The subject of consciousness

Cover
Preface
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
	[1] The distinction between awareness of self and knowledge of persons
	[2] Predilection of modern philosophy in direction of knowledge of persons
	[3] Theories of self and awareness of self
2. CONSCIOUSNESS
	1. Problems of Existence and Meaning
		[1] It is shown that William James’s denial of consciousness is a rejection of a philosophical theory of consciousness and is no repudiation of consciousness itself
		[2] An argument centring on Ryle and Wisdom to show that there is a basic sense of consciousness
		[3] A rejection of the view that ‘consciousness’ is indefinable, followed by a proposed definition along the lines suggested
	2. The Nature of the Concept
		[4] A comparison of the concepts ‘conscious’ and ‘colour’ to show a disanalogy which if not recognized leads to a false ‘mosaic’ view of consciousness
		[5] Rejection of the view that ‘consciousness’ stands for a common property of mental phenomena in favour of treating it as a polymorphous concept
		[6] The concept of consciousness gains its applicability through the existence of the reader
	3. Sir William Hamilton and His Critics
		[7] Hamilton’s theory of consciousness
		[8] The attack on Hamilton’s Duality of Consciousness
		[9] The implications of the historical survey and the direction the self-approach must take
		[10] The view of Samuel Alexander presented as heading in the right direction
		[11] Conclusions presupposed in the analysis offered in succeeding chapters
3. ATTENTION
	1. Consciousness and Change
		[1] The two dimensions of consciousness
		[2] TH. Ribot on the dependence of consciousness on change
		[3] A contrast between the theories of attention of James Ward and William James
		[4] Attention seen as the structuring of consciousness into foreground and background
	2. Rejection of the Notion of an Attention-Free Consciousness
		[5] The presence of attention in a pure sensuous consciousness
		[6] Its presence in a state of reverie
		[7] Conclusions drawn from this study
	3. The Varieties of Attention
		[8] Rejection of Ribot’s distinction between ‘spontaneous’ attention and ‘voluntary’ attention
		[9] The weaknesses in Hamilton’s theory of attention
		[10] The relation between ‘mere vital attention’ and ‘voluntary’ attention
		[11] ‘Unordered’ attention, ‘interrogative’ attention, and ‘executive’ attention: an alternative to the classifications offered
4. UNPROJECTED CONSCIOUSNESS
	1. The Structure of Consciousness
		[1] Attention and unprojected consciousness viewed as complements
		[2] The character of unprojected consciousness
	2. Unprojected Consciousness and Interrogative Attention
		[3] The logical character of ideational elements in mental preparedness
		[4] The question of the possibility of simultaneous attention to a number of objects
		[5] Answer given in terms of the notion of a ‘relevancy system’
		[6] Ribot’s theory that attention demands the suspension of change shown to be a misconception which the notion of a relevancy system can overcome
	3. Unprojected Consciousness and Executive Attention
		[7] The role of kinaesthetic sensation in executive attention
		[8] The logical status of physiological processes in attention
	4. The Logical Dependence of Mental Images and Thoughts on Bodily Activity
		[9] A defence of Ribot’s theory that even innerdirected attention (reflection) is dependent on bodily activity
		[10] Arguments against the ‘phantom approach’ according to which the occurrence of mental imagery is logically independent of bodily activity
		[11] The alternative ‘sentient approach’ defended in terms of the notion of the ‘origin’ of a mental image
		[12] Utilization of the distinction between compatible and incompatible activities in support of the sentient approach
		[13] The most mental of all forms of reflection - the having of thoughts - held to be logically dependent on bodily activity
5. THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF
	1. The Self as Unprojected Consciousness
		[1] The rationale of the theory
		[2] The elusiveness of the self explained
		[3] Rejection of the no-subject position
	2. The Problems the Theory Solves
		[4] Consideration of James’s theory of the self
		[5] Explanation of the connection between bodily sensation and the self
		[6] Making of the self its own object only partially possible
		[7] Analysis of Ayer’s supplementation of James’s theory
	3. Support from Unexpected Quarters
		[8] The loss of self in mystical ecstasy
		[9] Theories foreshadowing the one presented here
	4. A Defence against Some Objections
		[10] Difficulties which the theory has to surmount
		[11] An answer to Strawson
6. YESTERDAY’S SELF
	1. The Past of a Self and the Past of a Person
		[1] The manner in which this is a concern of the self-approach as distinct from a concern of the persons approach
		[2] Distinction between subjective time and objective time brought in to account for interruptions in consciousness
	2. Awareness as a State and Attention as an Activity
		[3] The meaning I give to ‘awareness’
		[4] The logical characteristics of verbs of perception and the relation between perceiving and awareness
		[5] The criteria of states and activities
		[6] The logic of ‘awareness’ and the logic of ‘attention’
	3. The Dependence of a Persisting Self on Sustaining Activity
		[7] The relation between attention and unprojected consciousness argued to demand a revision of Ryle’s adverbial theory of attention
		[8] Application to perceptual concepts of the distinction between states and activities
		[9] The continuous creation of the self
7. BODILY EXISTENCE
	[1] Selves and their bodily possibilities
	[2] Our kind of body
	[3] The point of contact between the selfapproach and the persons approach
	[4] Appeal to mental acts rendered unnecessary by the present theory
INDEX