Toward a Process Approach in Psychology: Stepping into Heraclitus' River

Cover
Half-title page
Title page
Copyright page
Contents
List of Figures
Acknowledgments
	A Word from Naomi de Ruiter
	A Word from Paul van Geert
	A Collective Word from Us Both
Introduction: An Invitation to Step into Heraclitus’ River
Chapter 1 Change, the Final Frontier: Introducing a Process Approach to Psychology
	1.1 What Are Processes?
	1.2 Introducing the Juxtaposition: A Substance Approach versus a Process Approach
		1.2.1 Mainstream Substantialism
		1.2.2 Emerging Processualism: Process Metaphysics
	1.3 Our Positions: Critical Realism and Plurality
		1.3.1 Critical Realism
		1.3.2 Timescales and the Illusion of Stable Things
	1.4 A Non-Linear Roller-Coaster Ride through the History of Process Philosophy
		1.4.1 Philosophical Origins
		1.4.2 The Branching Off of the Forked River: Process Philosophy
	1.5 It’s All Greek to Me: Concluding Remarks
Chapter 2 A (Selected) Foundation for a Process Approach: Complex Dynamic Systems Theory
	2.1 What Is a Complex Dynamic System?
	2.2 What Is a Dynamic System?
		2.2.1 Change Across Time
		2.2.2 Rules for Time Evolution
	2.3 What Is a Complex System?
		2.3.1 Many Interacting Components
		2.3.2 Nested Timescales
		2.3.3 Non-Linear Relationships
	2.4 Properties of Complex Dynamic Systems (in the Context of Psychological Constructs)
		2.4.1 Emergence
		2.4.2 Attractors
		2.4.3 Emergence as ‘Soft’ or ‘Strong’
		2.4.4 Self-Organization
			2.4.4.1 Synergetics and Coordination Dynamics
			2.4.4.2 Catastrophe Theory
			2.4.4.3 Self-Organized Criticality
Chapter 3 The Goal of Socrates: Philosophical Foundations for a Value-Laden, Action-Based Praxis of Research
	3.1 A Memorable Soccer Game
	3.2 The Philosophical Foundations of Doing Science: Aristotle’s Scheme of Knowledge
	3.3 Psychological Science and Arendt’s Notion of Praxis: Thinking, Doing, and Producing
		3.3.1 Praxis and the Importance of Appearing: The Responsibility of Free Scientists
		3.3.2 A Community Within a Community: The Responsibility of Science in Creating Worlds
	3.4 The Constructivist, or ‘Practice Turn’, in the Theory of Science
		3.4.1 Bruno Latour and a Praxis as Actor Network
		3.4.2 Inscription Devices as Active Agents
		3.4.3 An Anti-Reductionist View of Truth and Meaning
		3.4.4 The Enactment of Ontologies
	3.5 Foundations Set
Chapter 4 Esteeming Entities: Enacting a Substance Ontology in Self-Esteem Research
