The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism

Title page
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Part I: From the Received View to the Semantic Conception
	1. Prologue
		1.1 Origins of the semantic conception
		1.2 Scientific realism
		1.3 Plan of the book
		Notes
	2. What\'s Wrong with the Received View on the Structure of Scientific Theories?
		2.1 On partial  interpretation
		2.2 The observational/theoretical distinction
		2.3 The received view versus the semantic conception
		2.4 Summary and conclusion
		Notes
Part II: The Semantic Conception of Theories
	3. Theories, Their Formulations, and the Operational Imperative
		3.1 Theories
		3.2 The operational imperative reformulated
		3.3 Semantic relations
		3.4 Structural relations
		3.5 The empirical truth of theories
		3.6 Instrumentalist vs realist construals of theories
		3.7 Experimental methodology
		3.8 Tenability of the operational imperative
		3.9 Conclusion
		Notes
	4. Theories and Phenomena
		4.1 Observation
		4.2 Measurement
		4.3 Experimental testing
		4.4 Theories of the experiment and backgrounds to domains
		4.5 Experimental testing and the confirmation of theories
		4.6 Summary
		Notes
	5. Theoretical Laws
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 Laws on the semantic conception of theories
		5.3 Laws of succession, coexistence, and interaction
		5.4 Teleological and functional laws
		5.5 Conclusion
		Notes
Part III: Application of the Semantic Conception
	6. Theoretical Explanation
		6.1 Philosophical analyses of explanation
		6.2 Are all explanations explanations why?
		6.3 Theoretical explanation on the semantic conception
		6.4 Conclusion
		Notes
	7. Some Philosophical Problems in Biological Speciation and Taxonomy
		7.1 Key problems in taxonomic theory: a historical survey
		7.2 Natural taxonomies as factual descriptions of nature
		7.3 Taxa, natural kinds, and attributes
		7.4 Fixed taxa definitions and empirical truth
		7.5 Variable taxa definitions and empirical truth
		7.6 Are category definitions empirically true or false?
		7.7 Artificial taxonomies are not factually true or false
		7.8 Natural taxonomies as universal systems of taxonomy
		7.9 Taxonomic systems and scientific theories
		7.10 Summary and conclusion
		Notes
	8. Interlevel Theories and the Semantic Conception
		8.1 Interlevel biomedical theories of the middle range
		8.2 Concluding comments
		Notes
	9. Theoretical Perspectives on Closure
		9.1 Counterfactual confusions
		9.2 Goal-directed theories
		9.3 A Psychiatric example
		9.4 Conclusion
		Notes
Part IV: Toward a Qyasi-Realistic Theory of Scientific Knowledge
	10. Kuhn\'s and Feyerabend\'s Relativisms
		10.1 Empiricist views of scientific knowledge
		10.2 Feyerabend\'s views
		10.3 Kuhn\'s views
		10.4 Kuhn and Feyerabend as the last defenders of moribund empiricism
		10.5 Toward a viable epistemology of science
		Notes
	11. Scientific Realism
		11.1 Epistemology and scientific realism
		11.2 Conceptual devices
		11.3 Is there a philosophical problem of scientific realism?
		Notes
	12. Conclusive Reasons and Scientific Knowledge
		12.1 Dretske\'s analysis of conclusive reasons
		12.2 Whether conclusive reasons are necessary for knowing that
		12.3 Whether having a conclusive reason is sufficient for knowing that
		12.4 A modified Dretskian analysis
		12.5 Some alternative views briefly considered
		12.6 Scientific objectivity
		Notes
	13. Why Science Is Not Really Inductive
		13.1 Induction and the practice of science
		13.2 How good a model is standard inductive logic?
		13.3 Induction and methodology
		13.4 Induction as a philosophical tool
		13.5 Conclusion
		Notes
14. Epilogue
	14.1 Changing problems
	14.2 Recent, current, and future research emphases
	14.3 Emphases that should guide future research
	14.4 Why research on these problems is important?
	Notes
Bibliography
	A
	B
	C
	D
	E
	F
	G
	H
	J
	K
	L
	M
	N
	P
	Q
	R
	S
	T
	V
	W
	Z
Index
A Note on the Author