The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise

Cover
Half Title
Series Information
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of contents
List of Contributors
Acknowledgments
Introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise
	I.1 Skill in the history of philosophy (East & West)
		I.1.1 Skill in the history of Eastern philosophy
		I.1.2 Skill in history of Western philosophy
	I.2 Skill in epistemology
	I.3 Skill, intelligence, and agency
	I.4 Skill in perception, imagination, and emotion
	I.5 Skill, language, and social cognition
	I.6 Skill and expertise in normative philosophy
	Note
	References
Part I Skill in the history of philosophy (East and West)
	1 Skill and Virtuosity in Buddhist and Daoist Philosophy
		1.1 Upay in the Lotus Sutra
		1.2 Upaya in teaching: the Vimalakirtinirdesa-sutra and Sa.dhinirmocana-sutra
		1.3 Ethical skill, perception and perfection on the bodhisattva path
		1.4 Skill in Daoist thought
		1.5 Skill and karatedo
		1.6 Skill, spontaneity and the virtuoso life
		1.7 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	2 Skill and expertise in three schools of classical Chinese thought
		2.1 Skill in craft and performance
		2.2 Ethical expertise
		2.3 Concluding thoughts/future research
		Notes
		References
	3 Volition, action, and skill in Indian Buddhist philosophy
		3.1 Introduction
		3.2 Volition, action, and the skillful
		3.3 Actions, agency, agents
		3.4 Wisdom and skillful means
		3.5 Selflessness and liberated action
		3.6 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	4 Technē in the Platonic dialogues
		Notes
		References
	5 Technê in Aristotle’s taxonomy of knowledge
		5.1 Introduction
		5.2 The place of technê within knowledge
		5.3 The definition of technê
		5.4 Technê and practical wisdom: the distinctions
			5.4.1 Technê, ends and deliberation
			5.4.2 Technê, ends and production
		Notes
		Further reading
		References
	6 Mendelssohn and Kant on virtue as a skill
		6.1 Introduction
		6.2 Mendelssohn and the “modern doctrine of skills”
		6.3 Mendelssohn on virtue as a skill
		6.4 Kant’s qualified endorsement of the skill model of virtue
		6.5 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	7 Gilbert Ryle on skill as knowledge-how
