The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience

Cover
The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Preface
Introduction
Chapter 1: Clearing the Ground
	1.1 Sensation versus Perception
	1.2 Sensation versus Cognition
	1.3 Properties and Experiences
	1.4 Naïve Realism: Outline
	1.5 Naïve Realism and the Time-Lag Problem
	1.6 Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarities
	1.7 Mental Contact with Reality
	1.8 The Instability of Naïve Realism
	1.9 Sense-Datum Theories
	1.10 Representationalism: Contingent and Essential
	1.11 Representationalism: Naturalists and Phenomenal Intentionalists
	1.12 Representationalism: Content and Mode
	1.13 Representationalism: Broadness, Supervenience, and Identity
Chapter 2: Against Representationalism
	2.1 The Metaphysical Challenge
	2.2 Initial Representationalist Thoughts
		2.2.1 Conscious Character Fixes Accuracy Conditions
		2.2.2 Conscious Character Fixes Belief
		2.2.3 Conscious Character Fixes How the World Appears
		2.2.4 Conscious Character Is Described Representationally
		2.2.5 Conscious Character Represents Independently of Thought
		2.2.6 Conscious Character Is Manifestly Representational
	2.3 Naturalist Theories of Representation
	2.4 The Implausibility of Naturalist Representationalism
	2.5 The Distractions of Broadness
	2.6 Broadness in Context
	2.7 The Appeal to Transparency
	2.8 Free-Floating Properties
	2.9 Mysteries of Mental Contact
	2.10 Here-and-Now
	2.11 The Efficacy of Mental Representation
	2.12 The Incommensurability of Conscious and Representational Properties
	2.13 Pure Phenomenal Intentionalism
	2.14 What Are the Truth Conditions?
Chapter 3: The Structure of Experience
	3.1 The Qualitative View
	3.2 No Problems
	3.3 Block, Peacocke, and Qualia
	3.4 Functionalism and ‘Role Semantics’
	3.6 Quasi-Objects and Their Quasi-Properties
	3.7 Intentional Objects
	3.8 A Dangerous Confusion
	3.9 Paint That Doesn’t Point
	3.10 Spatial Experience
Chapter 4: Introspection, Adverbialism, and Rich Contents
	4.1 Not Sense Data
	4.2 Awareness
	4.3 Transparency Revisited
	4.4 The Complications of Attention
	4.5 Introspection of Experience
	4.6 Contentful Mental States
	4.7 Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument
	4.8 Talking about Experience
	4.9 Red Squares and Green Circles
	4.10 Rich Sensory Contents
	4.11 Very Rich Sensory Contents
References
Index
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