The Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Preface......Page 15
A ROADMAP FOR THE READER......Page 17
THE BOOK, IN SHORT......Page 20
BEHIND THIS BOOK......Page 25
Acknowledgments......Page 27
Abbreviations......Page 29
Contributors......Page 33
1 International Courts and Tribunals and the Rule of Law......Page 35
A. Dispute resolution tribunals......Page 36
B. International criminal tribunals......Page 40
C. The international criminal court......Page 42
E. Conclusion......Page 44
2 American Public Opinion on International Courts and Tribunals......Page 46
A. Past public opinion on international courts and tribunals (1942–2005)......Page 47
1. International Adjudication and the Case for U.S. Exceptionalism......Page 54
2. Detainee Treatment at Guantanamo Bay......Page 58
3. Charging Individuals and the ICC......Page 59
4. Torture......Page 61
C. Conclusion......Page 62
3 Arbitration and Avoidance of War: The Nineteenth-Century American Vision......Page 64
A. International arbitration and america: 1776–1872......Page 65
B. International arbitration and america: 1872–1918......Page 71
C. Conclusion......Page 78
4 The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies......Page 80
A. Antinomies in the u.s. relationship with the icj......Page 82
1. American Realism versus Institutionalism......Page 83
2. American Exceptionalism versus Sovereign Equality......Page 87
3. Autonomous National Law versus National Law Embedded in International Law......Page 89
B. Techniques for mediating the antinomies......Page 91
2. Circumscribed Jurisdiction......Page 95
3. State Influence on Selection of Judges......Page 103
4. No Direct Enforcement of Judgments in National Law......Page 105
5. Discursive and Political Constraints......Page 106
1. The Overall Track Record......Page 108
I. Oil Platforms Case......Page 113
II. Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion......Page 117
III. Breard/LaGrand/Avena Cases......Page 119
D. Conclusion......Page 130
5 The U.S. Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice: What Does “Respectful Consideration” Mean?......Page 146
A. FROM BREARD TO MEDELLIN: ABORTED DIALOGUES BETWEEN THE ICJ AND THE SUPREME COURT......Page 148
B. CONCEPTUALIZING TREATY DIALOGUE WITH THE ICJ: A HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL RELATIONSHIP?......Page 151
C. “RESPECTFUL CONSIDERATION” IN TREATY DIALOGUE: IN SANCHEZ-LLAMAS, CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP IS EVERYTHING......Page 155
1. The Conservative Conception: Horizontal Dialogue with the ICJ......Page 156
2. The Liberal Conception: Vertical Dialogue with the ICJ......Page 159
D. CONCLUSION......Page 162
6 U.S. Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals......Page 165
2. The Treaty of Versailles (1919)......Page 167
3. The League of Nations (1919–1945)......Page 170
1. Nuremberg and Tokyo......Page 171
2. Early United Nations Efforts to Create an International Criminal Court......Page 174
3. The International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda......Page 177
4. The International Criminal Court......Page 181
I. The Rome Conference – June-July 1998......Page 182
III. The Bush Administration and Notification of Intent Not to Become a Party......Page 184
IV. Attempts to Exempt U.S. Nationals from ICC Prosecution......Page 187
V. Increasing Expressions of Hostility toward the ICC......Page 190
VI. Abu Ghraib......Page 191
VII. Strengthening Preference for Resolution at the National Level......Page 192
VIII. The Darfur Referral......Page 193
IX. The Call to Move the Taylor Prosecution to The Hague......Page 197
X. The Moderation of the U.S. Position......Page 198
I. Sierra Leone......Page 201
II. Cambodia......Page 208
III. Other Courts with an International Dimension......Page 212
2. Strong Preference for Domestic Resolution; Other Courts as Last Resort......Page 214
4. Other and Underlying Factors......Page 215
6. The Limits of Pragmatism......Page 216
7. Postscript......Page 217
7 The United States and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights......Page 219
A. The creation of the inter-american human court of human rights: accepted but not embraced......Page 221
B. Prospects for u.s. acceptance of the court’s contentious jurisdiction......Page 223
C. Instances of engagement between the united states and the inter-american court......Page 225
D. Concerns cited as holding back u.s. ratifcation of the american convention and acceptance of the court’s contentious jurisdiction......Page 234
E. The mechanisms through which the united states engages with the inter-american court and commission......Page 236
F. The nature of current u.s. support for the regional human rights system......Page 237
G. The role of u.s. jurists on and before the court......Page 238
H. The role of the inter-american court in protecting the rights of u.s. citizens......Page 239
I. The work of the inter-american court and commission infuences international human rights law; that, in turn, has an effect on u.s. law and policy......Page 240