		7.1 Introduction
		7.2 Knowing how and knowing that, “intellectualism,” and “practicalism”
		7.3 The regress
		7.4 Gradability and learning
		7.5 Ryle’s positive conception of knowledge-how
		7.6 Learning by doing: habits versus intelligent powers, skills versus competences
		7.7 The role of the teacher
		7.8 A case study
		7.9 The role of knowledge-that in skill
		7.10 Perceptual and intellectual skills
		7.11 Philosophy as a skill
		Notes
		References
	8 Anscombe on action and practical knowledge
		8.1 Introduction
		8.2 Agential knowledge as non-observational
		8.3 The object of agential knowledge
		8.4 Agential knowledge as practical
		8.5 Does agential knowledge depend on know-how?
		8.6 Anscombean commitments regarding know-how
		Notes
		References
	9 Hubert Dreyfus on practical and embodied intelligence
		9.1 Introduction
		9.2 Embodied intentionality vs. the “Standard Story”
		9.3 A Sisyphean task?
		9.4 Practical wisdom without rationality
		Notes
		References
Part II Skill in epistemology
	10 Knowledge, skill and virtue epistemology
		10.1 Knowledge, luck and cognitive skill
		10.2 Types of virtue epistemology
		10.3 Robust virtue epistemology
		10.4 Anti-luck virtue epistemology
		Notes
		References
	11 Skill and knowledge
		11.1 Knowledge
		11.2 Justification: the thinker with an envatted brain
		11.3 Skill and competence
		11.4 Possessing vs. manifesting skill (competence)
		11.5 Gradability
		11.6 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	12 Know how and skill: The puzzles of priority and equivalence
		12.1 Introduction
		12.2 Intellectualism and (Kh≡Ab)
			12.2.1 Intellectualism and (Kh→Ab)
			12.2.2 Intellectualism and (Ab→Kh)
		12.3 PA-intellectualism and (Kh≡Ab)
			12.3.1 Dispositional attitudes
			12.3.2 PA-intellectualism and (Kh→Ab)
			12.3.3 PA-intellectualism and (Ab→Kh)
			12.3.4 PA-intellectualism and (Kh≡Sk1) and (Kh≡Sk2)
		12.4 PA-intellectualism and priority
		12.5 Conclusions
		Notes
		References
	13 Knowledge as skill
		13.1 A methodological point
		13.2 A distinction
		13.3 Introducing knowledge-practicalism
		13.4 Knowledge and belief
		13.5 Knowledge and justification
		13.6 Knowledge and truth
		13.7 Hyman’s narrower knowledge-practicalism
		13.8 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
Part III Skill, intelligence, and agency
	14 Consciousness and skill
		14.1 Introduction
		14.2 Choking under pressure
		14.3 Lightning-fast actions
		14.4 Post-performance amnesia
		14.5 The beauty of consciousness
		14.6 Concluding cerebrations on the philosophical import of  conscious skill
		Notes
		References
	15 Embodied experience in the cognitive ecologies of skilled performance
		15.1 Real experts
		15.2 Research on embodied expertise
		15.3 Ecologies and cues
		15.4 Methods
		15.5 Researcher-practitioners on expert embodied experience
		15.6 Case study: Chloe Hosking’s winning sprint
		15.7 Learning from the cognitive ecologies of experts
		Acknowledgements
		References
	16 Automaticity, control, and attention in skill
		16.1 Introduction
		16.2 The psychology of automaticity and control
		16.3 The coarse grain: an analysis of automaticity and control
		16.4 The fine grain: gradations in automaticity and control
		16.5 Skill as such
		16.6 Skill in attention
		Notes
		References
	17 Automatizing knowledge: Confusion over what cognitive neuroscience tells us about intellectualism
		17.1 Introduction
		17.2 Amnesia and automatization
		17.3 Intelligent control policies
		17.4 Conclusions
		References
	18 Practical representation
		18.1 What is a mode of presentation?
		18.2 Sensori-motor psychology and the Casio metaphor
		18.3 Why posit practical representation?
		18.4 From practical representations to practical concepts: the hierarchy of practical representation
		18.5 Conclusions
		Notes
		References
	19 The nature of skill: Functions and control structures
		19.1 Introduction
		19.2 Skills as functions
		19.3 Kinds of control
			19.3.1 Strategic control
			19.3.2 Attention
			19.3.3 Motor control
		Notes
		References
	20 The intelligence of motor control
		20.1 Introduction
		20.2 Motivating the hybrid approach
		20.3 Intelligence as flexibility
		20.4 Two types of motor representation: motor programs and  motor commands
		20.5 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	21 The targets of skill, and their importance
		21.1 Introduction
		21.2 Skill at action
		21.3 Moving beyond action
		21.4 Games
		21.5 Skill at games
		21.6 Action-domains
		21.7 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
Part IV Skill in perception, imagination, and emotion
	22 Embodying expertise as a performer and perceiver: Insights from the arts and robotics
		22.1 Linking action with perception
		22.2 Expertise, embodiment, and the performing arts
			22.2.1 Longstanding expertise
			22.2.2 De novo (laboratory) expertise
			22.2.3 Expertise, embodiment, and aesthetics
		22.3 Skill and expertise insights to optimize human–robot interactions
			22.3.1 From social cognition to social robotics
		22.4 Conclusions
		Note
		References
	23 Motor representation and knowledge of skilled action
		23.1 Introduction
		23.2 That skills matter for observational knowledge
		23.3 The effects of skill depend on having capacities to represent actions motorically
		23.4 An objection: motor representation and direction of fit
		23.5 How do motor representations influence knowledge states?
		23.6 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	24 Skill and expertise in perception
		24.1 Introduction
		24.2 Are motor skills constitutive of perceptual experience?
		24.3 Are recognitional dispositions ever constitutive of perceptual experience?
		24.4 How can perceptual attention reflect the subject’s skill?
		Notes
		References
	25 Perceptual skills
		25.1 What are perceptual skills?
		25.2 Perceptual expertise
		25.3 Picture perception
		25.4 The mechanisms of perceptual skills
		25.5 Conclusion
		Acknowledgement
		Notes
		References
	26 Skill, visual prejudice, and know-how
		26.1 Introduction
		26.2 Cognitive penetration of vision
		26.3 Control vs. automaticity
		26.4 Skilled seeing
		26.5 Skill and know-how
		26.6 Intentional control
		26.7 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	27 The skill of imagination
