Three pillars of skepticism in classical India: Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa

Cover
 Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India
 Series page
 Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa
 Copyright page
 Dedication
 Contents
 Preface
 Acknowledgments
 Abbreviations for Classical Texts
 Introduction
 0.1 Telling the Story of Skepticism in Classical India
 0.2 Skepticism about Philosophy versus Epistemological Skepticism
 0.3 The Scope of This Study and Preview of Contents
 0.4 Expanding the History of Philosophy
 Notes
 Chapter 1
 Skeptical Roots in Early Indian Philosophy
 1.1 Digging for Skeptical Roots 1.2 Skepticism in the Ṛg Veda: The Shadow of Philosophical Inquiry1.3 Upaniṣadic Mystical Skepticism: Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, Kaṭha, and Kena Upaniṣads
 1.4 Materialism, Sañjayan Eel-Wriggling, and Early Buddhist Quietism
 1.5: Can Skepticism about Philosophy be a Tradition?: Vitaṇḍa, Prasaṅga, and Prasajya
 1.6 Conclusion: Previewing the Fruits of these Skeptical Roots
 Notes
 Chapter 2
 Nāgārjuna's Buddhist Skepticism
 2.1 Interpreting Nāgārjuna: Mysticism, Anti-Realism, and Epistemological Skepticism
 2.2 The Middle Way between Mysticism and Anti-Realism
 2.3 Nāgārjuna's Two Phases 2.4 How Skepticism about Philosophy Takes Both Phases Seriously2.5 Nāgārjuna's Development of Early Buddhist Quietism: Religiosity without Belief
 2.6 Other Historical Precedents: Candrakīrti, Kumārajīva, Khedrupjey's Opponent, and Patsab Nyimadrak
 2.7 Conclusion
 Notes
 Chapter 3
 Nāgārjuna and the Cause of Skepticism
 3.1 An Overview of Nāgārjuna's Argumentative Strategies
 3.2 Brief Tour of Arguments Concerning the Means of Knowledge in the Vigrahavyāvartanī
 3.3 Nāgārjuna's Critique of Theories of Causation
 3.4 Conventionalist, Anti-Realist, and Epistemological Skeptical Interpretations 3.5 The Cause of Skepticism3.6 Conclusion: Combining Analysis-Insight and Quietism
 Notes
 Chapter 4
 Jayarāśi's Cārvāka Skepticism
 4.1 The Need for Cārvāka Studies
 4.2 Jayarāśi's Method of Destruction: Developing the Materialist and Sañjayan Strains of Early Indian Skepticism
 4.3 Jayarāśian Contextualism
 4.4 A Contextualist Response to the Inconsistency Objection
 4.5 How to Stop Worrying and Love a Life without Philosophy or Religion
 4.6 Conclusion
 Notes
 Chapter 5
 Jayarāśi and the Delightful Destruction of Buddhist Epistemology
 5.1 Jayarāśi's Denial of Epistemological Realism 5.2 Buddhist Epistemological Realism: Dignāga and Dharmakīrti5.3 The Non-Establishment of Difference Argument
 5.4 The Impossibility of Considering Duality Argument
 5.5 The Delightful Destruction of Epistemology and Jayarāśi's Skepticism About Philosophy
 5.6 Conclusion
 Notes
 Chapter 6
 Śrī Harṣa's Advaita Skepticism
 6.1 The Rise of Advaita Vedānta and the Continuing Refinement of Realism
 6.2 Interpreting Śrī Harṣa: Negative Dialectic, Positive Idealism, and Non-Realism
 6.3 The Critique of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā Realism
 6.4 The Possibility of Mystical Experience