The Panenmentalist Philosophy of Science: From the Recognition of Individual Pure Possibilities to Actual Discoveries (Synthese Library (424), Band 424)

Acknowledgments
Contents
Chapter 1: What Are Individual Pure Possibilities and for What Are They Good?
Chapter 2: How Many Pure Possibilities Are There? Or Contra Actualism
Chapter 3: A Panenmentalist Reconsideration of the Identity of Indiscernibles
Chapter 4: Two Kinds of Discovery: An Ontological Account
	4.1 Some Examples of Two Kinds of Discoveries
	4.2 Creation or Invention
	4.3 Conjectures, Hypotheses, or Predictions
	4.4 Fictions and Thought-Experiments
	4.5 Conventions
	4.6 Stipulation
	4.7 Epistemic Aids and the Discovered Existents
	4.8 Calculation and Measurement
	4.9 Abstract or Ideal Entities
	4.10 Possible Existents as Individual Pure Possibilities
	4.11 How Is a priori Accessibility to Pure Possibilities Possible?
	4.12 Panenmentalism and Its Uniqueness and Originality
	4.13 A Metaphysical Platform
	4.14 Two Kinds of Discovery
Chapter 5: Mathematical Possibilities and Their Discovery
	5.1 The Questions
	5.2 Pure Mathematical Entities Are Not Actualities
	5.3 Mathematical Entities Are Individual Pure Possibilities
	5.4 Individual Pure Possibilities and What Mathematics Really Is
		5.4.1 Hersh and a Failure in Proving That There Are Square Circles
			5.4.1.1 Mathematical Proofs, Showing, and Telling
			5.4.1.2 Hersh’s Examples
			5.4.1.3 The Panenmentalist Possibility of Square Circles
	5.5 An Alternative Indispensability Argument
	5.6 The a priori Epistemic Accessibility to Mathematical Pure Possibilities
	5.7 Pure Possibilities Are Discoverable, Not Inventible
	5.8 Some Examples of Discoveries of Mathematical Pure Possibilities
	5.9 Mathematical Language, Conceptual Possibilities, and the Applicability of Mathematics
	5.10 Is It Valid to Quantify over Mathematical Pure Possibilities?
	5.11 Proofs and the Reality of Mathematical Pure Possibilities
	5.12 Mathematical Fictions, Creativity, and Discoverable Truths
	5.13 Mathematical Discoveries Are of Pure Possibilities, Not of Actualities
	5.14 How Does Panenmentalism Challenge Parsons’s Recent View on Mathematical Objects?
	5.15 Conclusion: The Answers to the Abovementioned Three Questions
Chapter 6: A Panenmenalist Approach to Molyneux’s Problem and Some Empirical Findings
	6.1 Molyneux’s Problem
	6.2 Purely Geometrical Objects and a Philosophically Modal Approach to Molyneux’s Problem
	6.3 Empirical Answers to Molyneux’s Question
	6.4 Conclusions
Chapter 7: Pure Possibilities and Some Striking Scientific Discoveries
	7.1 Introduction
	7.2 Linus Pauling’s Discovery of the Alpha Helix
	7.3 Árpád Furka’s Discovery of a New Field—Combinatorial Chemistry
	7.4 F. Sherwood Rowland and Mario J. Molina’s Discovery—The Destruction of the Atmospheric Ozone Layer
	7.5 Kary B. Mullis’s Polymerase Chain Reaction
	7.6 Neil Bartlett’s Discovery of “Noble” Gas Compounds
	7.7 James Watson and Francis Crick’s Discovery of the DNA Structure
	7.8 Leo Szilard’s Idea of a Nuclear Chain Reaction
	7.9 George Gamow’s Big Bang Model
	7.10 Frances H. Arnold and a Novel Way to Open up Chemical and Evolutional Possibilities
	7.11 Conclusion
Chapter 8: The Philosophical Significance of Alan Mackay’s Theoretical Discovery of Quasicrystals
Chapter 9: Shechtman’s Three Question Marks: Possibility, Impossibility, and Quasicrystals
Chapter 10: Eka-Elements as Chemical Pure Possibilities
Chapter 11: Quantum Pure Possibilities and Macroscopic Actual Reality
	11.1 Introduction
	11.2 Quantum Possibilities and Reality
	11.3 The Relationship Between Quantum Pure Possibilities and Classical Actualities
	11.4 The Two-Slit Experiment, Interference, and Entanglement in the Light of Panenmentalism
	11.5 Yakir Ahronov: Free Will, Time, Teleology, and Kant
		11.5.1 Aharonov
		11.5.2 Kant’s Duality Problem: Natural Causality and Causality of Freedom
		11.5.3 Another Metaphysical Contribution Concerning Alternative Possibilities for Free Choice
		11.5.4 Some Philosophical and Scientific Lessons
	11.6 Conclusions
Chapter 12: Brain Imaging and the Human Mind
	12.1 A Current Ambition Concerning Brain Imaging Technologies
	12.2 Some Preliminary Doubts
	12.3 What Does It Really Mean that We Know What Other People Think?
	12.4 The Irreducibility of Individual or Personal Differences
	12.5 Psychical Possibility and Its Physical Actualization; Psychophysical Inseparability or Unity
	12.6 Why Is There No Psychical Inspection Either from Within or from Without?
	12.7 Why Our Body and Behavior Do Not Allow Any Epistemic Access to the Mind
	12.8 Psychical Reflection and Clinical Picture as Opposed to Imaging
	12.9 The False Dualistic Picture of the Psychophysical Unity
	12.10 Real Physicalism and Brain Imaging
	12.11 Conclusions
Chapter 13: Neoteny and the Playground of Pure Possibilities
	13.1 The Role of Neoteny in Human Evolution and Life
	13.2 Winnicott: Playing and Reality
	13.3 Panenmentalism, Saving Pure Possibilities, and Neoteny
Chapter 14: Stanley Milgram’s Experiments and the Saving of the Possibility of Disobedience
Chapter 15: Singularity and Uniqueness: Why Is Our Immune System Subject to Psychological and Cognitive Traits?
	15.1 My Psychophysical Assumptions
	15.2 Applying Psychological Terms to Immunology: Breznits’s Contribution
	15.3 A Comment on the “Cognition” and “Individuation” of Bacteria, Social Amoeba, and Social Insects
	15.4 Irun Cohen’s Novel Cognitive Paradigm for Immunology
	15.5 Tauber’s Criticism of Cohen and of Other Immunological Cognitivists
	15.6 Biological Agency, Metaphors and Biological Individuality: Comments on the Views of Wilson and Dennett
	15.7 The Application of My Psychophysical Assumptions to Immunology
	15.8 Immunology and Panenmentalism: Why Does Our Immune System Actualize Psychical and Cognitive Possibilities?
	15.9 Conclusions
References
Author Index
Subject Index