The origin of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program: Technical reality and Western hypocrisy

Abstract
Preface: From 1979 to 2005
Atomic Bomb: Iraq Went through CERN
	NUCLEAR WEAPONS --- A Researcher Blew the Whistle!
	Geneva: Cradle of the Iraqi Bomb
		Jafar Dhia Jafar's Connections
		Proliferant Technology
		The Calutrons Are Confirmed
	``To protect ourselves from the threat of nuclear proliferation, we will have to use force''
Iraq's calutrons : Electromagnetic isotope separation, beam technology, and nuclear weapon proliferation
	Abstract
	Introduction
	Principle and state of the art in calutron technology
		Enrichment technologies in perspective
		Basic principle and main characteristics of EMIS
		Sources of information on EMIS and calutrons
		EMIS in the United States
		EMIS in the Soviet Union
		EMIS in the United Kingdom
		EMIS in France
		EMIS in China
		EMIS in India
		EMIS in Israel
		EMIS in Japan
		EMIS in other countries and at CERN
	Iraq's calutron program
		Spring 1979 at CERN
		Jafar Dhia Jafar and the origin of Iraq's calutron program
		The NA10 magnet as a calutron magnet
		Iraq's calutron design
		The difficulties of publishing
	Implications for the proliferation of nuclear weapons
		Beam technologies and nuclear weapon proliferation
		EMIS for plutonium purification
		UN resolutions 687 and 707 and their implications for a halt of all proliferation prone nuclear activities
		Intelligence failure or staging for counter-proliferation?
	References
UN Security Council resolutions 687, 707, and 715, and their implications for a halt of all proliferation prone nuclear activities --- a technical and legal assessment
	Introduction
	Technical assessment
	Legal assessment
	Conclusion
	Notes and references
Iraq's calutrons: 1991 - 2001
	Introduction
	Suren Erkman's article in Le Journal de Genève of 22-23 April 1995
	``Iraq's Calutrons'' report [ISRI-95-03] and its reviewing
	Attempt to present a paper at the EMIS-13 conference and spontaneous contribution of Dr. I. Chavet
	Attempts to publish a paper [ISRI-96-06] on the legal implications of the UNSC resolutions related to Iraq
	The loss of contact with the IAEA
	Additional technical papers and sources of information
	Independent confirmation of Iraq's early interest in EMIS technology
	Independent confirmation of Iraq's use of CERN as a source of information
	Conclusions
	Acknowledgements and invitation for comments
	Letters
		From C. Llewellyn Smith, CERN, 25 April 1995
		From J. Steinberger, CERN, 27 April 1995
		To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 5 May 1995
		To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 8 November 1995
		From M. Zifferero, IAEA, 15 November 1995
		To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 20 November 1995
		To B. Al-Tikriti, Mission of Iraq, 20 November 1995
		From Mission of Iraq, 16 January 1996
		To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 22 January 1996
		To J.D. Jafar, IAEC, 22 January 1996
		From M. Zifferero, IAEA, 26 January 1996
		From R.F. Mozley, CISAC, 28 February 1996
		To P.J. Persiani, ANL, 17 June 1996
		To G. Münzenberg, GSI, 19 June 1996
		From I. Chavet, SOREQ, 25 June 1996
		To I. Chavet, SOREQ, 1 July 1996
		To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 1 July 1996
		From M. Zifferero, IAEA, 2 August 1996
		From I. Chavet, SOREQ, 6 August 1996
		From I. Langermann, ICLQ, 28 August 1996
		To M. Zifferero, IAEA, 30 December 1996
		From A. McDermott, Security Dialogue, 20 May 1997
		To R. Hooper, IAEA, 21 November 1997
Iraq's calutrons: 2002 - 2005
	J.D. Jafar's aborted visit to Geneva during the 2003 invasion of Iraq
	Comment: ``Farewell to a fellow whistle-blower''
	J.D. Jafar's book: ``The Assignment''
	Sixty years after Hiroshima
Postface: Nuclear weapons and Western democracy
Appendix 1: Annex 1 of UN Security Council document S/22872/Rev.1
Appendix 2: Original of Paper 1   Bombe Atomique: L'Irak est passé par le CERN