The Political Economy of the Company

Half Title Page......Page 1
Title Page......Page 3
Title verso......Page 4
Contents......Page 5
List of Contributors......Page 7
1.  Introduction: The Political Economy of the Company......Page 9
2.  The Politics of the Company......Page 29
THE MORAL BASIS OF THE COMPANY......Page 34
LIMITED LIABILITY......Page 37
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL......Page 42
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE COMPANY......Page 46
SHARES AND STAKES......Page 50
CONCLUSION......Page 55
THE PUBLIC INTEREST......Page 31
3.  The Labour Party and the Company......Page 59
LABOUR THINKING ON THE COMPANY......Page 62
COMPANY LAW REFORM IN THE 1920S AND 1930S......Page 66
THE COHEN COMMITTEE......Page 68
THE JENKINS COMMITTEE......Page 72
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY......Page 73
THE BULLOCK COMMITTEE......Page 84
CONCLUSION......Page 88
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY......Page 91
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL......Page 92
REUNIFICATION, ECONOMIC RENEWAL AND THE SHAREHOLDER......Page 94
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY......Page 98
CONCLUSIONS......Page 107
5.  Worker Rights and Responsibilities in the Modern Company......Page 109
6.  The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: a Pluralist Approach......Page 121
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SHAREHOLDER EXCLUSIVITY......Page 122
THE PLURALIST CRITIQUE......Page 129
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PLURALIST MODEL......Page 138
CONCLUSION......Page 144
7.  Defending the Rentier: Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the Public Company......Page 149
LOCATING CORPORATIONS ON THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE AXIS......Page 150
FROM OWNING ASSETS TO OWNING COMPANIES: THE RISE OF ENTITY THEORY......Page 153
RADICAL ENTITY THEORY AND THE QUESTION OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP......Page 156
HENRY MANNE AND THE REPRIVATISATION OF THE CORPORATION......Page 160
GOVERNANCE AND THE GROWING POWER OF FINANCE......Page 165
A PRIORI EFFICIENCY AND THE CONTRACTUALISATION OF THE CORPORATION......Page 169
AGENCY THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF OWNERSHIP......Page 171
FROM THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP TO THE MYTH OF EFFICIENCY: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE......Page 176
INTRODUCTION......Page 183
LONG-RUN ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM......Page 185
FEARS, THREATS AND PHOBIAS......Page 189
TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS......Page 192
THE STAKEHOLDER FIRM: WHAT IS REALLY “NEW” ABOUT “NEW” LABOUR?......Page 194
CONCLUSION......Page 202
INTRODUCTION......Page 203
WHY FOCUS ON INSTITUTIONS’ LEGAL OBLIGATIONS?......Page 205
THE STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONAL SHARE OWNERSHIP......Page 209
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS’ LEGAL OBLIGATIONS......Page 217
REGULATORY OPTIONS......Page 232
SELF-HELP......Page 237
CONCLUSION......Page 239
INTRODUCTION......Page 241
REASONS FOR THE LIMITED EVOLUTION OF BOARD-LEVEL MONITORING......Page 246
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONITORING BOARD......Page 254
THE BOARD AND MONITORING TODAY: A CASE FOR FURTHER INTERVENTION?......Page 265
CONCLUSION......Page 270
INTRODUCTION......Page 273
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: A REEXAMINATION......Page 276
FIRMS AS HIERARCHIES: EMPLOYEES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE......Page 287
THE SOCIAL WORLD OF TOP MANAGERS......Page 289
NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “MODELS”?......Page 292
CONCLUSION......Page 294
Index......Page 297