The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science (Routledge Philosophy Companions)

Cover......Page 1
Title page......Page 5
Contents......Page 7
Illustrations......Page 11
Contributors......Page 13
Introduction......Page 21
Part I: Historical and philosophical context......Page 31
1 The epistemology of science after Quine......Page 33
Empiricism, epistemology, and science in “Two Dogmas”......Page 34
Science without foundations......Page 36
Science fully naturalized......Page 38
Naturalism and normativity/politics and epistemology......Page 41
Further reading......Page 44
2 The history of philosophy and the philosophy of science......Page 45
The end of history......Page 47
History recalled......Page 51
Further reading......Page 55
Introduction......Page 56
Early attempts at demarcation......Page 57
Rethinking the divide......Page 59
Contemporary responses: getting our priorities right......Page 61
The Canberra plan......Page 62
A posteriorism......Page 63
Non-alignment......Page 64
Further reading......Page 65
4 Philosophy of language......Page 66
Proper names: the description view......Page 67
The new theory of reference......Page 68
Putnam's “Twin Earth” examples......Page 69
The two-dimensionalist backlash......Page 71
Holism and incommensurability......Page 73
References......Page 75
Further reading......Page 76
Introduction......Page 77
The standard logic......Page 78
Methodological concepts......Page 79
Logics for methodological concepts......Page 80
Formal problem-solving processes......Page 84
Content-guided reasoning......Page 85
References......Page 86
Further reading......Page 87
What is critical rationalism?......Page 88
Critical rationalism and science......Page 89
Some criticisms of critical rationalism......Page 92
Critical rationalism and its limits......Page 94
Further reading......Page 96
Thomas Kuhn......Page 97
Imre Lakatos......Page 101
Paul Feyerabend......Page 104
Recent developments......Page 106
Further reading......Page 107
The analytic and the synthetic......Page 108
What kind of empiricism?......Page 109
The analytic-synthetic distinction and theoretical language......Page 111
The nature of the empirical basis......Page 112
The reference of theoretical terms......Page 113
The unity of science......Page 115
Conclusion......Page 117
References......Page 118
Further reading......Page 119
Pragmatism......Page 121
Pragmatism and induction......Page 122
Scientific realism......Page 124
Explanation......Page 126
Conclusion......Page 127
Further reading......Page 128
Part II: Debates......Page 131
The rules of epistemic probability......Page 133
“Logical omniscience”......Page 134
Bayesian confirmation theory......Page 135
The old-evidence problem......Page 136
Conditionalization......Page 137
The principle of indifference......Page 138
Objective Bayesianism......Page 140
Subjective Bayesianism......Page 141
Convergence of opinion......Page 142
References......Page 143
Further reading......Page 144
Concepts of confirmation......Page 145
Qualitative confirmation......Page 146
Instance confirmation and the ravens paradox......Page 147
Probability theory and probabilistic measures of support......Page 148
Logical probability: Carnap's program......Page 154
Acknowledgements......Page 157
Further reading......Page 158
12 Empiricism......Page 159
Observation......Page 160
Acceptance......Page 164
Contrastive empiricism......Page 165
Whither the super-empirical virtues?......Page 166
Concluding comments......Page 167
Further reading......Page 168
Natural kinds and real essences......Page 169
Essentialist metaphysics......Page 172
Laws of nature......Page 173
Counterfactuals......Page 174
Meinongianism......Page 177
Further reading......Page 178
Justifying ethical norms in science......Page 179
The universality of ethical norms in science......Page 180
The normative ethics of science......Page 182
Openness......Page 183
Respect for colleagues......Page 184
Stewardship of research resources......Page 185
Humane treatment of animal subjects......Page 186
Comments about science's ethical norms......Page 187
Further reading......Page 188
The early history and philosophy of experiment......Page 189
The place of experiment in twentieth-century philosophy of science......Page 191
Towards an epistemology of experiment......Page 193
The exploratory role of experiment and its relationship to theory......Page 195
Concluding remarks: the autonomy of experimental practice......Page 198
Further reading......Page 199
The D-N model......Page 201
Motivation for the D-N/I-S model......Page 202
Counterexamples to the D-N/I-S model......Page 203
The CM model......Page 204
Unificationist models......Page 205
Open issues and future work......Page 206
Explanation, the D-N model, and other areas of philosophy......Page 209
Further reading......Page 211
17 The feminist approach to the philosophy of science......Page 212
Dismissal......Page 213
The feminist approach as a philosophy of science......Page 214
Assessing the feminist challenge to traditional philosophy of science......Page 215
Sandra Harding on women and science: the epistemic challenge......Page 216
Helen Longino on women and science: the methodological challenge......Page 218
The feminist approach and liberal ideals for inquiry......Page 220
References......Page 221
Further reading......Page 222