J. Conclusion......Page 242
8 From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights Treaty Bodies......Page 244
A. Legal Context: The Human Rights Framework Applicable to the United States......Page 257
B. Supervisory Treaty Body System and the Scope of U.S. Engagement......Page 267
1. Periodic Reporting Process......Page 269
2. Individual and Collective Complaint Procedures and Precautionary Measures......Page 275
3. Other Promotional Mechanisms......Page 282
C. Interest Management: The Push-Pull of Domestic and Foreign Policy Agendas......Page 283
1. Foreign Policy Interests: Net Push Toward Greater Treaty Body Engagement......Page 284
2. Domestic Policy Interests: From Pull to Push – The Evolution of Domestic Social Struggles......Page 290
I. Diminishing U.S. Receptivity to Insulationism......Page 293
II. Creeping Incorporation, Despite Insulationist Obstruction......Page 297
III. Responding to Incorporation\'s Advances: Reappropriating Rights......Page 302
D. Mediating Techniques for Promoting U.S. Engagement: Asserting Clear Lines and Recurring (Selectively) to Subsidiarity Doctrine......Page 306
1. Carving Out “No-Go” Zones: The Substantive Parameters of Treaty Body Competence......Page 310
2. Preferring “Political” to “Judicial” Controls in Human Rights Supervision and Interpretation......Page 313
3. Retaining Full Remedial and Policy-Making Discretion......Page 316
E. Honoring Subsidiarity Doctrine in Full: From International Defense to Domestic Challenge......Page 319
1. A National Office on Human Rights Implementation and Inter-Agency Coordination Body......Page 324
2. United States Commission on Human Rights......Page 326
F. Conclusion: Institutionalizing Subsidiarity......Page 329
9 The U.S. and International Claims and Compensation Bodies......Page 331
A. THE IRAN–UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL......Page 332
B. U.S. ROLE IN THE CREATION AND OPERATION OF HOLOCAUST VICTIMS COMPENSATION MECHANISMS......Page 340
1. The Swiss Bank Claims Institutions......Page 341
2. Forced and Slave Labor Claims......Page 345
4. Insurance Claims......Page 347
C. THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION......Page 348
D. CONCLUSION......Page 353
10 Does the United States Support International Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System......Page 356
A. The turn to liberal trade policies......Page 357
B. The birth of the international trade system: from the international trade organization to the general agreement on tariffs and trade......Page 361
1. The Original U.S. Draft......Page 362
2. The Drafting Process and Creation of the GATT......Page 364
C. The gatt experience......Page 367
1. The Early Years......Page 368
2. The 1960s: The Fall of GATT Dispute Settlement and the Rise of Anti-Legalism......Page 370
I. Increasing Use of Dispute Settlement and Increasing Frustrations......Page 372
II. The Tokyo Round Negotiations......Page 374
4. 1980–1994: Aggressive Unilateralism and the Birth of the WTO......Page 375
I. Deflecting Protectionist Pressures......Page 376
II. The Spur of Unilateralism......Page 377
1. Outline of the DSU......Page 379
2. U.S. Implementation and Debate over the DSU......Page 380
E. U.S. experience under wto dispute settlement......Page 382
F. Conclusion......Page 388
11 The United States and Dispute Settlement under the North American Free Trade Agreement: Ambivalence, Frustration, and Occasional Defiance......Page 390
A. An overview of dispute resolution under nafta......Page 396
B. Investment disputes under chapter 11......Page 398
C. Review of unfair trade disputes under chapter 19......Page 409
D. Government-to-government disputes under chapter 20......Page 419
E. Conclusion......Page 427
12 Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Response to the Critics in the United States......Page 429
1. The Process......Page 430
2. The Claims......Page 433
1. Intrusions into U.S. Sovereignty......Page 438
2. Due Process Concerns......Page 440
1. Exaggerations......Page 442
2. Moderate Concerns......Page 446
D. Conclusion......Page 451
13 The United States and International Courts: Getting the Cost-Benefit Analysis Right......Page 453
1. International Courts Are More than “Dispute Settlers” and “Problem Solvers,” and, Surprise!, They Do What They Are Supposed to Do......Page 457
2. International Courts Are Like Halloween Haunted Houses: They Spook Only the Naïve or Those Who Want to Be Spooked......Page 462
3. You Cannot Have International Courts That Are Always on Your Side......Page 465
4. International Courts, and the Services They Render, Are Global Public Goods......Page 467
5. Easy-Riding Will Cost You......Page 470
6. If You Do Not Understand Your Instruments, You Risk Blunting Them Unnecessarily......Page 473
7. The United States Needs International Courts, and International Courts Need the United States......Page 476
Index......Page 479