	4.1 A Critical-Realism Stance toward Praxes
	4.2 Self-Esteem Research as a Case Study
		4.2.1 On the Nature of Self-Esteem from a Substance-Ontology Perspective
			4.2.1.1 Conceptualizing Self-Esteem: Self-Esteem as a ‘Thing’ That We ‘Have’
			4.2.1.2 Capturing Self-Esteem: Questionnaires
		4.2.2 In search of ‘True’ Self-Esteem: Central (Trait) Tendencies and Random (State) Variability
			4.2.2.1 Trait Self-Esteem
			4.2.2.2 Self-Esteem Stability
			4.2.2.3 State Self-Esteem
		4.2.3 Individual Particulars of Self-Esteem as Enduring over Time
			4.2.3.1 Individual Self-Esteem as Instances of Esteem as a Universal
			4.2.3.2 Relationships as Universals
			4.2.3.3 Explaining Development
			4.2.3.4 Self-Esteem in the Real-World: The Pursuit of High Self-Esteem
	4.3 Reflecting on the Enactment of a Substance Ontology in Self-Esteem Research
		4.3.1 Natural-Science Envy
		4.3.2 An Alternative Praxis for Self-Esteem Research?
		4.3.3 Studying Processes despite a Substance Ontology
	4.4 Conclusion: The Enactment of a Substance Ontology in Self-Esteem Research
Chapter 5 A Person Acting amongst Persons: Enacting a Process Ontology in Self-Esteem Research
	5.1 On the Nature of Self-Esteem from a Process Philosophy
		5.1.1 Observing Self-Esteem: Descriptive Methodologies of Actions
			5.1.1.1 Subjective and Socially Constructed Processes
			5.1.1.2 Research Contexts as Affordances for Experiences of Specific Forms of ‘Self’
			5.1.1.3 Characteristics of Process Description
	5.2 Descriptions and Conceptualizations of Self-Esteem as Processes
		5.2.1 Self-Esteem as Processes of Negotiation and Performance: A Qualitative Account
		5.2.2 Self-Esteem as a Self-Organizing and Self-Maintaining Processes: A Time-Series Account
			5.2.2.1 Time-Series Account of Behavioural and Emotional Cues
			5.2.2.2 Time-Series Account of Narratives
			5.2.2.3 Time-Series Account of Self-Report
		5.2.3 A United Analytical Framework: Complex Dynamic Systems
			5.2.3.1 Intrinsic Dynamics of Self-Esteem Variability
			5.2.3.2 Higher-Order Soft-Assembled Recurrent Patterns of Self-Esteem
	5.3 Separate Roads of Knowledge Construction?
	5.4 Self-Esteem in the Real World: Experiencing the Stability and Flux of Self-Experience
	5.5 Conclusion: The Enactment of a Process Ontology in Self-Esteem Research
Chapter 6 Cliffhangers and Utilitarian Infants: On How Classification and Science Communication Create Worlds
	6.1 Crossing the Visual Cliff and Failed Experiments
		6.1.1 On Words, Kinds, and Entities
		6.1.2 Extensional and Intensional Definitions and the Logic of Experiments
	6.2 Text and the Creation of Infant Economists
		6.2.1 Infants Inferring the Value of Goals from the Cost of Actions
		6.2.2 Texts as Producers of Genericity
			6.2.2.1 Does ‘Infants’ Mean ‘All Infants’? On Bare Nouns and Implicit Quantifiers
			6.2.2.2 ‘Do Infants Look Longer at Test Trials?’ On Individuals, Sets, and Kinds
			6.2.2.3 Sensitive Infants, Generic Statements and Individual Cases
			6.2.2.4 Are Generic Statements Necessarily Majority- or High-Probability-Statements?
			6.2.2.5 On Generic Statements and Their Use for Practical Applications
	6.3 Conclusion
		6.3.1 The Tip of an Iceberg
		6.3.2 Processualizing Science Communication
Chapter 7 Causes, Kings, and Interventions: Causality and Explanation in Mainstream Psychological Theory and Research
	7.1 The Effectiveness of Psychotherapies: Questions for a Health Insurance Company
		7.1.1 The Cases and the Questions
		7.1.2 The Likely Answers from the Insurance Company
	7.2 Causality and the Wish to Make a Difference
		7.2.1 Causality Is Grounded in ‘Doing’
		7.2.2 Type-Causality Statements and the Standard Praxis of Psychological Research
		7.2.3 Causality, Experiments, and Randomized Control Trials
	7.3 Causality and the Wish to Explain
		7.3.1 Aristotle’s Four Forms of Causal Explanation
		7.3.2 Contrastive versus Processual Explanations
	7.4 Toward Processual Explanations: Tinbergen’s Framework
Chapter 8 (Compl)explanation and King Alfonso’s Lament: Complex Dynamic Systems and Causal Explanation