Introduction......Page 223
Articulating the slogan......Page 226
Identification, matching, and guiding......Page 227
Explanationism and Bayesianism......Page 230
The justificatory project......Page 231
Further reading......Page 232
Introduction......Page 233
What laws do......Page 234
What laws are......Page 238
References......Page 241
Further reading......Page 242
Naturalism as a methodological stance......Page 243
Naturalism in the philosophy of science......Page 245
Naturalism and evolutionary theory......Page 246
Naturalism and cognitive science......Page 247
Naturalism and normativity......Page 248
Naturalism and model choice......Page 249
Naturalism and pragmatism......Page 250
Naturalism and realism......Page 251
Naturalism and secularism......Page 252
Further reading......Page 253
What are the realism issues?......Page 254
Common-sense realism......Page 256
Arguments for scientific realism......Page 257
The underdetermination argument......Page 259
The pessimistic meta-induction......Page 262
Conclusions......Page 263
Further reading......Page 264
22 Relativism about science......Page 266
Sociology of science......Page 267
Feminist epistemology and relativist interpretations of science......Page 268
Postmodernist relativism and science......Page 269
Underdetermination and its consequences......Page 270
Incommensurability and relativism......Page 272
Conclusion......Page 275
Further reading......Page 276
23 Scientific method......Page 278
Naive inductivism......Page 279
The hypothetico-deductive method......Page 281
Popper's falsificationist theory of method......Page 282
From paradigms to pluralism......Page 284
The justification of method......Page 286
References......Page 287
Further reading......Page 288
Francis Bacon on knowledge, power, and method......Page 289
Marx on science and production......Page 290
Merton's ethos of science......Page 291
The social construction of scientific knowledge......Page 293
Some salvos in the science wars......Page 297
Further reading......Page 298
The “syntactic” view......Page 299
The “semantic” approach......Page 302
Partial structures......Page 304
Truth and meta-representation......Page 306
Further reading......Page 309
Introduction......Page 311
Theory-change and scientific rationality......Page 312
Theory-change and scientific realism......Page 317
References......Page 320
Further reading......Page 321
What does it mean to say that one thing is underdetermined by another?......Page 322
Why is underdetermination philosophically interesting?......Page 323
What reason(s) do we have to believe underdetermination claims?......Page 324
What can one say in response to underdetermination claims?......Page 326
References......Page 330
Further reading......Page 331
Social and epistemic values......Page 332
Justifying the value-ladenness thesis......Page 335
Postmodernism: it's politics all the way down......Page 337
Normative naturalism and externalist reliabilism......Page 338
Objectivity, rationality, relativism, and critique......Page 339
Further reading......Page 343
Part III: Concepts......Page 345
Introduction......Page 347
Challenges......Page 348
Regularity theories of causation......Page 349
Probabilistic theories of causation......Page 350
Counterfactual theories of causation......Page 352
Manipulability theories of causation......Page 353
Process theories of causation......Page 354
References......Page 355
Further reading......Page 356
30 Determinism......Page 357
Clarifying determinism......Page 358
Determinism and quantum theory......Page 361
Determinism and statistical mechanics......Page 364
Conclusion......Page 365
Further reading......Page 366
Four concepts of evidence......Page 367
Objective Bayesian definition......Page 369
The error-statistical view......Page 370
Satisfaction definitions......Page 371
The weakness assumption......Page 372
Rejection of these assumptions......Page 374
Final definitions......Page 375
References......Page 377
Further reading......Page 378
Reductive non-teleological function......Page 379
Ersatz teleological function......Page 380
Contribution to fitness......Page 382
Causal role function......Page 383
Non-reductive teleological function......Page 385
References......Page 386
Further reading......Page 387
Introduction......Page 388
Mathematical idealization......Page 389
Idealization and representation: models and theories......Page 390
Idealization and scientific realism......Page 394
References......Page 395
Further reading......Page 396
Epistemic questions......Page 397
Quantification......Page 400
The improvement of precision......Page 401
Some problems of measurement in the social sciences......Page 402
Further reading......Page 405
Introduction......Page 406
Mechanisms are productive of phenomena or behaviors......Page 407
Mechanisms are hierarchical......Page 408
Discovering, representing, and explaining mechanisms......Page 409
Mechanisms and causation......Page 411
The scope of the mechanical paradigm......Page 412
Further reading......Page 414
Introduction......Page 415
The background to philosophical views about scientific models......Page 416
Current debate on the nature and function of scientific models......Page 418
Conclusion......Page 423
References......Page 424
Further reading......Page 425
37 Observation......Page 426
Kuhn's view......Page 427
Fodor's view......Page 428
