The Value Gap

Cover
The Value Gap
Copyright
Dedication
Preface
Contents
Acknowledgements
Part I: Elements
	1: Value Taxonomy
		1.1 Different Taxonomies
		1.2 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Values
		1.3 Final and Non-Final Values
		1.4 Varieties of Non-Final (Extrinsic) Value
		1.5 The Coherence of IE
	2: Good and Good-For
		2.1 Kinds of Positive Value
		2.2 Less Interesting Senses of Good-For
		2.3 Mooreans and Good-For Monists
		2.4 Value Dualism
	3: Challenging Mooreanism
		3.1 Introducing a Debate
		3.2 Overall and Pro Tanto Value
		3.3 The Argument against Mooreanism
		3.4 The Totality of Value
		3.5 The Intuition of Neutrality and Value Monism
		3.6 Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality
		3.7 Non-Relationalists and the Intuition of Neutrality
	4: Challenging Good-For Monism
		4.1 Relationalist Strategies
		4.2 Relationalism and Aggregation
		4.3 Separating Value from Normativity
		4.4 Good-For Monism and Thick Value Concepts
		4.5 Reasons Provided by Relational Value
		4.6 Relationalism, Supervenience, and Constitution
	5: Good-For Unitarianism
		5.1 The Background
		5.2 Good-For Unitarianism
		5.3 Disunitarianism
		5.4 Well-Being
		5.5 Thin and Thick Values
		5.6 The Thickor Thinness of Good-For
		5.7 Good-For and The Intuition of Neutrality
Part II: A Fitting-attitude Analysis Of Value
	6: Fitting-Attitude Analysis
		6.1 The New Agenda
		6.2 FA Analysis and its Advantages
		6.3 Brentano, Kriegel, Rowland, and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
		6.4 FA Analysis and the Moore/Brentano Challenge
		6.5 A Reason’s Strength
		6.6 The Real Agency Challenge to FA Analysis
		6.7 The Value of Actuality
	7: The Logical Consequence of Fitting Attitudes
		7.1 The Property of Being an Intrinsic Property
		7.2 FA Analysis and Value Dualism
		7.3 The Normative Approach
		7.4 The Logical Consequence Argument
	8: The Fitting-Attitude Analysis Revised
		8.1 The Combinatorial Account
		8.2 Challenging the Arguments
		8.3 Downgrading the Logical Consequence Argument
		8.4 Redefining Final Goodness
		8.5 A Substantive Argument Against P**
	9: 'Sake’
		9.1 For Pete’s Sake
		9.2 The Untranslatability Objection
		9.3 The Functional ‘Sake’
		9.4 The Non-Evaluative ‘Sake’
		9.5 Vocation and Being Struck by Personal Value
		9.6 ‘Sake’ in FA Analysis
	10: FA and Motivating Reasons
		10.1 Two Issues
		10.2 Introducing Some Terminology
		10.3 Favourings and Motivating Reasons
	11: Favouring for No Reason
		11.1 Aim
		11.2 Favourings Not Governed by Reason
		11.3 Raz and Expressive Acts
		11.4 Habits and Explanatory Reasons
		11.5 The Dual-Role Requirement
		11.6 Reasonm and Reasong
		11.7 Two Challenging Cases: The Surprise Party and Placebo
		11.8 Arguments from Intentional Overload, Complexity, and Form
	12: Mind The Value Gap
		12.1 On My Own Authority
		12.2 The Width and the Profundity
		12.3 Geachian Crossing
		12.4 The Disapprovables—A Personality Response
		12.5 Silencing
		12.6 Incommensurable but Comparable
		12.7 Two Kinds of Importance
		12.8 Minding the Gap
References
Index