		27.1 What is a skill?
		27.2 Treating imagination as a skill
		27.3 Objections
		27.4 Concluding remarks
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	28 Emotion recognition as a social skill
		28.1 Introduction
		28.2 Skills
		28.3 Standard accounts of emotion recognition
			28.3.1 Evolved expression recognition
			28.3.2 Accounts of social cognition
				28.3.2.1 Theory Theory
				28.3.2.2 Simulation Theory
				28.3.2.3 Direct Perception
		28.4 Assessing leading accounts of emotion recognition
			28.4.1 Evolved expression recognition
			28.4.2 Theory Theory
			28.4.3 Simulation Theory
			28.4.4 Direct Perception
		28.5 A proposal: emotion recognition via scripts
			28.5.1 Scripts
			28.5.2 Scripted emotions
			28.5.3 Scripting emotion recognition
			28.5.4 Script-based emotion recognition as a skill
			28.5.5 Three objections
		28.6 Conclusion
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
Part V Skill, language, and social cognition
	29 Skill and expertise in joint action
		29.1 Introduction
		29.2 Mechanisms in skilled joint action
			29.2.1 Strategies of action modulation
			29.2.2 Action prediction
			29.2.3 Joint action planning and monitoring
		29.3 Action contexts: cooperation vs. competition
		29.4 Conclusion
		References
	30 Self- and other-awareness in joint expert performance
		30.1 Introduction
		30.2 The Dreyfus model
		30.3 The phenomenology of expert performance
		30.4 Performing with others
		30.5 Other-awareness in synchronic performance
		30.6 Variations on expert experience
		30.7 Conclusion
		Acknowledgments
		Notes
		References
	31 The evolution of skilled imitative learning: A social attention hypothesis
		31.1 Uniquely human skills: manual, vocal and orofacial imitation
		31.2 The Mirror Neuron System as a neural substrate of imitative learning
		31.3 The evolution of the MNS
			31.3.1 Mirror neurons and imitation are not in our genes
			31.3.2 Evolving imitation for a language ready brain
			31.3.3 The evolution of the MNS: the social attention hypothesis
		31.4 The evolution of skilled imitative learning
		Notes
		References
	32 Semantic competence
		References
	33 Pragmatic competence
		33.1 Pragmatics and cognition
			33.1.1 The Gricean view
			33.1.2 Pragmatics: performance vs. competence
			33.1.3 The experimental turn in pragmatics
		33.2 Dimensions of variation in pragmatic competence
			33.2.1 Presupposition (and some but not all about scalar implicatures)
			33.2.2 Conversational mechanisms
			33.2.3 Metaphor
			33.2.4 Irony
		33.3 Conclusion
		Note
Part VI Skill and expertise in  normative philosophy
	34 Moral expertise
		34.1 Moral judgment
		34.2 Moral practice
		Notes
		References
	35 A theory of political expertise
		35.1 The political expert as expert political analyst
		35.2 The political expert as normative political expert or expert political actor
			35.2.1 Functionalism
			35.2.2 Institutional and role-based context
		35.2.3 Normative functionalism
		35.3 A contextually specific story of normative political expertise and expert political actors
			35.3.1 The context: modern electoral representative constitutional democracy
			35.3.2 Political expertise and elected political representatives
		35.4 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	36 Skills of justice
		Notes
		References
	37 Why moral philosophers are not the most virtuous people
		37.1 Moral judgment and virtuous behavior
			37.1.1 Good moral judges, non-virtuous agents
			37.1.2 Bad moral judges, virtuous agents
		37.2 Virtuous behavior as skilled action
			37.2.1 Different accounts of skill
			37.2.2 Virtue and skill
			37.2.3 Promising avenue
			37.2.4 Why music?
			37.2.5 Fridland’s three levels of control
			37.2.6 Virtue and skill
		37.3 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
	38 Virtue as skill: Self-regulation and social psychology
		38.1 Introduction
		38.2 Self-regulation: goal setting and goal striving
		38.3 Skill acquisition, deliberate practice, and automaticity
		38.4 Framing effects, stereotypes, and the bystander effect
		38.5 Situationism and the rarity of virtue
		Notes
		References
	39 De-biasing, skill, and intergroup virtue
		39.1 Resisting argumentation
		39.2 Intergroup contact
		39.3 Personal connections
		39.4 Social referents and the perception of norms
		39.5 Which norms?
		39.6 Conclusion
		Notes
		References
Index