	8.1 Playing a Simple Tune
	8.2 Process as Cause
	8.3 Process Characteristics Relevant for Causality
	8.4 Features of Complex Process Causality
		8.4.1 Self-Causation: Self-Organization, Emergence, and Circular Causality
		8.4.2 Normativity and Intentions
		8.4.3 External Causal Forces: Perturbations
		8.4.4 Distributed Causality
		8.4.5 Causality as Probabilistic and Processual
	8.5 From Abstract to Concrete: Specifying Causality in Complex Systems through Models
		8.5.1 Wiener–Granger Causality
		8.5.2 Interacting Causal Agents: Agent-Based Models
		8.5.3 Continuous Processes
		8.5.4 Provocations of Development: Control Parameters
		8.5.5 Qualitative Process Dynamics as Specifications of Causality
			8.5.5.1 System Dynamics, Network Models, and Dynamic Fields
			8.5.5.2 Visualizing Complex Causality: Changing Attractor Landscapes
	8.6 Conclusion: Causality Is Interaction and Interaction Is Causality
Chapter 9 What’s in a Name?: On the Ontology of Psychological Measurement
	9.1 Understanding (Psychological) Measurement
		9.1.1 The Standard View
		9.1.2 A Processual View on Measurement
	9.2 The Ontology Enacted in Standard Psychological Measurement
		9.2.1 Intelligence: An Example of a Thriving Praxis of Measurement
		9.2.2 The Ontology of Measured Intelligence in the Standard Praxis
			9.2.2.1 Abilities as Pervasive Entities with Independent Existence
			9.2.2.2 The Identity of the Ability Is Conserved Across Occasion and Time
			9.2.2.3 Ergodicity and the Enactment of a Substance Ontology
	9.3 Psychological Measurement and the Enactment of a Process Ontology
		9.3.1 A Thought Experiment on Running
			9.3.1.1 A Substance Ontology of ‘Currence’
			9.3.1.2 A Process Ontology of Running
		9.3.2 A Process Ontology for the Measurement of Psychological Abilities
			9.3.2.1 The Concept of Ability in Relation to Measurement
			9.3.2.2 Toward a Processual and Complexity-Oriented Reconceptualization of Intelligence
				9.3.2.2.1 Intelligence as an Ability of Living Systems
				9.3.2.2.2 Properties of Intelligence in a Processual, Complexity-Oriented Framework
			9.3.2.3 Measuring Abilities?
Chapter 10 (Un)Certainties: Epistemological Issues of Psychological Measurement
	10.1 The Colours of Uncertainty
		10.1.1 A Universe of Plain-Colour Socks: On Classical Measurement Error
		10.1.2 A Universe of Patterned Socks: On Qualitative or Categorical Error
		10.1.3 The Socks of Tomorrow: Determinacy and Indeterminacy
		10.1.4 Back to Psychological Capabilities
	10.2 Observation and Measurement as Processes of Uncertainty Management
		10.2.1 Measurement, Information Exchange, and Coordinated Interaction
		10.2.2 Measuring Vocabulary as Participation in Child–Parent Conversations
		10.2.3 Measuring Psychopathology as Participation in Symptom-Generating Processes
	10.3 Vagueness and Ambiguity as Forms of Uncertainty
		10.3.1 Vagueness and Ambiguity and the Praxis of Psychiatric Categorization
		10.3.2 Complementarity and Superposition
		10.3.3 Emergence and the Boundary Problem
		10.3.4 Vagueness, Ambiguity, and the Distributed Nature of Psychological Processes
		10.3.5 Probability and Uncertainty
			10.3.5.1 The Frequentist Interpretation
			10.3.5.2 The Single-Case Problem and the Propensity Interpretation
			10.3.5.3 The Subjective Interpretation of Probability
		10.3.6 Iterative Reduction of Uncertainty: Dynamic Systems
		10.3.7 Fuzzy Logic
		10.3.8 Working with Uncertainty
Chapter 11 Troubled Waters of Heraclitus’ River?: A Process View on Reproducibility and Generalization in Psychological Research
	11.1 The Reproducibility Crisis
	11.2 Picking Apart the ‘Crisis’
		11.2.1 Heraclitus Wouldn’t Be Bothered: A Culture of Expectations
		11.2.2 A Restricted Account of What Constitutes ‘Results’
		11.2.3 Underdeterminacy: One of Many Roads
	11.3 A Process Approach to Generalization and Reproducibility
		11.3.1 Expecting Variability
		11.3.2 Patterns as the Aim of Generalization
		11.3.3 Generalization and Reproducibility as a Reflective and Long-Term Process
	11.4 Conclusion: Stepping into the River
Chapter 12 Psychological Science as a Complex Dynamic System: From an Entrenched Substance-Oriented Praxis to the Emergence of a Process-Oriented Praxis
	12.1 Mechanisms of Praxis Development
		12.1.1 The Formation of Actant Networks
		12.1.2 Emergence of a Higher-Order Praxis
			12.1.2.1 A Self-Maintaining Praxis via Self-Organization
				12.1.2.1.1 Self-Organization of a Substance Orientation
				12.1.2.1.2 Emergent Substance-Orientation with Causal Power
				12.1.2.1.3 The Role of Feedback Loops in Maintaining an Entrenched Attractor State
			12.1.2.2 Supportive and Oppressive Structures as Central Nodes
		12.1.3 Historicity: A Discipline with Memory
	12.2 Created Ontologies Accepted as Realities
	12.3 Bringing about Change to the Mainstream Praxis
		12.3.1 Perturbations Wanted
			12.3.1.1 Micro- and Meso-Level Perturbations: Individual (Inter)Actions and Events
			12.3.1.2 Macro-Level Perturbations: Replacing Structures of Support
	12.4 A Multi-Stable Praxis: A Tug of War
	12.5 Conclusion
Glossary
References
Index