Model of Rotating Indivisible Goods Game
			4.2.2 Results of Model 1
			4.2.3 Model 2: Rotating Indivisible Goods Game with the Peer Selection Rule
			4.2.4 Results of Model 2
			4.2.5 Model 3: A Forfeiture Rule Is Introduced
			4.2.6 Results of Model 3
			4.2.7 Effect of Labeling Rules
			4.2.8 Effect of Reputation Levels
		4.3 Discussion and Conclusions
		References
	Chapter 5: Tanomoshi-ko Field Study and Subjective Experiment
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Ko on Sado Island
			5.2.1 Tanomoshi-ko in Fukura-District
			5.2.2 Tanomoshi-ko in Ogi-District
			5.2.3 Nenbutsu-ko
			5.2.4 Michibushin
			5.2.5 Summary: Ko in Sado
		5.3 Experimental Study of ROSCA
			5.3.1 Experiment
				5.3.1.1 Design
				5.3.1.2 Treatment B (Base)
				5.3.1.3 Treatment P (Punishment)
				5.3.1.4 Treatments V (Voting) and VP (Voting With Punishment)
			5.3.2 Theoretical Predictions
			5.3.3 Results
				5.3.3.1 Average Contribution Rates Over Time and Distribution of Total Profit
				5.3.3.2 Why Did the Voting System Work Well?
				5.3.3.3 Why Did the Punishment Rule Not Work Well?
				5.3.3.4 Order Effect for the Receipt of Payouts
				5.3.3.5 Panel Regression of Average Contribution Rates
			5.3.4 Conclusions of the Experiment
		References
	Chapter 6: Who Does a Group Admit into Membership or Which Group Does a Player Want to Join?
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 Models
		6.3 Results
		6.4 Discussion and Conclusions
		References
	Chapter 7: The Mutual-Aid Game as an Early-Stage Insurance System
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Model
		7.3 Results
			7.3.1 Eight Strategy Sets Are Categorized into Two
			7.3.2 Calculating the Expected Payoffs
			7.3.3 What Happens When S-J Players Are the Majority?
			7.3.4 Can Rare S-J Players Invade the Population Occupied by AllD Players?
			7.3.5 The Effect of Large Group Size
			7.3.6 Reputation vs. Experience
			7.3.7 Why Cannot Conditional Cooperators Except S-J Players Invade the Population in n  4?
			7.3.8 Perception and Implementation Errors
			7.3.9 If Pure Cooperators Are Added in the Population
		7.4 Discussion and Conclusions
			7.4.1 Comparison with the Previous Studies About the Mutual-Aid Game
			7.4.2 The Mutual-Aid Game as an Institution
		References
Part III: Cooperation, Trust, and Credibility in Society
	Chapter 8: Cooperation and Punishment in the Linear Division of Labor
		8.1 Introduction
			8.1.1 The Linear Division of Labor
			8.1.2 The Industrial Waste Treatment Process in Japan
		8.2 Models
			8.2.1 Baseline System in the Three-Role Model
			8.2.2 Actor Responsibility System in the Three-Role Model
			8.2.3 Producer Responsibility System in the Three-Role Model
		8.3 Results
			8.3.1 Comparison with the Results of Kitakaji and Ohnuma (2014)
			8.3.2 Comparison with Empirical Reality
			8.3.3 Comparison Between the Three-Role and Two-Role Models
		8.4 Discussion and Conclusions
		References
	Chapter 9: Can Cooperation Evolve When False Gossip Spreads?
		9.1 Introduction
			9.1.1 Comparison with Previous Studies About Indirect Reciprocity
			9.1.2 Comparison with Nakamaru and Kawata´s Gossip Model
			9.1.3 Unification of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity
		9.2 Models
			9.2.1 Strategies
			9.2.2 Definition of the P-Score
			9.2.3 The Giving-Game Session
			9.2.4 The Gossip Session
			9.2.5 The Updating Rule Through Generations
			9.2.6 Parameter Settings
		9.3 Competition Among Gossiping Reciprocators with Various Criteria
			9.3.1 Fair Gossipers with Various Criteria for Giving-Games (qG = qB = 0)
			9.3.2 Biased Gossipers (qG = qB = k)
		9.4 Effects of Different Types of False Gossip on the Evolution of Reciprocity
			9.4.1 ZDISCs Versus Non-gossiping ALLDs
			9.4.2 ZDISCs Versus Fairly Gossiping ALLDs
			9.4.3 ZDISCs Versus Pure Self-Advertising ALLDs
			9.4.4 ZDISCs Versus ALLB-ALLDs
			9.4.5 ZDISCs Versus ALLG-ALLDs
		9.5 Effects of Selecting Gossip Based on the Trustworthiness of Speakers
			9.5.1 ZDISCs Versus Fairly Gossiping ALLDs
			9.5.2 ZDISCs Versus Pure Self-Advertising ALLDs
			9.5.3 ZDISCs Versus ALLB-ALLDs
			9.5.4 ZDISCs Versus ALLG-ALLDs
		9.6 Discussion and Conclusions
		References
Part IV: Ecological Sustainability, Institutions, and Cooperation
	Chapter 10: Field Abandonment Problem in Rice Paddy Fields
		10.1 Introduction
		10.2 Models
			10.2.1 Baseline Assumption in a Well-Mixed Population
			10.2.2 Consideration of Spatial Structure
		10.3 Results
			10.3.1 Simulations for a Well-Mixed Population
			10.3.2 Simulations for a Spatially Structured Population
				10.3.2.1 Comparison Between Population Applying (*, Global, *) and (*, Local, *) Schemes
				10.3.2.2 The Effect of Various (*, Local, *) Schemes
				10.3.2.3 Parameter Regarding Cultivation Effort in the (*, Local, *) Schemes: a, b, and cclt
				10.3.2.4 Parameter Regarding Collective Action in the (*, Local, *) Schemes
				10.3.2.5 Parameters Regarding Two Side Effects of Cultivation Effort in the (*, Local, *) Schemes
					Water-Use Competition, β3
					Land Abandonment, β1
		10.4 Discussion and Conclusions
			10.4.1 Summary of the Results
			10.4.2 Method of Validating the Model Results
			10.4.3 Game Structure and Its Effect on the Dynamics
			10.4.4 Application of the Current Model and Future Research
			10.4.5 Implications
		References
	Chapter 11: Ecological Features Benefiting Sustainable Harvesters in Socio-Ecological Systems: A Case Study of Swiftlets in Ma...
		11.1 Introduction
			11.1.1 An Appropriate Example: Swiftlets´ Nests in Sarawak, Malaysia
			11.1.2 Comparison with the Previous Theoretical Studies About the Social and Ecological Dynamics
			11.1.3 The Findings of This Chapter
		11.2 Models and Results
			11.2.1 Model 1: The Baseline Model
			11.2.2 Result 1: The Population Dynamics of Swiftlets in the Habitat Without Harvesters
			11.2.3 Model 2: The Open-Access Model
			11.2.4 Result 2: The Results of the Open-Access Model
			11.2.5 Model 3: The Property Rights Model
			11.2.6 Result 3: Results of the Property Rights Model
		11.3 Discussion and Conclusions
			11.3.1 Application of Our Model
			11.3.2 One Direction of Our Future Work
			11.3.3 The Effect of the Price of a Nest
			11.3.4 Back to the Reality About Swiftlets
			11.3.5 Comparison with Theoretical Studies About Socio-Ecological Dynamics
		References
Epilogue
	Searching for tanomoshi-ko in Micronesia
	The World´s First Credit System Was Established in Japan
	Revival of Mutual-Aid Organizations in Japan?
	References