Van Fraassen's view......Page 430
Critique of Fodor's and van Fraassen's views......Page 431
Further reading......Page 434
Deductive and probabilistic prediction......Page 435
Prediction and confirmation......Page 436
Beam balance example......Page 437
Prediction versus accomodation......Page 438
Other kinds of prediction that emerge from the overdetermination of parameters......Page 440
Prediction and approximate truth......Page 441
Further reading......Page 442
Historical sketch......Page 444
The classical interpretation......Page 447
The frequency interpretation......Page 448
The propensity interpretation......Page 449
The logical interpretation......Page 450
The subjective interpretation......Page 452
References......Page 453
Further reading......Page 454
Introduction......Page 455
Substantive issues......Page 456
Hierarchy and compositionality......Page 457
Multiple realizability......Page 459
The unity and disunity of science......Page 460
Trouble in the details......Page 461
Research strategy......Page 463
Further reading......Page 464
Representation in science: linguistic and otherwise......Page 465
The ubiquitous inexactitude of human representation......Page 466
Evaluation of inexact representations......Page 467
An approach to evaluating truth-evaluable representations......Page 468
Representation in science......Page 470
Further reading......Page 471
Historical overview......Page 472
Some reasons for pessimism......Page 473
Some reasons for optimism......Page 475
Conclusion: goodbye to the global, two-context distinction......Page 479
References......Page 480
Further reading......Page 481
Introduction......Page 482
Space and time in classical mechanics......Page 483
Substantivalism, relationalism, and Mach's principle......Page 485
Special relativity......Page 487
Special relativity and the philosophy of time......Page 491
General relativity......Page 492
The hole argument......Page 494
References......Page 496
Further reading......Page 497
The basics......Page 498
Symmetry and scientific theories......Page 501
Spontaneous symmetry-breaking: between symmetry and asymmetry......Page 502
Interpretive issues: between mathematics and physics......Page 504
References......Page 506
Further reading......Page 507
45 Truthlikeness......Page 508
The content approach......Page 509
The likeness approach......Page 511
Hybrid approaches......Page 513
Frame dependence......Page 514
Truthlikeness and value theory......Page 516
References......Page 517
Further reading......Page 518
Introduction......Page 519
What is unification?......Page 520
Unification and explanation......Page 523
References......Page 526
Further reading......Page 527
A little history......Page 528
Kuhn and the multiplicity of theory virtues......Page 530
Empirical fit and explanatory power......Page 531
Internal virtues......Page 532
Contextual virtues......Page 533
Diachronic virtues......Page 534
The diachronic dividend......Page 536
References......Page 537
Further reading......Page 538
Part IV: Individual sciences......Page 539
Darwin refutes Kant......Page 541
Biological laws......Page 542
Functional attributions and explanations......Page 543
Reduction of functional to molecular biology......Page 545
Biology and the human sciences......Page 546
Biology, ethics, and meta-ethics......Page 547
References......Page 548
Further reading......Page 549
Chemical kinds......Page 550
Microstructuralism......Page 551
Intertheoretic reduction......Page 555
Ontological reducibility......Page 557
Further reading......Page 560
Theories and explanations: mechanisms......Page 561
Disciplinary interrelations......Page 565
General philosophical implications......Page 569
References......Page 571
Further reading......Page 572
Economists about economics......Page 573
Testability and progress: Popper and Lakatos......Page 574
Models and their assumptions......Page 576
Rhetorical persuasion and truth......Page 579
Economics as a resource for the philosophy of science......Page 580
Explanatory expansionism and interdisciplinary relations......Page 581
References......Page 583
Further reading......Page 584
Introduction......Page 585
Frege's Constraint......Page 586
Abstractionism......Page 588
Structuralism......Page 591
Applied mathematics and set theory......Page 594
References......Page 595
Further reading......Page 596
Orthodoxy......Page 597
Pilot-wave theory......Page 602
State-reduction theories......Page 604
The Everett interpretation......Page 606
Whither quantum mechanics?......Page 608
Further reading......Page 609
Computationalism......Page 611
Virtues......Page 612
Productivity and systematicity......Page 613
Objections......Page 614
Virtues......Page 615
Hybrid views and radical alternatives......Page 616
Fodorian modularity......Page 617
Massive modularity......Page 618
Nativism......Page 619
Arguments......Page 620
What is innateness?......Page 621
References......Page 622
Further reading......Page 623
Models and reality......Page 624
Mechanisms and individuals......Page 627
Evolution and function......Page 629
Fact and value......Page 630
References......Page 633
Further reading......Page 634
B......Page 635
C......Page 636
D......Page 637
E......Page 638
G......Page 639
H......Page 640
L......Page 641
M......Page 642
N......Page 643
P......Page 644
Q......Page 645
S......Page 646
V......Page 648
Z......Page 649