The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq

Kenneth Pollack......Page 1
THE SECOND COMING......Page 2
PREFACE......Page 3
The Problem of Iraq......Page 6
THE EROSION OF CONTAINMENT......Page 8
THE MENU OF DECISION......Page 11
From Sumer to Saddam......Page 12
THE SHADOW OF IRAQ\'S PAST......Page 13
SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE BA\'TH......Page 15
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PERSIAN GULF, 1800-1980......Page 17
THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, AND THE TILT TOWARD IRAQ, 1980-1988......Page 20
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT, 1988-19901......Page 26
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 1990-1991......Page 32
1991, THE YEAR OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES......Page 38
Containment and Beyond......Page 43
THE PRODUCTS OF IMPATIENCE, 1991-1994......Page 45
THE TIDE TURNS, 1995-1996......Page 53
SADDAM ON THE OFFENSIVE, 1997-1998......Page 61
REGIME CHANGE AND CONTAINMENT, 1999-2002......Page 67
ANOTHER BUSH CONFRONTS SADDAM......Page 73
Iraqi State and Society......Page 75
SADDAM\'S POWER BASE......Page 76
THE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES......Page 78
THE RULE OF TERROR......Page 82
THE SUFFERING OF THE IRAQI PEOPLE......Page 84
THE SHI\'AH......Page 94
THE KURDS......Page 96
The Threat......Page 97
SADDAM\'S GOALS......Page 98
TERRORISM......Page 100
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES......Page 104
MILITARY FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, 1999......Page 105
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION......Page 111
The Regional Perspective......Page 118
LINKAGE......Page 119
THE ARAB \"STREET\"......Page 120
SAUDI ARABIA......Page 122
KUWAIT......Page 124
THE SOUTHERN GULF STATES......Page 125
JORDAN......Page 127
SYRIA......Page 128
TURKEY......Page 129
EGYPT......Page 130
ISRAEL......Page 131
IRAN......Page 132
BEYOND THE REGION......Page 133
The Erosion of Containment......Page 135
TAKING ON WATER......Page 137
THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE \"SMART SANCTIONS\"......Page 140
REVISING THE SANCTIONS......Page 142
WHY NONE OF THIS WILL EVER HAPPEN......Page 144
THE INSPECTIONS TRAP......Page 149
THE NO-FLY ZONES......Page 153
The Dangers of Deterrence......Page 155
THE ADVANTAGES OF DETERRENCE......Page 156
DETERRING SADDAM......Page 158
SADDAM THE DECISION MAKER......Page 161
SADDAM\'S DECISION MAKING IN PRACTICE......Page 164
LESSONS FROM SADDAM\'S EXPERIENCE WITH DETERRENCE......Page 171
CAN WE DETER A NUCLEAR-ARMED SADDAM?......Page 173
GAMBLING WITH OUR FUTURE......Page 177
The Difficulty of Covert Action......Page 178
COULDN\'T WE JUST KILL HIM?......Page 179
WHAT ABOUT OVERTHROWING SADDAM IN A COUP?......Page 182
The Risks of the Afghan Approach......Page 185
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE AFGHAN APPROACH......Page 187
WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN AFGHANISTAN......Page 188
THE KOSOVO EXPERIENCE......Page 191
LESSONS FROM THE GULF WAR......Page 193
WHAT SMART BOMBS DO AND DON\'T DO......Page 195
IRAQ IS NOT AFGHANISTAN......Page 197
THE STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC RISKS......Page 202
WHY NOT TRY THE AFGHAN APPROACH AND INVADE ONLY IF IT DOESN\'T WORK?......Page 208
THE ADVANTAGES OF AN INVASION......Page 211
THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS......Page 213
DURATION AND CASUALTIES......Page 216
THE DIPLOMATIC REQUIREMENTS......Page 222
Syria......Page 226
THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS......Page 229
INTERNATIONAL LAW......Page 231
WOULD SADDAM TRY TO ATTACK U.S. FORCES BUILDING UP FOR AN INVASION?......Page 233
DEALING WITH SADDAM\'S COUNTERATTACKS......Page 236
WILL THE IRAQI PEOPLE RESIST OR WELCOME AN INVASION?......Page 239
DON\'T WE NEED TO GET SADDAM?......Page 240
THE ROLE OF THE IRAQI OPPOSITION......Page 241
TWELVE......Page 242
COMPETING APPROACHES TO IRAQ AFTER SADDAM......Page 243
RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ......Page 248
The Limits of Knowledge and Planning......Page 252
and Humanitarian Considerations......Page 253
Not Whether, but When......Page 258
HALF MEASURES WILL NO LONGER WORK......Page 259
RISKS AND COSTS......Page 260
SOONER OR LATER?......Page 262
LOOKING BACK ON THE FUTURE......Page 265
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 266
NOTES......Page 268
The End......Page 317