The Road to European Monetary Union: A Political and Economic History

Cover......Page 1
Contents......Page 6
Introduction......Page 12
1 The Political Background to European Integration......Page 16
1.2 The impact of the Suez Crisis......Page 17
1.3 Assessment......Page 20
2.1 Imbalances in the Treaty......Page 22
2.2 CAP and a common currency......Page 23
2.3 Economists and monetarists......Page 24
2.4 The Barre plans......Page 26
2.5 Assessment......Page 27
3 Economic and Monetary Union: The Hague Summit of 1969......Page 30
3.1 Tensions in the international monetary system......Page 31
3.2 Tensions within the European Community......Page 35
3.3 Brandt\'s new Ostpolitik......Page 40
3.4 Assessment......Page 43
4.1 Monetary Union......Page 45
4.2 Economic Union......Page 46
4.3 Political Union......Page 47
4.4 First stage......Page 48
4.5 Assessment......Page 49
5.1 The snake in the tunnel......Page 51
5.2 Moment of truth......Page 52
5.3 Snake and mini-snake......Page 54
5.4 Once again French problems......Page 56
5.5 Assessment......Page 58
6.1 Shift in purpose and timing......Page 61
6.2 Controversies......Page 62
6.3 Assessment......Page 64
7 The Making of the European Monetary System (1978)......Page 66
7.2 The exchange rate mechanism......Page 67
7.3 The European Monetary Fund......Page 69
7.4 Schmidt\'s problem and solution......Page 70
7.5 Confronting the partners......Page 71
7.6 Back to the snake......Page 73
7.7 Schmidt and Giscard......Page 75
7.8 Assessment......Page 77
8 The Working of the European Monetary Systemin the Period 1979–87......Page 81
8.1 1979–83: Crisis......Page 82
8.2 Basle-Nyborg......Page 84
8.3 Assessment......Page 89
9 Promoting the ECU......Page 91
9.1 The Fund......Page 92
9.2 Acceptance limits......Page 93
9.3 Negotiations......Page 95
9.4 Assessment......Page 97
10 The Single European Act (1985–6)......Page 100
10.1 Capital liberalisation......Page 101
10.2 A \'monetary dimension\' in the Treaty......Page 104
10.3 The Luxemburg European Council......Page 107
10.4 Assessment......Page 110
11.1 French dependence on German policies......Page 113
11.2 Changes in technical arrangements......Page 114
11.3 French–German Financial and Economic Council......Page 115
11.4 French proposal for a European Central Bank......Page 116
11.5 German reactions......Page 118
11.6 The link with security and defence......Page 121
11.7 Assessment......Page 122
12.1 Composition and mandate of the Delors Committee......Page 125
12.2 The requirement of unanimity......Page 127
12.3 The report\'s contents......Page 130
12.4 Assessment......Page 133
13.1 British reaction to the report......Page 135
13.2 Thatcher\'s options......Page 137
13.3 Assessment......Page 142
14 The Madrid Summit (June 1989) and its Follow-up......Page 145
14.1 Timing and substance......Page 146
14.2 Long or short transitional stage......Page 149
14.3 Assessment......Page 150
15.1 Exodus......Page 152
15.2 German Monetary Union......Page 154
15.3 Two sides of the same coin......Page 156
15.4 Assessment......Page 159
16.1 Central Bank independence......Page 162
16.2 French rearguard action......Page 165
16.3 Assessment......Page 167
17 Economic Union......Page 169
17.1 Why budget constraints......Page 170
17.2 Economic Government......Page 171
17.3 Excessive deficits......Page 173
17.4 Convergence criteria and the third stage......Page 175
17.5 Assessment......Page 177
18.1 Danish disaster......Page 180
18.2 French miscalculation......Page 182
18.4 German last comer......Page 183
18.5 Assessment......Page 185
19.1 The lira\'s devaluation......Page 187
19.2 First steps to Black Wednesday......Page 189
19.3 Crisis......Page 192
19.4 Aftermath......Page 195
19.6 Assessment......Page 197
20.1 Lost opportunities......Page 200
20.2 Prelude to derailment......Page 203
20.3 The July crisis......Page 205
20.4 The crises in retrospect......Page 207
20.5 Assessment......Page 209
21.1 Trailing the German mark......Page 211
21.2 The last devaluations (1979 and 1983)......Page 213
21.3 Interest rate controversies......Page 216
21.4 The guilder and the crisis of 1992......Page 219
21.5 German–Dutch bilateral agreement......Page 220
22.6 Conclusion......Page 243
22.1 German motives......Page 228
22.2 French motives......Page 231
22.3 The decision-making process......Page 234
22.4 Contradictions......Page 237
22.5 Dilemmas......Page 240
Notes......Page 245
Bibliography......Page 263
Index......Page 269