The Politics of Quasi-Government: Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control (Theories of Institutional Design)

Cover......Page 1
Half-title......Page 3
Series-title......Page 4
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
Figures......Page 11
Tables......Page 12
Acknowledgments......Page 13
Acronyms......Page 15
1 Introduction......Page 17
Why are hybrids of interest?......Page 19
The strange world of the federal quasi-government......Page 20
In search of an analytic framework......Page 24
Hybrid literature......Page 28
2 Building a better model of bureaucratic control......Page 37
Can Principal A secure Preference P from Agent X?......Page 38
Research design......Page 42
Cases......Page 44
Measurement and interpretation......Page 48
3 Administration by regulation......Page 53
Administrative control tools......Page 54
Regulatory control tools......Page 58
Administration by regulation......Page 61
Having the right tools: explaining the control challenge for hybrid organizations......Page 62
Financing home loans with regulations......Page 63
Likelihood of preference satisfaction is lower for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac......Page 66
Regulating the wild world of venture capital......Page 71
Effective regulation is key......Page 82
Conclusion......Page 84
4 Principal’s preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control......Page 86
Positive versus negative control......Page 87
Mission-versus non-mission-related preferences......Page 88
Export promotion: implementing administration policy......Page 91
Housing: the challenges of GSE regulation......Page 97
International market development......Page 101
Summary......Page 104
Different control tools......Page 105
Ceding control to the market......Page 107
Competing considerations......Page 108
Implications......Page 110
5 Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests: the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac......Page 113
The private Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: GSEs as interest groups......Page 114
The public Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: GSEs as powerful bureaucracies......Page 117
The best of both worlds: more powerful than agency or private company......Page 118
The alignment of interests around GSEs......Page 119
The alignment of interests around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac......Page 120
Alignment in action: redesigning a regulatory framework......Page 123
Organizational structure as feedback loop......Page 135
Hybrid organizations: out-of-control or self-control?......Page 136
Tools of congressional control......Page 138
Oversight......Page 139
Hybrids are more difficult to control than agencies......Page 141
Uncertainty in evaluating costs and benefits......Page 144
Off-budget status......Page 148
Use of agents......Page 150
Conflict among goals......Page 151
Hybrids and the politics of oversight......Page 155
Conclusion......Page 156
7 Regulating hybrids: structure and control......Page 158
The Wilson and Rachal argument......Page 160
Applying the argument to hybrid organizations......Page 162
Hybrids do not seem easier to regulate......Page 163
Structural variation in hybrid regulators......Page 164
Concentration of regulatory authority......Page 165
Structure of regulatory agency leadership......Page 170
Scope of regulating agency authority......Page 174
Conclusion......Page 177
8 Conclusion......Page 180
Summary of findings......Page 181
Implications......Page 184
Building a better theory of bureaucratic control......Page 185
Understanding the realities of quasi-government......Page 188
Reinventing accountability in the reinvention era......Page 190
Transparency......Page 192
Controllability......Page 193
Responsibility......Page 195
Responsiveness......Page 196
Accountability in the reinvention era......Page 197
The promise of quasi-government......Page 199
Housing......Page 202
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac......Page 203
Other housing organizations......Page 207
Department of Commerce......Page 209
Export-Import Bank of the United States......Page 210
Overseas Private Investment Corporation......Page 212
Other export promotion organizations......Page 215
United States Agency for International Development......Page 216
Enterprise Funds......Page 217
OPIC investment funds......Page 220
Interview subjects......Page 225
References......Page 230
Index......Page 251